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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis examines the strategic leadership, and the high level direction, of the Royal Air 
Force’s contribution to the strategic air offensive against Germany. It takes the conceptual 
thinking, the organisational aspects and the leadership required to bring it into being, from 
its inception in the First World War through to 1945. The thesis uses modern 
understanding of strategic (or senior) leadership as an analytical tool.  The realm of 
strategic leadership is complex, and ambiguous, and the senior leaders required high levels 
of intellectual capacity to cope with the survival of the force and its subsequent rapid to 
meet the rising threat from Germany. The senior leaders, political and military, 
acknowledged that their methods of warfare must be just, and the thesis examines the 
legality and morality of the planning and conduct of the offensive. A key facet of strategic 
leadership is the setting of the vision and purpose of the enterprise and the thesis examines 
the challenges that arose from the competing views on how the offensive should be waged. 
Genuine strategic leadership requires dexterity in working at the interfaces with other 
organisations, or Allies, and the thesis examines the complexities of the Combined Bomber 
Offensive and Overlord.  
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Chapter One 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Leadership, the so-called Warrior‟s Art, has been an inherent part of military 
consciousness for as long as historians, and warriors themselves, have been recording their 
thoughts.
1
  For example, Kolenda quotes from Xenophon to explain that leaders needed 
mental agility as well physical might in order to achieve great deeds.
2
  The requirement for 
intellectual capacity at senior levels is a recurring theme in this analysis.  The American 
historian, turned leadership writer, James MacGregor Burns wrote: „Leadership is one of 
the most observed and least understood phenomena on earth‟.3  This may be so; the 
extensive literature on leadership seems to confirm Burns‟ statement, but the association of 
good leadership with achievement of results also remains a consistent theme.  People look 
to their leaders for an appealing vision and trust them to take them in the direction most 
likely to achieve mutually beneficial results.  In more extreme circumstances, leaders are 
required to build trust, set standards of performance, display personal courage and 
rationalise sacrifice.
4
 
 
 There are many definitions of leadership, to the point that almost every author has 
his or her own.
5
  For the purposes of this dissertation the definition of leadership espoused 
by the United Kingdom Defence Leadership and Management Centre (DLMC) will be 
used: 
                                                 
1
 Christopher D. Kolenda, (ed.), Leadership: The Warrior’s Art (Carlisle PA: Army War College Foundation 
Press, 2001).  
2
 Kolenda, ibid., „What is Leadership? Some Classical Ideas‟, p. 3.  General Barry R. McCaffrey (US Army, 
Retired) in the Foreword also appeals to the Ancients with mention of Plato: p. xi. 
3
 James MacGregor Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper, 1979), p. 2. 
4
 Lieutenant General Walter F. Ulmer Jr., „Introduction‟, in Kolenda, Leadership: The Warrior’s Art, p. xxxi.  
5
 Burns, Leadership, p.2. 
2 
 
Leadership is visionary; it is the projection of personality and character to inspire 
the team to achieve the desired outcome. There is no prescription for leadership and 
no prescribed style of leader.  Leadership is a combination of example, persuasion 
and compulsion dependant on the situation.  It should aim to transform and be 
underpinned by individual skills and an enabling ethos.  The successful leader is an 
individual who understands him/herself, the organisation, the environment in which 
they operate and the people that they are privileged to lead.
6
 
 
The DLMC differentiates leadership from command and management. Command is a 
„position of authority and responsibility to which military men and women are legally 
appointed‟.  Management is „the allocation and control of resources (human, material and 
financial) to achieve objectives‟.7  These definitions are comprehensive in their own right.  
Nevertheless, it is the relationship between them, in a given context, that will often 
determine the success of the leader and of the wider enterprise. 
 
 It may seem axiomatic that where there are leaders, there should also be followers 
and colleagues.
8
  It is, nevertheless, vital that the relationships between them are sound.  In 
Leadership in the Trenches, Sheffield stresses the importance of the relationship between 
men and their officers for the well-being of the force.
9
  At a higher level, Cohen 
emphasises the importance of relations between soldiers and statesmen pointing out that, 
especially in wartime, the stakes are great.
10
  Tension in relationships, at any level, can be 
due to many factors including differences in background, outlook, approach and 
personality.  These differences may be accentuated at the top of organisations where the 
                                                 
6
 Quoted in Air Commodore Peter W. Gray and Jonathan Harvey, „Strategic Leadership Education‟, in 
Colonel Bernd Horn and Lieutenant-Colonel Allister MacIntyre (eds.) In Pursuit of Excellence: International 
Perspectives of Military Leadership (Kingston ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006), p. 91.  
7
 Gray and Harvey, ibid. The full definitions are at Appendix 1. 
8
 In innumerable conversations following 360 degree reporting debriefs on the Defence Strategic Leadership 
Programme, run by the DLMC which the author directed for nearly four years, reports and comment from 
direct colleagues were almost invariably the most telling. 
9
 G. D. Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches: Officer-Men Relations, Morale and Discipline in the British 
Army in the Era of the First World War (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. xxi. 
10
 Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime (New York: The Free 
Press, 2002), p. 2. 
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pressure is greater. But the whole issue is complicated by the reality that senior leaders are 
also responsible for the leadership of the organisation as a whole and not just for their 
behaviour as leaders in direct relationships.
11
 This concept must be extended to the 
requirement for the senior leader to be able to work across the range of „silos‟, many of 
which he or she will have no immediate experience; the danger in this is that the leader 
will overly concentrate on the „silo‟ from which they were promoted, to the exclusion of 
the others and risk micro-management and the diversion of effort. Depending on 
personalities, egos and interdependencies, there is a risk that the organisation could come 
under the sway of an individual.  But far more regularly, the pinnacle of the organisation 
will be run by a top team.    Kakabadse points out that the senior management team is a 
group of individuals who are specifically brought together for the purpose of planning and 
clarifying direction – unlike a middle management team which is primarily task 
orientated.
12
  This is as relevant in the military environment as it is in the board room of a 
major company.
13
 
 
 In complex military structures, as with multi-national conglomerates, it is highly 
unlikely that the board, or top team, will be able to act in isolation.  Rather, they will have 
to work alongside other elements of the organisation, or in a hierarchical relationship.  The 
interfaces between these elements can be critical to the success, or otherwise, of the whole 
enterprise.  It is the role of the senior leaders to facilitate these interfaces.
14
  The interfaces 
                                                 
11
 James G. Hunt, Leadership: A New Synthesis (London: Sage, 1991), p. 4.  See also Kimberley B. Boal and 
Robert Hooijberg, „Strategic Leadership research: Moving On‟, Leadership Quarterly, 11 (2001), pp. 515-
549.  For the extension of Hunt‟s work into the military context see Leonard Wong, Paul Bliese and Dennis 
McGurk, „Military leadership: A context specific review‟, Leadership Quarterly, 14 (2003), pp. 657-692. 
12
 Andrew Kakabadse and Nada Kakabadse, Essence of Leadership (London: Thomson, 1999), pp. 298-299. 
13
 See, for example, John Keegan, The Mask of Command: A Study of Generalship (London: Pimlico, 1999 
[1987]), pp. 40-44. 
14
 See Hunt, Leadership: A New Synthesis, p. 71 for the stratified systems theory approach.  For a more 
conventional view, see John Adair, Effective Strategic Leadership (London: Pan, 2003), p. 95. 
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may work seamlessly. Alternatively they can be subject to the same frustrations and 
difficulties as interpersonal relationships.  Causes of friction can emerge from any of the 
areas where senior leaders hold specific jurisdiction, especially formulation of strategy and 
the apportionment of resources.
15
  An inevitable consequence of senior leadership in the 
public sector is the complicating factor of political involvement.  This is a permanent 
feature of public life, but was all the more prevalent under Churchill‟s premiership; 
Alanbrooke‟s Diaries have provided ample evidence.16 
 
 Given the controversial nature of its strategy, and for many people its potential to 
be a war-winning force, the senior leaders responsible for the formulation, and execution, 
of the strategic bombing offensive against Germany were under considerable pressure to 
deliver the results expected.
17
 This thesis seeks to examine the challenges faced by the 
leaders, at the various stages of development of the offensive from its early inception in the 
First World War, through the years where aerial bombardment was under threat of 
abolition, to the Second World War. The challenges were complicated by the unknown 
nature of the offensive which was being planned; the concepts had neither been tried, nor 
the technology proven. As the war progressed from phoney to total, the very flexibility of 
air power compounded the difficulties in that it could be easily diverted to other tasks and 
                                                 
15
 This was particularly true of the discussion in Chiefs of Staff meetings in the mid-1930s.  See, for example 
Brian Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980).  Bond is far 
eloquent on the subject than his air counterpart H. Montgomery Hyde, British Air Policy Between the Wars 
1918- 1939 (London: Heinemann, 1976). 
16
 Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, War Diaries 1939-1945, ed. Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman, (London: 
Wiedenfeld & Nicholson, 2001); see, for example, p. 331 for a heated debate on the employment of bombers 
over Germany rather than Tunisia in support of ground troops. 
17
 There are many books on the evolution of strategy for the bombing offensive, but one of the most 
persuasive, and scholarly, is Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of 
British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914 – 1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press 
2002).  
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other theatres of war. The iteration of the vision and purpose of the enterprise is a recurring 
theme in the strategic leadership literature. 
 
The Literature 
The literature on leadership in general is extensive, with an occasionally uneasy overlap 
between the battlefield and the boardroom.
18
  Beyond these works, the leadership genre has 
been broadly contributed to by four areas of academic endeavour.  The particular areas are: 
the works of the successful businessmen; the psychology field (including occupational and 
organisational); the social scientists; and the broad historical church.  At the strategic 
leadership level, the literature review must also take into account the wider field of 
organisational design (arguably this could be encapsulated into organisational psychology, 
but the work of Mintzberg et al goes further than this).
19
  These will be tackled, in turn, in 
the Leadership section of the Review.  From a military perspective
20
, the issue of 
leadership is inextricably linked with command (and management); the „command genre‟ 
will therefore be tackled next.
21   The exploits of Bomber Command have also generated a 
wide field of material.  This review of the literature will examine each in turn. 
 
                                                 
18
 See for example, Manfred Kets de Vries, „Doing an Alexander: Lessons on Leadership by a Master 
Conqueror‟, European Management Journal, 17 (2006), pp. 138-245 and Alan Axelrod, Patton on 
Leadership: Strategic Lessons for Corporate Warfare (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1999).  This genre 
frequently adorns the shelves of airport bookstores, but need not be considered further for the purposes of this 
thesis. 
19
 H. Mintzberg, „The Fall and Rise of Strategic Planning‟, Harvard Business Review, Jan/Feb 1994, pp.107– 
14. 
20
 The civilian world tends to have an issue with the word „command‟; this stems from a fundamental 
misunderstanding that military leaders rely almost exclusively on orders.  The reality is that virtually 
everyone has someone else set in authority over them.  
21
 See Peter W. Gray and Sebastian Cox (Eds.), Air Power Leadership: Theory and Practice (London: The 
Stationary Office, 2002).  The chapter by Howieson and Kahn tackles this relationship where Gray looks at 
Dowding in each of these categories. 
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 The works of successful business people tend to illustrate the subject‟s (the 
majority are autobiographical) rise to fame and the leadership lessons gleaned in the 
process.
22
  These sources are very specific to the upper echelons of the business world and 
rarely have any theoretical underpinning.  Furthermore, they rarely have a historical 
context and will therefore not be considered further.  The more academic facet of business 
school literature is sizeable, albeit with a variable standard.  Much of the work is empirical, 
being based on consultancy opportunities with companies (and individuals).
23
  Again, these 
works will not impinge further on the thesis. 
  
One of the better examples of the business school literature merging into social 
science from the United Kingdom is by Grint who examines the concept of leadership as 
an „array of arts‟ against which individuals and scenarios are examined.24  Although Grint 
generally avoids the trap, many of his contemporaries are highly selective over their choice 
of case study ensuring that history is used to support the theory.  In his most recent book, 
Grint uses the concept of „Tame, Wicked and Critical problems‟ and applies this theory to 
a number of events on D-Day to illustrate their applicability.
25
 This thesis specifically aims 
to use the leadership theory as an analytical tool, rather than select examples from history. 
                                                 
22
 Examples include Jack Welch, Jack: What I’ve learned leading a great company and great people 
(London: Headline, 2001). 
23
 For some of the better examples, see Jim Collins, Good to Great: why some Companies Make the Leap… 
and Others don’t (London: Random House, 2001), and Stephen R. Covey, The 7 Habits of Highly Effective 
People; Powerful Lessons in Personal Change (London: Simon & Schuster, 1989).  The gist of the genre can 
be appreciated with the amazing discovery of an 8
th
 habit – Stephen R. Covey, The 8th Habit: From 
Effectiveness to Greatness (London: Simon & Schuster, 2004). 
24
 Keith Grint, The Arts of Leadership (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).  Grint has been a Reader in 
Organisational Behaviour at Said Business School, Oxford and then Director of the Lancaster Leadership 
Centre.  More recently, he became Deputy Principal Leadership and Management with Cranfield University 
within the Defence Academy and worked alongside the author.   
25
 Keith Grint, Leadership, Management and Command: Rethinking D-Day (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008), ch. 1. 
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„Wicked‟ problems, to which there is not a linear solution, will recur during the 
examination of the senior leadership challenge. 
  
As the scientific content increases, a wide subset of leadership work has been 
produced by psychologists.  The majority of these are specialists in either occupational or 
organisational psychology.  Although much of their work is characterised by their attempts 
to give their research a high degree of scientific and methodological rigour, some 
researchers do use historical case studies.  The most extreme of these took official 
despatches, battle orders and published letters from the American Civil War archives; from 
these documents, they derived estimates of the cognitive complexity scores of six Civil 
War Generals (Burnside, Grant, Hooker, Lee, McClellan and Meade).
26
  Similar 
approaches have been used to develop personality profiles of key leaders from letters and 
diaries; others have used biographies and autobiographies.
27
  Notwithstanding these 
examples, very few works utilise an historical context.  Despite the scope for history to 
provide both data and context, social scientists tend to eschew these sources on the grounds 
that the data is insufficiently precise for them to be able to measure leadership accurately 
(demonstrating repeatability etc).
28
  Their preference is for surveys (of living people) that 
can be analysed as hard data.  Most historical references tend to be illustrative and 
therefore tend to have been selectively chosen to match the hypothesis under discussion.   
 
                                                 
26
 P. Suedfeld, R. S. Corteen and C McCormick, „ The Role of Integrative Complexity in Military 
Leadership: Robert E. Lee and his opponents‟, [Special Issue: Applications of Social Psychology to military 
issues], Journal of Applied Social Psychology, (1986) 16, pp. 498 – 507. 
27
 An example of this approach is Howard Gardner, Leading Minds: An Anatomy of Leadership (London: 
Harper Collins, 1997) who uses a cognitive approach (i.e. concentrating on the human mind) with portraits of 
senior leaders and their relationships with their followers.   
28
 Allan English, The Masks of Command: Leadership Differences in the Canadian Army, Navy, and Air 
Force, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, 25-27 
October 2002. Kingston, Ontario, Canada.  Available on 
<www.rmc.ca/academic/conference/iuscanada/papers/english_commandpaper.pdf>. 
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The next discrete area worthy of consideration is that occupied by the social 
scientists; they have either produced stand-alone pieces or, more often, have contributed to 
business school curricula.  A number of these use historical examples to illustrate ideas put 
forward.  This case study approach is also widely used by psychologists and will be dealt 
with below.  Probably the best known and most influential author is James MacGregor 
Burns, who was cited earlier in the Introduction. In their chapter entitled „A New Vision of 
Leadership‟ Sahkin and Rosenbach describe Burns‟ Leadership as „ground breaking work 
of a political scientist and historian‟.29  Burns‟ work was taken forward by Bernard M. 
Bass to look at leadership as either transactional or transformational.
30
  In the former, Bass 
argues that the leader could either be laissez-faire; lead by contingent reward (through 
either a contract or carrot and stick approach); or manage by exception.  For an ideal 
example of this contractual approach in a Bomber Command scenario, Musgrove cites the 
30-sortie tour of duty as being his contract with the Service and made it a replacement for 
leadership.
31
  What Musgrove omitted to mention was that after a six month rest period, 
crews were returned for a further full tour!  Transformational leadership involves 
„Charisma‟, „Inspiration‟, „Individualised Consideration‟ and „Intellectual Stimulation‟.  
This unlocks the ability and motivation so ordinary people do extraordinary things. 
 
No review of leadership literature would be complete without reference to the work 
of John Adair.  His work is well known throughout the UK military officer corps.  He was 
a Sandhurst academic who, in the 1960s, was sent off to garner current thinking on 
                                                 
29
 Marshall Sashkin and William E. Rosenbach, Á New Vision of Leadership‟, p. 50, in Robert L. Taylor and 
William E. Rosenbach, eds., Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence, 4
th
 edn. (Oxford: Westview Press, 
2000). 
30
 Bernard M. Bass, Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations (London: Macmillan, 1985) and 
Transformational Leadership, Industrial, Military and Educational Impact (Mahwah NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, 1998). 
31
Frank Musgrove, Dresden and the Heavy Bombers: An RAF Navigator’s Perspective (Barnsley: Pen & 
Sword, 2005), p. 44.  
9 
 
leadership theory in an effort to bring teaching up to date in the Royal Military Academy 
Sandhurst.  He devised a model of functional leadership based on the now legendary three 
circles arranged in a Venn diagram; the circles represent „Team‟, „Individual‟ and „Task‟ 
needs, set within a specific context.  He then defines a common set of functions: „Defining 
the task‟; „Planning‟; „Briefing‟; „Controlling‟; „Supporting‟; „Informing‟; and 
„Reviewing‟.  This approach has been adopted by each of the Initial Officer Training 
establishments, not least because it provides a controlled mechanism for running training 
exercises.  Adair has sold many books based on this simple theory and is adamant in his 
discussions that no other theory of leadership is necessary – his three circles do the job.32  
What becomes interesting is that his work is rarely, if ever, cited outside of the military 
context.  The behavioural science community do not believe that it has any intellectual or 
scientific rigour.  Adair‟s predictable riposte is that his theory has stood the test of time in 
the most demanding of academies.  He contends that Leadership training should be based 
„on the established body of knowledge‟ – i.e. his work.33   
 
 Adair‟s work provides a useful transition from general leadership theory to the 
strategic leadership literature. Adair expanded his model of team, task and individual needs 
to embrace seven strategic functions:
34
  
 Providing  Direction for the Organisation as a Whole – Purpose/Vision 
 Getting Strategy and Policy right – Strategic Thinking and Planning 
                                                 
32
 John Adair, Effective Leadership; How to Develop Leadership Skills (London: Gower, 1993).  John Adair, 
Effective Teambuilding; How to make a Winning Team (London: Gower, 1986). 
John Adair, Inspiring Leadership; Learning from Great Leaders (London: Thorogood, 2002). 
John Adair, Great Leaders (Guildford: Talbot Adair Press, 1989). 
John Adair, Developing Leaders; The Ten Key principles (Guildford: Talbot Adair Press, 1988). 
33
 See the interview by Sue Weeks in The Edge, (the House Magazine of the Institute of Leadership and 
Management), September 2005, „Professor versus Professor‟ in which Adair and Professor Keith Grint (then 
Director of the Lancaster Leadership Centre) exchange views on the nature of  leadership education and 
training. 
34
 Adair, Effective Strategic Leadership, p. 95. 
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 Making it Happen – Operational  and Administrative functions 
 Organise/Reorganise – Making the organisation fit for purpose 
 Release the Corporate Spirit – Energy, Morale, Confidence, Esprit de Corps 
 Relate the organisation to others and to broader society – Allies, Partners, 
Stakeholders 
 Develop today and tomorrow‟s leaders – Succession Planning the long term view 
 
These bullets are emphasised to a greater or lesser extent in the wider strategic leadership 
literature. The language contained therein will recur generally throughout the analysis, 
with the inter-linkage of direction and „vision and purpose‟ a consistent element. 
 
 A number of authors have confirmed the intuitive assertion that a senior leader‟s 
personality can become imprinted on the organisation.
35
 Furthermore, the top team can 
define the values of the organisation and create a social structure which embodies them.
36
  
There is considerable consistency in the literature on the strategic leader‟s responsibility 
for setting the vision and direction of the organisation.
37
  While high-level directional 
leadership is often associated with charisma, it is by no means essential.
38
 When discussed 
in a disciplined leadership context, charisma must be analysed through the subjective lens 
of the followers and not on absolute, or objective, scale.
39
  This has particular importance 
should one consider looking at Harris‟s personality when he was Commander-in-Chief (C-
                                                 
35
 D. Miller and C. Droge, „Psychological and Traditional Determinants of Structure‟, Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 31(1986), pp. 539-560. 
36
 P. Selznick, Leadership in Administration (New York: Harper and Row, 1957). 
37
 J.P. Kotter, A Force for Change: How Leadership Differs from Management (New York: Free Press, 
1990).  M. Sashkin, „The Visionary Leader‟, in J.A. Conger and R.N. Kanungo, eds., Charismatic 
Leadership: The Elusive Factor in Organisational Effectiveness, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1988).  See 
also William L. Gardner III and John R. Schermerhorn Jr., „Strategic Operational Leadership and the 
Management of Supportive Work Environments‟, in R. L. Phillips and J. G. Hunt, eds., Strategic Leadership: 
A Multiorganizational-Level Perspective, (Westport CT: Quorum, 1992).  This work was based on 
contributions to a conference supported by the United States Army Institute for Behavioural and social 
Sciences and the United States Army War College held in February 1991. 
38
 Sashkin, „The Visionary Leader‟. 
39
 Sashkin, „The Visionary Leader‟. See also B.M. Bass, Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations,  
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in-C).
40
  Notwithstanding the issue of charisma, Gardner and Schermerhorn point out that 
strategic leaders need to be able to cope with cognitive complexity; be self-reliant; have a 
strong motivation; be able to develop a value-based vision; then develop policies and 
programmes for implementing that vision; and finally, engage in behaviours that reflect the 
values inherent in the vision.
41
  Further characteristics have been identified including the 
ability to make abstract ideas clear; being caring; possessing good communication skills; 
and a consistency between words and actions over time.
42
  Although a number of these 
concepts will recur, there is a distinct risk of taking these lists to extremes and the 
temptation of trying to match individual against them could be seen as an extension to trait 
theory which was in vogue in the inter-war years, but is now less fashionable.
43
 
 
Adair‟s theme of „making it happen‟ is reflected elsewhere in the literature.  Kotter, for 
example, refers to this as a management function.
44
  Gardner and Schermerhorn highlight 
that strategic leadership involves a degree of operational responsibility, in that the 
organisation must have the internal capacity to be able to pursue the task on a sustained 
basis.
45
  An extension of this may reflect the leadership‟s attitude to technology and the 
organisation‟s ability to make the linkages between people, processes and technology.46 
 
                                                 
40
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the  interviews with Lancaster veterans in 101 Squadron Association conducted when the author was officer 
commanding and president of the Association. 
41
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42
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Dynamics, 34(2005), p. 48. 
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The strategic leadership literature has therefore several offerings that can underpin the 
analysis of the leadership of Bomber Command and its relationship with the Air Ministry 
and these will be expanded upon below.  But as Boal and Hooijberg point out, there has 
been little contemporary (let alone historical) work done on the environmental and 
organisational context that surrounds the conditions, timing and rationale of the leaders‟ 
decisions.
47
  A combination of the top team and their immediate context therefore 
represents a practical way forward. 
 
The literature on command and leadership, and their inter-relationship, follows a 
traditional mix of monographs and collections of papers.  The key texts will be dealt with 
in turn.  Cohen takes four wartime leaders – Churchill, Lincoln, Clemenceau and Ben 
Gurion – and examines how they worked with their generals.48  He contends that all four 
were successful, comfortable with technology and avid students of warfare.  Much of the 
early part of this book has resonance with the importance of key relations at the very 
pinnacle, or apex, of strategic decision making.
49
  Cohen points out that senior leaders have 
basic common tasks such as setting direction, choosing subordinates, monitoring 
performance, inspiring achievement and handling external constituencies.  He takes this 
latter point further, stating that in wartime the stakes are exceptionally high and gaps in 
knowledge and mutual understanding so great; these factors are exacerbated by differences 
in background and personality.  Relationships are therefore critically important, not just to 
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48
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the military historian, but to anyone involved in the study of leadership.
50
 In his chapter on 
Churchill, Cohen is taken with the idea of artistry, by which he means the ability to 
combine technical detail with an overall sense of where the whole is going; he takes this 
concept from Churchill‟s own comparison of statesmanship with painting.  Inevitably, the 
technical detail is vital to achieving the decisive edge and strategic leaders need to be 
comfortable with the ambiguity symptomatic of a time of radical change and innovation.  
 
For the purpose of this literature review, Cohen provides a key text.  His focus on 
civil military relations is key to the discussion on leadership. Although it is a statement of 
the obvious to point out that Cohen does not deal with Bomber Command, his introductory 
comments do highlight the importance of relationships between political leaders and their 
senior generals. This adds to the complexity of the task facing the senior military leaders in 
that they have to recognise that, even in wartime, politics impact on the formulation of 
strategy.  
 
Van Creveld in Command in War investigates the historical evolution of command, 
control and communications – C3 in the modern jargon.51  He discusses the nature of 
command and describes its prime function as visiting death and destruction on the enemy 
within the shortest period of time and at minimum loss – something which the architects of 
the bomber offensive would associate themselves.  Such an approach is, however, at odds 
with international legal, and ethical, notions of discrimination and proportionality.  These 
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will be dealt with in a later chapter, but suffice it to say that Van Creveld‟s work has been 
subject to challenge in a number of areas.
52
  
 
John Keegan, in his oft-cited work The Mask of Command, looks at the activities of 
four military leaders – Alexander the Great, Wellington, Grant and Hitler.53  He portrays 
them in the light of being an archetypal hero, anti-hero, unheroic and a false hero 
respectively.  In his introduction, Keegan deliberately attempts to distance himself from 
social scientists who have tried to seek universality from the traits and behaviours of 
generals.  Rather, he posits that the demands of generalship (which is more than merely 
command in the field) will be determined by the context.  Keegan looks at a range of 
command functions, and, critically for this review, looks at the support proffered by the 
generals‟ top teams – the staff.  Unfortunately, Keegan does not offer a theoretical 
underpinning for this inclusion, but merely describes them. 
 
There are a number of historical works that focus on failure in war.
54
  The genre 
that detail mishaps in general will not be discussed further.  Pois and Langer‟s work, 
Command Failure in War: Psychology and Leadership, includes a chapter on Churchill, 
Harris and strategic bombing.
55
  This chapter is unhelpful as it seeks to castigate the main 
proponents for a pointless offensive.  As with so many works that have „leadership‟ in the 
title, the discussion is actually more centred on the „leaders‟, omitting any real discussion 
on how they carried their role or office – or their relationship with the organisation at 
                                                 
52
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which these individuals were the head.  The psychological element of their discussion 
concentrates on the role of trial and error in animal behaviour experiments and seeks to 
draw parallels with Harris‟s inflexible and dogmatic adherence to bombing doctrine.  The 
chapter concludes, somewhat disingenuously, with an admission that the complexity of 
attrition warfare was such that limited benefit had actually resulted from sticking to the 
task.  
 
In terms of closing in on the literature directly pertinent to the Second World War 
and, in particular, the Bomber Command experience, there are a number of chapters in 
edited works.  Brian Farrell‟s examination of Leadership and Responsibility in the Second 
World War, provides a collection of essays in tribute to the life of Robert Vogel.
56
  Farrell, 
in his introduction, wrestles with definitions of leadership ranging from Harry S. Truman‟s 
desk sign stating the buck stopped with him through to issues of accountability – an 
important concept when looking at the waging of total war at an extreme beyond the 
realms of moral philosophy.  Paul D. Dickson in his chapter „Colonials and Coalitions: 
Canadian-British Command Relations between Normandy and the Scheldt‟ serves to 
emphasise the complexity of leadership at the strategic levels when dealing with coalition 
partners.
57
  Although Dickson barely mentions the air component, he sets a useful reminder 
that the relationship between allies adds further complexity to the leadership challenge. 
This can be complicated yet more if the decision making levels of authority between the 
partners do not exactly align; if there is a break down in communications; or if 
interpersonal relations become strained. Each of these facets will emerge in Chapter 6. 
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Sheffield‟s work on Leadership and Command takes a series of papers produced 
through the auspices of the British Commission for Military History.
58
  A recurring theme 
from the papers contained therein is the relationship between leadership and command.  
John Bourne‟s chapter, „British Generals in the First World War‟, points out that failures in 
leadership often resulted in dramatic failures on the battlefield.
59
  As the war progressed, 
the more able started to rise through the ranks, resulting in a shift towards a meritocracy.  
Furthermore, senior leaders are a product of their own backgrounds, with important lessons 
for the subsequent study of Bomber Command personnel.
60
  Although Goulter admits to 
„Harris fatigue’ [emphasis in the original], her paper on Harris fills usefully a gap in the 
historiography by concentrating on Harris in his time as Air Officer Commanding (AOC) 5 
Group and as the DCAS.
61
 The thesis will touch on Harris‟s role in the latter appointment. 
 
Brian Bond and Kyoichi Tachikawa in their British and Japanese Military 
Leadership in the Far Eastern War, 1941 -1945
62
, include chapters on air operations, with 
Michael Dockrill contributing for the British and Hisayuki for the Japanese
63
.  The very 
specific theatre of operations precludes any overlap with Bomber Command leadership, 
but the contest for resources at the very senior echelons will need further consideration. 
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Conrad C. Crane, writing in Kolenda‟s collection, Leadership: The Warrior’s Art 
looks at LeMay‟s leadership role and the ethics of the fire-bombing of Japanese cities.64  
Crane describes the circumstances leading up to LeMay‟s switch to low level incendiary 
raids in some detail, strongly suggesting that tactical considerations and effectiveness were 
of greater importance than ethical debate.  The fire-bombing of Tokyo in March 1945 was 
followed by a psychological operation involved in leaflet dropping over major cities.  This 
resulted in an exodus of 6.5 million civilians from their homes causing huge disruption.  
(There is a common theme here with the escalating war in Europe in which changes were 
more a result of tactical expediency than the consequences of high level policy 
considerations.)
 65
  The archetypical philosophical conversation over the bombing of Japan 
has centred on the conclusion that the firestorms and the nuclear deliveries prevented huge 
loss of American (and Japanese) lives in removing the need for an invasion of the home 
islands.  This may well be true, but the debate is complicated by the then widespread, 
absolute loathing of the Japanese as a race.  The ethical debate over the bombing of 
Germany is more complex and understanding of the pressures on the leadership is not 
helped by the tendency of modern writers to impose a modern interpretation of 
international law, ethics and philosophy.
66
   
 
There can, however, be no doubt that ethical (and legal) considerations are a 
fundamental element of strategic leadership. Contemporary leadership theory considers 
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legal and ethical issues as being of increasing importance as the leader becomes more 
senior.
67
  The inter-relationship between decision-making on the basis of what is ethically 
right and what is legal is more complex than at first sight.  This is especially true when the 
law, whether in the commercial sphere or in international relations, is in the process of 
development.
68
  This is certainly true in the retrospective analysis of the bombing 
campaigns spawning another discrete genre of literature.  Bomber Command has had its 
share of critics including works such A. C. Grayling‟s Among the Dead Cities.69  These 
criticisms tend to adopt contemporary jurisprudential thinking along with ethical language 
that was not in common use at the time that senior leaders were actually making the 
decisions.  It is nevertheless, an important area and will be examined, from the perspective 
of the leadership challenge, in later chapters. 
 
Two key texts on leadership and Bomber Command are Mark Wells, Courage and 
Air Warfare, and Allan English, The Cream of the Crop.
 70
  Both works represent the 
authors‟ doctoral theses.  Wells analyses aircrew selection, reaction to combat, morale, 
leadership and ability to withstand the stress of flying.
71
  He provides an excellent chapter 
on the importance of leadership at the group level and below emphasising the vital need for 
good people to be at squadron commander level if the units are to operate effectively.  
English looks critically at the Canadian experience over the Second World War, again with 
an emphasis on the human dimensions. 
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In terms of the relationship between senior Bomber Command commanders and 
their „colleagues‟ in the Air Ministry, Cox‟s analysis in Gray and Cox, Air Power 
Leadership: Theory and Practice, is excellent
72
 and is worth reading in parallel with 
Biddle‟s chapter in the same volume which describes Portal‟s relationship with Churchill.73  
These relationships, primarily in the context of the development of bombing policy and 
doctrine are also covered in Biddle‟s Rhetoric and Reality.74 In the academic arena, the 
unpublished thesis by Cording deals with the relationship between the Air Ministry and 
Harris in considerable detail and draws heavily on the Bufton Papers; this will be covered 
in a later chapter.
75
 
 
The more general works on Bomber Command have little specific discussion on 
leadership issues in general, nor on the relationship between Bomber Command and the 
Air Ministry.  As a number of the more influential works draw heavily on the Official 
History, that will be dealt with first.
76
  The four volume set on The Strategic Air Offensive 
against Germany 1939-1945 was compiled by Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland 
and published in 1960.
77
  The first point to note with this work is that it just tackles the 
strategic bomber offensive and is not, therefore, the official history of Bomber Command. 
It has, however, come to be viewed as such and this has tended to skew the historiography 
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and much of the subsequent debate.
78
 That Webster and Frankland do not tackle leadership 
head on is not through their lack of interest in the subject; rather it reflects the notion that 
the art and science of leadership as a subject in its own right has tended to be a post-war 
phenomenon.
79
  The attitudes towards leadership of those serving at the time, and their 
debt to the „Trenchard legacy‟, will be dealt with at the start of Chapter 2 where it leads 
into the formulation of, and adherence to, doctrinal thinking. 
 
One area on which Webster and Frankland do concentrate was the deterioration in 
the relationship between Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris when he was C-in-C and the 
CAS, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal, in 1944.
80
  The great extent to 
which the „Whitehall machine‟ attempted to dampen the implied criticism of Portal caused 
Webster and Frankland considerable angst at the time of writing and stoked much 
controversy on publication.
81
  The Harris/Portal relationship will be looked at in more 
detail in a subsequent chapter where it will be dealt with in its own right, but also in the 
context of the impact that high level spats have on the associated top teams and their 
relationships. 
 
A key difficulty in using Webster and Frankland as a basis for a history of Bomber 
Command is the problem of deciding just which of the raids, campaigns or offensives were 
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strategic in nature, which were designed to support operations leading up to the invasion of 
France and which were in support of other Commands.  Both Hastings and Verrier draw 
heavily on Webster and Frankland and this theme is evident in both.
82
  Hastings, for much 
of his work, follows a narrative theme linking the development of bombing policy with 
first-hand accounts of some of the major raids.  His occasional forays into leadership issues 
concentrate on Harris as an individual.
83
  Neither author looks in any depth at the 
relationship between the two organisations.
84
 
 
Beyond Hastings and Verrier, there are many books on Bomber Command at the 
tactical level that have little, if any, relation to this thesis.  This trend is typical of that 
identified by Black in Rethinking Military History in which he laments the tendency for 
military historians to become compartmentalised concentrating „largely on developments 
at the front‟.85  Ironically, this trend is very much mirrored in the leadership field with a 
preponderance of studies at the lower management levels; this reflects the difficulty in 
obtaining study samples of higher level executives.
86
 
 
The vast majority of the contemporary leadership literature focuses on, 
unsurprisingly, the individual.
87
  This inevitably ranges from „great man‟ theory, through 
trait (and neo-trait) theory, transformational, situational, functional, emotional intelligence 
into the business world of „gurus‟ and the magical number lottery – pick your favourite 
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number and there will be an appropriate number of „habits‟ or traits.  Some work has been 
done on psycho-history, but the lack of methodology makes it unconvincing and will not 
be followed further.
88
  Biographical treatment of the key individuals has been attempted, 
albeit not in a leadership theory context.  The older biographies tend to the hagiographic 
which gloss over major areas of conflict, or are evidently biased to the benefit of their 
subject.
89
  Probert‟s biography of Harris is a much more balanced work.90 A more prolific 
author of Royal Air Force senior officer biographies, Vincent Orange, has dealt with a 
number of important men.  His work on Tedder is comprehensive in scope and approach, 
but that on Slessor is less so.
91
 
 
A review of the equivalent works on Second World War generals would reveal a 
specific genre that is absent from the air world.  There are a number of books reviewing the 
performance, in command, of senior army officers.  The earliest of these was by C. N. 
Barclay who took a series of case studies of generals from the early days of the War.
92
 
Others effectively look at the same officers in the context of them being Churchill‟s 
generals.
93
 In terms of relationships with Allies, which will feature strongly in Chapter 6, 
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Danchev‟s works on the relationships that Dill forged in Washington are significant.94 But 
there are no equivalent studies for, say, Slessor‟s time in Washington. Beyond the standard 
biographies, one of the more relevant works on leadership from a naval perspective is 
Roskill‟s The Art of Leadership in which he expresses his views on the essence of military 
leadership.
95
 Roskill draws on a wide range of examples from military and naval figures. 
This is an example of the use of „great man theory‟ which will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
 
In summary, the literature review can be characterised by paradoxes.  At first sight, 
there are vast numbers of books on leadership.  But the literature on strategic leadership is 
limited.  Likewise there is a huge range of material on Bomber Command, but little is 
focused on leadership and less still on the strategic leadership and direction of the 
campaign. Although Danchev‟s work on the relationships between Dill and the Americans 
suggests that there is considerable scope for these issues to be explored, apparently little 
work has been done on this for any of the services. Nor has work looked at the strategic 
leadership of a campaign from its inception to its conclusion using contemporary 
leadership theory as an analytical tool. 
 
The leadership literature strongly suggests that there is a paradigm shift in the 
challenge of moving up into the strategic arena. It would therefore be fruitful to 
concentrate on the modern theory of this transition in order to analyse the direction of the 
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Offensive.  This significant shift is consistent with the strategic studies literature which 
looks at the role of the senior commanders (the generals), and in particular the relationship 
between them and the politicians.
96
 The extensive literature on strategy formulation, senior 
leadership and policy generation – coupled with widely varying usage of similar 
terminology in the military context (contemporary and historical) risks confusion in 
analysis as trailed in the discussion on Webster and Frankland.  This issue will be covered 
in the next discrete section. 
 
Terminology 
The literature on strategic bombing uses „doctrine‟, „policy‟ and „strategy‟ to tell much the 
same story; „ideas‟, „thinking‟ and „planning‟ can be added to the lexicon.97  To prevent the 
risk of confusion, or duplication, some definition of key terms is necessary.  In the 
„strategic‟ leadership literature the terms „senior‟, „executive‟ and „strategic‟ are used 
interchangeably, often within the same book: Zaccaro goes on to confirm that only 
between 2% and 5% of the literature on leadership covers the senior area.
98
  In a military 
environment, there is a reluctance to use the first two of these titles, as „senior‟ embraces a 
range of ranks and „executive‟ either refers to an appointment or has inferences of civilian 
management terminology; hence „strategic leadership‟ is the marked preference.99   
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 In its broadest dictionary sense, „strategic‟ is seen as serving the ends of strategy; it 
also refers to those materials essential in fighting a war; but it also refers to those weapons 
that are „used for attacking an enemy‟s home territory as a longer-term military 
objective‟.100 Strategy in turn, comes from the Greek strategia – meaning „generalship‟.   
The first dictionary definition given is „the art of war‟; this is followed by the 
„management of an army, or armies in a campaign‟; the next version of the definition is 
„the art of moving troops, ships or aircraft etc. into favourable positions‟.  The final 
definition given is „a plan of action or policy in business or politics etc.‟.101  From these 
definitions it is clear that „strategy/strategic‟ could be taken to mean what anyone chose it 
to mean.  From a more purist military doctrinal viewpoint, strategy is instinctively linked 
to the higher organisation of defence and includes the art of developing and employing 
military forces with grand strategic objectives.
102
  It is axiomatic that, at the highest levels 
of international relations, the strategic levers of power encompass all aspects of 
government including industrial, economic, diplomatic, legal and political, as well as 
military. 
103
  The wider business nomenclature reinforces the high level nature of strategy 
formulation: 
Strategy is the direction and scope of an organisation over the long term which 
achieves advantage for the organisation through its configuration of resources 
within a changing environment to meet the needs of markets and to fulfil 
stakeholder expectations.
104
 [Emphasis added] 
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Among the authors on business strategy, Mintzberg acknowledges the linkage of, and 
differentiation between, strategy and tactics and acknowledges the long-standing debt that 
the business world owes to military thinking.
105
  Mintzberg also states that care must be 
taken not to label things simply as tactics or strategy, because perspectives will vary 
according to from where in the hierarchy the plan is viewed. 
 
 This issue is more complex in the typical military model which interposes 
„operations‟ between „strategy‟ and „tactics‟.  The last of these is very much the business of 
those involved in close contact with the enemy and represents the means by which local 
victory is achieved.  The operational level of war has historically embraced the theatre of 
operations in which a commander has control.  It is the level at which campaigns, and 
major operations, are planned and directed – usually in accordance with direction from the 
strategic level which, in turn, has political direction.  The strategic level maintains the 
overview of all theatres and other commands.
106
  A common thread running through these 
levels is the acquisition of resources at the highest governmental levels and the subsequent 
prioritisation of those resources, namely money, personnel and materiel.
107
  Competition 
for resources is inevitably intense, especially in the years immediately preceding a major 
conflict, during hostilities, and in the aftermath when the need to reduce public spending is 
paramount.  It is essentially the role of committees, such as the Chiefs of Staff, to decide 
upon the relative priorities.
108
  Contemporary doctrine acknowledges a degree of overlap in 
the levels of warfare and that the dynamic nature of conflict will result in interaction 
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between the levels.
109
  For much of the Bomber Command Offensive against Germany, the 
art of the operationally possible seriously influenced what could be sensibly planned at the 
strategic level.
110
 
For the purposes of this thesis, „strategy‟ will be used to refer to the higher 
organisation of, in this specific case, the Air Ministry and its development and employment 
of air power in the prosecution of grand strategic objectives – eventually the overthrow of 
the Axis forces.  In terms of the Bomber Command part in this, the thesis will follow the 
example set by Webster and Frankland in using the Strategic Air Offensive against 
Germany to refer to: „…direct attack on the enemy state with the object of depriving it of 
the means or the will to continue the war‟.111 It is immediately clear from this definition 
that Bomber Command operations over France would fall outside these terms.  So would 
attacks on Germany with other objectives in mind.  But it may be argued that all activity 
was grist to the mill.  The reality of the prioritisation of targets and the subsequent 
allocation of resources was to put real strain on individual relationships, on relationships 
between staffs and between allies; for example, the debate over targeting priorities in the 
run up to Overlord occasioned considerable friction between Portal, Harris and Tedder.  
These will be dealt with in some depth. 
 
 „Policy‟, again at its simplest dictionary definition, is the „course or principle of 
action adopted or proposed by a government, party, business, or individual etc‟.112 
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Thus policy can be formulated at each of the levels within an organisation.  In practical 
terms, the strategy projects the long term goals and higher aspirations.  The policy is an 
iteration of how this can be done.  A sub-set of the policy nomenclature is use of the term 
to represent a set of rules to supplement formal regulations.
113
  „Policy‟ could therefore be 
formulated on almost any subject. In most bureaucracies, it invariably is and the Air 
Ministry was no exception.
114
  For the purposes of this thesis, the term will be used in the 
context of senior decision making and not in terms of strategy formulation or doctrinal 
thinking. 
 
 „Doctrine‟ is, again at its simplest, „that which is taught‟.115  Although this 
definition may appeal to the dictionary writers, it has considerably less relevance for the 
military audience.  For them, however, doctrine has been defined as: 
fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of 
objectives.  Doctrine is authoritative, but requires judgement in application, it is 
dynamic and must be reviewed for relevance.
116
 
 
In the context of strategic bombing, this contemporary definition is not helpful in that 
doctrine is based upon both theory and practice.
117
  The concept was still unproven and the 
approach of many senior officers to the subject actually more closely reflected the religious 
definition of doctrine in which it is used to state „principles of belief‟.118  A more useful 
approach to this issue reflects that taken by Corbett in looking at the use of theoretical 
study.  He suggested that this type of doctrinal thinking allows politicians and military 
planners to be able to utilise „mental power and verbal apparatus‟ on a level playing 
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field.
119
  For the purposes of thesis, „doctrine‟ will be used sparingly and then to reflect 
„doctrinal thinking‟ in the Corbett sense, rather than the contemporary usage. 
 
Senior Leadership – The Underpinning Theory 
There are many definitions of leadership, management and command.
120
  For the purposes 
of this thesis, the definitions used by the United Kingdom Defence Academy are 
comprehensive and of sufficient authority.
121
  But as Katz and Kahn point out, there are 
significant qualitative differences between the requirements of junior and senior levels of 
leadership.
122
  Although leadership development should be a continuum through rank level 
within an organisation, contemporary literature emphasises the step changes between face-
to-face leadership and the running of an organisation.  Both Katz and Kahn, and more 
recently Day and Lord, consider lower level leaders to be primarily interested in the 
deployment of technical knowledge and the administration of an existing system (on the 
tacit assumption that it is fit for purpose even though it may not be).  Middle level leaders 
„interpret, and elaborate structure policy and strategy‟.123  Leaders at the top level „create 
organizational structure, formulate policy and develop corporate strategies‟.124   
 
 Day and Lord emphasise that the vast majority of practical organisations are open 
and must therefore interact with their environment.
125
  Although their table of direct and 
indirect influences is orientated towards the corporate world, the parallels with the thesis 
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topic are valid. Targets in the external environment include influence on Government 
policy and the acquisition of resources. Strategic planning and organisational design help 
to bring about adaptation to that environment.  This leads to the requirement, internally, to 
ensure that the organisation, management processes and reporting systems are in place and 
fit for purpose.  Organisation climate and culture must also be improved to increase 
employee motivation and commitment.
126
 
 
 Zaccaro adds that senior leadership is also concerned with longer time lines than 
the lower levels in the organisation.
127
  He goes on to synthesise the various models and 
has proposed the following definition of senior leadership: 
That set of activities directed toward the development and management of the 
organization as a whole, including all of its subcomponents, to reflect long-range 
policies and purposes that have emerged from the senior leader‟s interactions 
within the organization and his or her interpretations of the organization‟s external 
environment.
128
 
 
Zaccaro expands his own research by using Stratified Systems Theory and applying it to 
the United States Army; he contends that senior leadership embraces 3* and 4* grade 
officers – Air Marshal and Air Chief Marshal in Royal Air Force ranks.129  For the basis of 
the thesis, it will not be necessary to take this theory any further other than to acknowledge 
a considerable degree of consistency in the levels under consideration.  Likewise, 
Zaccaro‟s definition of senior leadership does not require significant overhaul.  It is, 
however, worth adding that the senior leader has to cope with increasingly complex tasks 
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brought about by the need to cope with the uncertainties, and risks, inherent in both the 
internal and external environments.
130
   
 
It is a moot point, at this stage, as to whether military education programmes, and 
systems of succession planning, identify and educate officers to fill these demanding 
requirements, in addition to them having the technical expertise and courage necessary to 
progress in their respective services.  This latter point has particular relevance to services 
such as the RAF where prowess as a pilot is essential to progress through the ranks, but 
may not be sufficient at the higher levels of command. Proficiency at the lower levels of 
leadership, as evinced by Katz and Kahn, may not necessarily qualify officers for the 
middle and senior levels of leadership.  Although it is outside the scope of the thesis to 
conduct an analysis of each of the officer‟s personal and professional attributes, succession 
planning is an integral part of the duties of the senior leader and this will be a consistent 
theme running through the chapters. 
 
The organisational theory literature is vast, as is that on the leadership of change.  
From an empirical approach, Jackson and Bramall have suggested, possibly simplistically, 
that real change in military affairs only comes about when three key factors come together: 
defeat, public opinion and cost.
131
  From a practical viewpoint, it could be argued that 
significant change in the political landscape could be added to this list whether it be in 
terms of liberal imperialism, pacifism or a narrow focus on economical determinants.  The 
modern literature emphasises the importance of this external environment on an 
organisation and how the senior leadership must take cognisance of it if they are to avoid 
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(potentially cataclysmic) failure.
132
 In the ideal world, a senior team will monitor this 
environment and make incremental change as appropriate; a top team will seek, from 
within their organisation, to influence their environment for the benefit of their 
organisation and to some extent this can seen in Trenchard‟s approach to RAF policy in 
1921 (see below).  Many historians, especially when dealing with inter-war strategy, policy 
and doctrine, seek to impose a degree of logic and causality yet modern literature 
acknowledges that the most effective senior managers recognise that they have only 
limited power to impose corporate renewal from the top.
133
  Rather, they „create a climate 
for change by specifying the direction in which the company should move, without 
insisting on specific solutions‟.134  This may appear similar to mission command, but is 
arguably a degree more subtle.  The cognitive complexity involved in such an approach 
does not suit all personality types (or traits) and Norman Dixon would argue that many in 
the senior echelons of the military are unsuited to wrestling with ambiguity on this scale, 
both by natural inclination to anti-intellectualism and poverty in education and personal 
development.
135
 It would be tempting, and mischievous, to conduct an analysis on the basis 
of Dixon‟s work, but it could not be conducted in a rigorous manner and is, in any case, 
social psychology rather than history.  
 
 
 
                                                 
132
 Jean Hartley, „Organizational Change and Development‟, Peter Warr (ed), Psychology at Work, 5th edn. 
(London: Penguin, 2002 [1971]),pp, 402 – 404.  Various tools are used in the commercial world such as 
PEST – Political, Economic, Sociological and Technological.  This has recently been expanded to PESTLE 
to include Legal and Environmental.  The author has used these approaches with top teams (2*- 4*) and it is 
an interesting reflection on cognitive capacity as to the willingness to embrace a different approach.  The 
teams under question in this thesis did all of this intuitively. 
133
 Eugene McKenna, Business Psychology and Organisational Behaviour (Hove: Psychology Press, 2006), 
p. 544. 
134
 Ibid. 
135
 Norman Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence (London: Cape, 1976). 
33 
 
Thesis Content 
From the various recurring themes in the literature on strategic leadership one in particular 
needs to be emphasised because it features throughout this thesis (and in its title). That is 
the relationship between strategic leadership and direction. Senior leaders set the vision 
and purpose of the organisation or enterprise. In so doing, they set the direction as 
discussed above in the review of the theory. Beyond this, the direction is critically 
important because it takes the enterprise from the conceptual plane into the operational 
sphere where something is actually done to „make it happen‟. The strategic leadership 
literature emphasises the importance of the interfaces between open organisations; where 
there is action needed between the sides, direction will often be the means by which ends 
are sought and achieved though these interfaces. In this thesis, the use of the word is 
complicated by the formal mechanism by which the will of the Air Council was translated 
into instructions to the front line. This was through Directives (or Directifs (sic)). Many of 
these were formal and the more important will be discussed. Others tended to reflect 
changes in targeting policy or political imperatives. It was the sheer quantity of these to 
which Harris objected and this will be covered in the last two substantive chapters. But it 
may also be argued that Harris may not have grasped the subtleties or distinctions. The 
emphasis on direction is also important because of the popular perception on inspirational 
leadership (discussed above, especially in the context of the work of Burns and then Bass). 
But in the vast majority of organisations, especially in wartime, this type of leadership 
must run in parallel with straight direction if the war aims are to be achieved. 
 
This thesis will examine a number of more general recurring themes beyond the setting of 
the vision and purpose for the bomber offensive, both in terms of its conceptual 
34 
 
development and its execution. The „direction‟ of the offensive, in all of the meanings of 
the word, will be explored in the context of the experience of the senior leaders, the 
organisation they grew into, and its fitness for purpose. The complexity and ambiguity of 
the challenges facing the senior leaders will be discussed, particularly at the interfaces with 
other organisations and allies. The nature of the interfaces between the senior military 
leaders and their political masters will be of key importance because the relationships 
varied depending on the personalities involved at each level. Another theme which will 
continue throughout the thesis is the development of thinking on the ethical and legal 
dimensions of aerial warfare and the challenges this brought to the senior leaders at the 
Command, Air Ministry and political levels of government.  This was, and remains, a 
vexed issue for the senior leaders in the United Kingdom, and for their counterparts across 
the Empire.  Repercussions continue, not least in Canada where the remembrance of crews 
lost in the Command is marred by continuing accusations of war criminality.
136
  The topic 
must be examined in the context of what was taught to the participants at all levels and to 
what extent ethical debate was part of the discussion process.  This leads in turn into the 
debate on the development of international legal thinking and its interpretations.  Given 
that the legal instruments were in draft, it was very much a question of interpretation and 
policy formulation.  This was intuitively at odds with the desired object of a strategic 
bombing campaign designed to take its effects to the enemy heartlands and people.  
Although much of the debate on law, policy and, to a lesser extent morality, occurred prior 
to 1942, and the appointment of Harris to Bomber Command, it is necessary to set the 
scene for the conduct of the bomber offensive and the establishment of the need for there 
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to be a „just war‟; this in turn sets the conditions for the debate on Dresden.137 The thesis 
will be confined to the air operations against Germany, and not venture into the wider 
employment of Bomber Command, other than to highlight the debates at the strategic level 
over some of these „diversions‟. 
 
The second chapter will explore the theme of education by examining the 
intellectual context in which the new Service developed. Without attempting to undertake a 
deep analysis of the culture of the Royal Air Force, it will establish the background into the 
thinking behind how and why things were approached in a given way.
138
   It will start with 
an analysis of what was understood by leadership and „morale issues‟.  This examination 
will look at the origins of the Royal Air Force in the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) and the 
Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) and distil the likely thinking of senior officers into what 
was expected of leaders in general and them as senior leaders in particular.  The chapter 
will then start the examination of the legal issues. The final section in this chapter will 
examine the formulation of the strategy, and air doctrine, which was to underpin much of 
the thinking by the organisation of the Service in the face of the rising German threat and 
the dangers of a further Depression. 
 
 Chapter three will examine the organisational context of the inter war years where 
the survival of the new Service was paramount. The chapter will look at the constitutional 
and legal basis on which the Air Ministry, and its leaders, operated and start to explain 
some of the issues surrounding the „direction‟ of war through the Air Council. The chapter 
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will outline the relationships between the Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff and how this 
developed. This context is important to establish formally because the senior leaders had to 
operate within it under successive Prime Ministers culminating in Churchill and his role as 
Defence Minister from May 1940 onwards. 
 
 Chapter four will examine the challenges facing the senior leaders in the period 
where the disarmament talks in Geneva threatened the Service with the complete abolition 
of military aviation; this was seriously considered both in the talks and in the Cabinet. In 
this context, the chapter will continue with the development of legal thinking on the 
restriction of aerial bombardment as an alternative to outright abolition. Overlapping with 
this tension over arms limitation, was the growing realisation that Germany was becoming 
a real threat and some form of air parity had to be achieved. This brought a completely new 
range of challenges with the struggle for resources intense across the Services and 
expansion the order of the day.  But technology was not in a position to keep pace and the 
senior leaders were faced with real dilemmas as to what to order in terms of airframes to 
build crew competency while well aware that the doctrinal potential of the Command was 
still some way from being operationally achievable.  
 
 Chapter five will then take this challenge forward into the years when Bomber 
Command was at war; hostilities were underway, but the force was effectively impotent.  
The realities of the story were becoming embarrassing and costly, and survival of the force 
in being was under threat and the concept risked being abandoned.  It is easy to say that 
anyone can lead in times of plenty, but in the face of adversity real leadership is essential.  
This is also the time at which relationships can be become seriously strained – often with 
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long-term consequences. This chapter will examine the challenge for the senior leaders in 
aligning the vision of the air offensive with art of the possible and the advent of area 
bombing. The legal and moral thinking will be discussed in the context of the war 
becoming more „total‟.  
 
Chapter six will examine the grand strategic and strategic levels and analyse the 
relationships between the senior leadership team and their American colleagues, both 
before Pearl Harbor and subsequently.  The chapter will look at the strains the relationship 
came under both in the setting of priorities, and in how the desired ends could be achieved. 
As Overlord became a necessity, the stakes became higher and inter-personal relationships 
came into play. The establishment of air superiority for Overlord was paramount, but the 
debates over the language of „command‟ direction and supervision were far from simple. 
 
Chapter seven will look at the interface between the strategic and operational levels 
within the RAF. Throughout this debate the correspondence between Portal and his staff, 
and Harris became increasingly strident with the vexed question lurking in the background 
as to whether Portal should have sacked the C-in-C. 
 
The final chapter will conclude by examining the senior leadership from the 
inception of the offensive through to the end of the war. This chapter will highlight the 
complexity of the conceptual and practical issues, and the ambiguity brought about by its 
non-linear nature. Inherent in this is that the flexibility of air power made it all the more 
desirable in so many theatres and for so many tasks. Both because of the promise of air 
power and the stakes being so high, the pressure on the strategic leaders was all the greater.   
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Chapter Two 
 
THE INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT 
 
  
This chapter will examine the various factors relevant to the professional development of 
the future officers who were likely to be responsible for the leadership and direction of the 
strategic bomber offensive.  It will start with an analysis of the contemporary 
understanding of leadership and the requirement to make an organisation „fit for purpose‟.1  
The chapter will then go on to set the base level understanding of the ethical and legal 
dimension which would underpin much of the early debate on strategy and targeting 
policy; ironically, this debate would re-surface towards the very end of the war as 
individuals sought occupancy of the „moral high ground‟ and contested the ethical viability 
of strategic bombing.
2
  The final section of this chapter will cover the broad understanding 
of the doctrine of strategic bombing and its relationship with the other roles of the air 
power.  Each of these issues is consistent with the modern literature on senior leadership in 
which, in turn, argues that the development of future strategic leaders should not be left to 
chance, but should be subject to professional training and education.  Similarly, a sound 
ethical and legal base is essential to underpin the strategy, its development and execution.  
Finally, it is essential that senior leaders are able to develop, and articulate the purpose, 
role and vision of their organisation. Having decided on the vision and purpose, the leaders 
are then able to direct the conduct of war 
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The issues to be discussed in this chapter are not easy ones with which to wrestle.  
Nor were they at the time under discussion when the understanding was less developed, the 
disciplines less precise and the military education system not as focused.  Furthermore, the 
complexity of military strategic leadership was not always acknowledged.  There is a 
distinct tendency to regard senior officers in the first half of the twentieth century (and 
beyond) as buffoons, or „Colonel Blimps‟.3  The revisionist school has not entirely 
eradicated the „Lions Led by Donkeys‟ characterisation of senior military personnel.4  An 
academic psychologist has suggested that the military, and in particular those at senior 
levels, are anti-intellectual by nature and the system favours their advancement over their 
more gifted colleagues.
5
 This may be an extreme hypothesis and it could be argued that 
Dixon is selective in his examples to prove his point.  The modern literature is, however, 
consistent in the assertion that senior leaders need to have above-average intelligence, but 
genius levels are not required.
6
  Adair sees this level of intelligence as necessary, but not 
sufficient.
7
   The intellectual skills of the senior officer ideally need to be developed, honed 
and then applied in a logical and coherent manner.  Slim emphasised that his thinking on 
morale and raising the fighting spirit of his army was not based on study, but on „some 
experience and a good deal of hard thinking‟.8  Slim went on to set the intellectual 
challenge for the commander to ensure high morale: 
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a. He must be convinced that the object can be attained: that it is not out of 
reach. 
b. He must see, too, that the organisation to which he belongs and which is 
striving to attain the object is an efficient one. 
c. He must have confidence in his leaders and know that whatever dangers and 
hardships he is called upon to suffer, his life will not be lightly flung away.
9
 
 
Slim was writing within his own context, but the challenges could have been scripted 
specifically for the senior airmen, politicians and senior officials who were destined to be 
the strategic leaders responsible for the bomber offensive. 
 
The role of air power in general, and the use of aircraft capable of offensive action, 
would be a continuing theme throughout the period 1917 to 1945; occasionally there would 
be unanimous accord.  But there would also be a degree of acrimony, especially over 
targeting priorities.
10
 For example, both Harris and Spaatz (his American counterpart) had 
hoped that the success of the Bomber Offensive would have led directly to the collapse of 
the German will to fight thus obviating the need for any form of large-scale invasion.  The 
reality was that the debate would expand to encompass plans of attack that would 
concentrate on transportation systems, oil and targets directly related to the land 
offensive.
11
  Some of this debate was borne of the experience gained during war thus far.  
Similarly, some senior officers naturally had to support the deployment of major war 
fighting assets because their own part of the campaign required them.  But the almost 
religious adherence to the potential of strategic bombing was consistently present in the 
debate.  The chapter will therefore review the thinking, and the teaching, that influenced 
those senior personnel who were so vital to the debate as it evolved. 
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Fundamental to the structure of the RAF, was the premise that the best form of 
defence of the Nation was offensive action by aircraft against the country of the potential 
aggressor.  Although the active offensive had to be combined with a defensive system, the 
proportion allocated to home defence should be the „lowest possible minimum‟.12  This 
thinking was applied consistently through the inter-war years and underpinned the 
formation of the front line Commands in 1936. 
 
Leadership Thinking and Teaching 
 
Much of the voluminous literature on leadership is of relatively recent origin.  In the first 
half of the twentieth century, leadership was more a question of what one did, rather than 
what was studied.  Officers tended to come from a higher social class than their men and 
ensuring the well-being of their troops, along with achievement of the task and 
maintenance of discipline, was an intuitive process.
13
   Sheffield describes the role of the 
public school system and team games in formulating the characters of those who become 
the officer corps in the First World War.
14
  He states that the application of  
the public school ethos to military leadership was effective.  Paternal, courageous, 
self-sacrificing officers earned the loyalty and love of their men.
15
 
 
But it was only with the rapid expansion of the British Army during the First World War, 
and the concomitant broadening of the pool from which potential officers were recruited, 
was it thought necessary to issue unofficial „Guides to Officership‟.16  These guides 
emphasised the nature of the relationship between the officer and his men                                                                           
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stressing the need to balance firmness with sympathy; that orders should be enforceable; 
and that all have „feelings, tempers and temperaments‟.17 
 
 Of the senior airmen who would be responsible for the relationships and debates of 
the period, the majority had joined their respective service, or arm, either before, or at, the 
outbreak of the First World War.  The following examples illustrate the point.  Portal, who 
would be CAS for much of the Second World War, joined the Royal Engineers as a motor-
cycle despatch rider (acting corporal) on 6 August 1914 cutting short his time at Oxford 
(having been previously educated at Winchester).  He was commissioned shortly 
thereafter, and then joined the RFC as an observer in July 1915.
18
  The first squadron to 
which he was appointed was commanded by Major Brooke-Popham, later to be Portal‟s 
Commandant at the RAF Staff College. 
 
 Harris (Commander-in-Chief Bomber Command, 1942-1945) was also public 
school educated, albeit at Allhallows College near Honiton, a somewhat less prestigious 
establishment than Portal‟s old school.  He joined the army in Rhodesia and fought in 
South-West Africa.  Harris came back to Britain in October 1915 and immediately 
volunteered to join the RFC – weeks of marching in South Africa had convinced him that, 
in future, it was preferable to fight in a sitting posture!
19
  
 
 Tedder was educated at Whitgift and went up to Cambridge, to read history, in 
1909.  He graduated and joined the consular service returning to Britain at the end of 1914.  
Tedder was commissioned into the Dorsetshire Regiment.  After considerable persistence, 
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he joined the RFC in January 1916.
20
  These short examples illustrate a degree of 
consistency in the start of three key players‟ background which was not untypical across 
the Services.  With their public school backgrounds and cadet corps service, their 
subsequent thinking on leadership would have been conditioned by their experiences in the 
army, of which the RFC remained an integral part until the formation of the RAF on 1 
April 1918.  These experiences may have been enhanced by reading the various guides 
discussed above – or by their having to recommend them to new officers under their care.  
The degree to which any official publication actually influences its audience is always 
difficult to assess and the RFC situation, where the officer corps was doing much of the 
actual fighting and therefore had less interaction with the other ranks than their 
counterparts in the trenches, makes their likely impact even more questionable. 
 
 A similar debate could be had over what was to become a logical progression for 
all of the key contenders – attendance at Staff College.  The degree of influence emanating 
from the reading, teaching, or the wider learning environment, can easily be overstated.  
Terraine quoted correspondence between Esher and Hankey in 1915 suggesting that  
Obviously history is written for schoolmasters and armchair strategists. Statesmen 
and warriors pick their way through the dusk.
 21
 
 
On the other hand, Travers‟ contention that Haig had been considerably influenced by his 
attendance at the Army Staff College at Camberley, probably goes beyond what most 
                                                 
20
 Orange, Tedder, pp. 8-30. 
21
 These comments were made following the presentation of the Chesney Gold Medal at RUSI in 1982; the 
literature in question was Julian S. Corbett,  Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London: Longman, 1911)  
and Esher and Hankey suggested that out of all who might benefit from reading such books, probably only 
Churchill had done so.  John Terraine, „Leadership in Coalition War: The Achievements of World War I‟, 
JRUSI, 127 (4) (1982: Dec), p. 11. 
44 
 
observers would think reasonable.
22
  Haig attended Staff College in 1896 -1897 and 
Travers‟ contention was that Haig combined his experiences of Sudan and South Africa 
with Staff College teachings and applied them to the strategic planning and execution of 
major battles in the First World War – including Passchendaele and the Somme.23  In 
practical terms, it would be surprising if any officer did not take forward some of the 
teachings from institutions such as the Staff College and apply them in later life.  Where 
Travers probably overstates the case is in his belief that Haig did so „tenaciously‟.24  It is 
always possible to draw parallels of concept or fact; but it is much more difficult to assign 
accurately the degree in which they have been applied.  The debate could be extended to 
include the relevance, and influence, of doctrine manuals and journals.  The linkages, and 
potential influence will be dealt with at each stage in the chapter. 
 
 An examination of Staff College thinking, throughout the sections of this chapter, 
does, however, have some merit.  In the first instance, the attendees are in no doubt as to 
the privilege of having been selected for the course – in the Army case, having had to pass 
an examination before consideration.  In Dowding‟s (later Commander-in-Chief for 
Fighter Command during the Battle of Britain) case this was preceded by a year‟s leave of 
absence, on reduced pay, to prepare and attendance at a crammer.
25
  Small wonder that the 
students were influenced to some extent!  Second, the competition resulting from this 
process ensured that the students were in a greater concentration of high calibre peers that 
they had experienced hitherto resulting in the opportunity to debate and share 
                                                 
22
 Travers, The Killing Ground, chap. 4. 
23
 Travers, ibid., p. 97. 
24
 Sheffield, The Chief. 
25
 Vincent Orange, Dowding of Fighter Command: Victor of the Battle of Britain (London: Grub Dtreet, 
2008), pp. 16-18. 
45 
 
experiences.
26
  Third, the full year (or two in the Camberley instance) allowed ample time 
for the students to think; to read; and to commit some of their thoughts to paper for 
assessment and possibly for publication.  Fourthly, for the early courses the CAS 
personally selected the candidates for the course.  Finally, the prestige, and importance, of 
the courses ensured that the students received presentations from very senior officers.  In 
the case of the first RAF course at Andover in 1922, Trenchard was due to deliver the 
inaugural address.  In the event, this was actually read by Air Vice-Marshal Sir John 
Salmond who apologised both for CAS‟ absence, but also for that of the Secretary of State 
for Air.
27
  It must, however, be emphasised that the courses were not specifically academic 
in nature and were certainly not the degree awarding institutions of recent years.  The 
reading lists were comparatively „light‟ although some of the works had widespread 
currency.
28
 
 
Squadron Leader Portal was selected to attend the first of the RAF Staff College 
Courses at Andover in April 1922 and not only listened to the opening address from Air 
Commodore Brooke-Popham, but also his thoughts on „Morale‟.29  Brooke-Popham 
lamented the economies of the time which prevented the establishment of stables and 
„horses-allowance‟ for his students.30  He nevertheless set the tone – and more importantly 
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the element of continuity of thinking with Camberley by emphasising the need for 
economy among the students: 
Show young officers how to economise on weekends, cocktails, port and cigarettes, 
and save money to keep a horse which is much better for him than a motorcycle.  
There are good men who do not hunt and bad ones who do, but every man is 
improved by hunting.
31
 
 
Brooke-Popham went on to explain the three objects of the Staff Course.  The first 
of these was to train the participants to become staff officers in both peace and war.
32
  This 
was the classic role of the Staff College whether it was Camberley or Andover with 
emphasis on preparing officers to serve on the Staff of headquarters at various levels; the 
Army course included lectures on the role of officers at each level of headquarters.
33
 
Implicit in this is that the staff organisation should be „fit for purpose‟ and that each officer 
understood his role and purpose.   
 
The second aim was much broader in that the Staff College sought to give „future 
commanders some instruction in the broader aspects of war whether on sea, on land, or in 
the air‟.34  The Commandant then went on to say that the Staff Course was designed to 
found a school of thought and to assist in solving problems regarding the 
organisation, training or employment of the Air Force.
35
 
 
So attendance on the course had practical outcomes; but more importantly, it was designed 
to educate and broaden those who had been identified as future senior commanders.  The 
final objective was particularly important in that, without using modern jargon, Brooke-
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Popham was encouraging his charges to take a collective responsibility for the vision and 
purpose of the organisation. 
 
The Commandant‟s theme, which has clear resonance with modern thinking on 
strategic leadership, was reinforced in his Preliminary Lecture for Students in which 
Brooke-Popham warned the students that they would indeed become the mysterious „they‟ 
with all of the attendant responsibilities.  He added that they would have to be „far more 
unselfish, and work for others, not only your own little command‟. 36 This again chimes 
with modern literature which emphasises that the difference between strategic leadership 
and the levels below is this responsibility for the interfaces of the organisation with other 
bodies in parallel or above.
37
  This was reinforced in the Commandant‟s Final Address in 
which he enunciated his version of the motto of the staff officer: „Honour the King. 
Loyalty to your Chief. Sympathy with the Troops‟.38 Critically, Brooke-Popham went on 
to define the 'Chief‟ as collectively being the immediate superior and the „Air Council and 
the Air Ministry‟.  Portal may well have later regretted that Harris went to Camberley and 
therefore missed this particular admonition.
39
 
 
 The need for commanders to have sympathy with the plight of their troops 
effectively reinforces the emphasis placed on morale.  Brooke-Popham prepared his own 
notes on the subject in a 16-page paper in 1923.
40
  He wrestled with the difficulty of 
reducing aspects of human nature to science; but also admited a role for the discipline of 
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psychology.  Clearly linked with this debate is the role of leadership and the Commandant 
suggests that the following factors contribute to the art of leadership: 
i. Disinterested zeal for the cause. 
ii. Confidence in subordinates 
iii. Confidence in ultimate success. 
iv. Personality. 
v. Prestige. 
vi. Efficiency. 
vii. Ability to judge character.41 
 
Brooke-Popham then went on to emphasise the inter-linkage between leadership 
and morale by identifying several key historical figures (such as Nelson and Cromwell) 
and analysing their styles.  The Commandant recommended the writings of Kipling by 
commenting that the requirements of leadership can be found in his poem IF.
42
 In terms of 
the historiography of leadership theory, „Great Man Theory‟ in which the apprentice is 
encouraged to emulate those who have succeeded in great deeds, has been long standing.  
For example, Machiavelli recommended: 
So the prudent man must always follow in the footsteps of great men and imitate 
those who have been outstanding. If his own prowess fails to compare with theirs, 
at least it has an air of greatness about it.
43
 
 
But the use of the deeds of Great Men in the analysis of leadership is entirely consistent 
with the extant use of Great Man theory in the wider teaching of military history.  In this, 
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historians studied great victories (and occasionally significant defeats), and from these the 
immutable qualities of leadership could be distilled.
44
  It is therefore no surprise to find the 
students tasked to produce essays on morale.  A selection from the first course, presumably 
of the better ones, was chosen for publication in Air Publication 956.  Among these 
preserved, not only for posterity, but for wider readership among the new Service, was the 
essay by Squadron Leader C. F. A. Portal in which he examined the morale in the forces of 
Cromwell, Nelson and Garibaldi.
45
 
 
Not surprisingly, Portal‟s work is in accord, both with broad contemporary 
thinking,
 46
 and the remarks made by his Commandant (and former Squadron 
Commander).  Morale and leadership were entirely interlinked with the resulting 
achievement of extraordinary deeds by folk who would not normally have performed to 
that level – often reaching the heights of heroism.   But the thinking and discussion at the 
Staff College also focused on the basic tenets of staff work, strategic leadership and 
making an organisation „fit for purpose‟.  Although the teaching may not have been 
couched in explicit management style terminology, the graduates from Portal‟s course, 
many of whom subsequently had distinguished careers, were very likely to have 
internalised some of the thinking, especially given the prestige of the course.   
 
The relationship between leadership and morale was first expounded in an official 
RAF document with the issue of Air Publication 1300, Royal Air Force War Manual 
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which included a short chapter on „Command Leadership and Morale‟.47 Leadership was 
defined as the power to influence and inspire men.
48
  The section on morale built on this 
explaining that high morale would allow greater heights to be achieved than was possible 
through the exercise of professional skill alone.
49
  The closest the Manual approached 
modern thinking was to make the explicit linkage between the establishment of high 
morale, leadership and the need to influence the environment through organisation and 
administration.
50
 This nevertheless allowed the foundations for leaders ensuring that their 
organisation was „fit for purpose‟. 
 
The Contemporary Thinking on the Ethical and Legal Use of Armed Force 
 
Aside from popular accusations that Machiavelli advocated leaders acting in a ruthless, or 
unethical manner, there is a standing assumption that leaders are required to establish 
values and uphold them in such a way that their people are willing to follow.
51
 More 
recently, General Viscount Wolseley in his Life of John Churchill, writing in 1894, stated 
that 
history proves that it [the army] has seldom fought well in what it believed to be an 
unrighteous cause.  Unless the Rank and File are interested in their work, there will 
be no enthusiasm, and from an army without enthusiasm little can be expected.
52
 
 
The essence of this, written as it was by a distinguished soldier, was that the need for a just 
cause was paramount for military forces to be expected to function (presumably in the 
absence of prevailing laws of armed conflict which newly under development).
53
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  According to modern literature, an effective organisation requires a climate in 
which there is a shared perception of what is right and wrong, and of how ethical issues 
should be handled.
54
  Furthermore, leaders, especially at the organisational level, play a 
critical role in establishing an appropriate climate.
55
  The debate over the requirement for 
ethical behaviour is also considered to extend to the arena of international affairs.
56
  But it 
is also recognised that the Realist school of international relations frequently requires 
politicians, senior officials and, by association and direction, strategic military planners to 
acknowledge the primacy of the pursuit of the national interest.
57
 Beyond the realm of 
politics and organisation psychology, philosophers have also sought an acceptable means 
of intellectually balancing the various interests.  Statman describes this as the „tragic 
solution to a tragic dilemma‟; his work was specifically written to find a way through the 
moral maze facing decision makers in supreme emergencies and „national-defence wars‟.58 
 
Any particular situation will be complicated by the reality that the dilemmas will be 
played out at various levels of debate.  These may emerge in a logical and linear pattern of, 
for instance, philosophical and ethical debate influencing the international lawyers whose 
writings form one of the sources of international law.
59
 In turn, government law officers 
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advise politicians and military planners of the latest developments and policy changes 
result.  In practice, however, the debates may occur in isolation – or more likely in either a 
chaotic or anarchic manner.  In some administrations, the debates will be monitored and 
those that suit a given course of action will be preferred. This is Realism in international 
relations in full play.
60
 
 
To varying degrees, each of these scenarios was evident in the period from the 
formation of the RAF in 1918 through to the end of the Second World War.  It is unlikely 
that the senior leaders would have seen the debates in the theoretical terms of the previous 
paragraph.  But they nevertheless had to participate in them as they progressed over the 
period and, indeed, beyond into the era of recriminations and the unedifying sight of senior 
personnel distancing themselves from reality of some of their harsher decisions and 
policies.  It is therefore important to examine the intellectual and practical understanding of 
the philosophical/ethical debate, the international legal issues and the policies that arose, 
especially where these ran counter to established doctrinal thinking.  
 
Philosophers tend to regard their studies as being of higher order than, say, the 
laboratory work of scientists.
61
 Ethics, often loosely referred to as moral philosophy, are 
concerned with the values that inform people‟s lives when they are deciding what to do, 
and informs their views on the actions and thinking of others.
62
  Beyond reference to this 
set of values, most people are willing to accept moral constraints on what they should do 
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and from what they should refrain. But even in his short introduction to the subject of 
ethics, Williams adds caveats such as „unless life is desperate‟ and „most of the time‟.63  He 
goes on to refine the definitions of „ethics‟ and „moral‟, suggesting that the former is 
relatively broad, encompassing wider aspects of life and activity.  He suggests that „moral‟ 
is narrower in focus concentrating on obligations and rules.  Notwithstanding these finer 
points, this thesis will use „ethics‟ as the umbrella term thus avoiding potential confusion 
with „morale‟ as something that bombing sought to lower.64  The aspect of rules and 
obligations also risks confusion with the more tangible (albeit only slightly) aspects of 
international law. 
 
The conduct of the strategic bombing offensive against Germany has been subject 
to considerable attention and philosophical debate after the war years. A. C. Grayling, for 
example, is convinced that the bombing offensive was morally „very wrong‟.  He 
concludes that it was neither necessary, nor proportionate; furthermore, it was contrary to 
the general moral principles that had existed in Western civilisation for at least five 
centuries, and possibly back to the ancient Greeks.
 65
 The subject has also been approached 
from the conventional consequentialist (acts to bring about the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number) and deontological (concerned with the rights of individuals) 
standpoints.
66
  The use of armed force has also been explored in the context of Just War 
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Theory which dates back, from its resurgence in 1977, to the letters of St Augustine.
67
  The 
theory builds on the work of early Christian writers who, acknowledging the sanctity of 
human life, tried to impose a degree of rationalism and discipline on the inevitable exercise 
of violence and taking of life.  In 418, St Augustine wrote a short treatise on military 
morality to a senior Roman official charged with keeping tribesmen from the Sahara out of 
Roman (Christian) Africa.  Augustine advised that war should only be conducted when 
necessary and then with the minimum force necessary; he added that mercy should be 
shown to the enemy.
68
  These tenets gave rise to the concepts of ius ad bellum and ius in 
bello which are central to the Just War Theory and are also key in the International Law of 
War; in turn, they reflect the rules of going to war and the conduct of combatants in war 
itself.
69
 
 
The literature on Just War Theory is extensive with key texts published in several 
editions, each succeeding one with new comment on the latest conflict.
70
  These are 
supplemented by academic debates on the subject.
71
 But it is noteworthy that the 
historiography on Just War Theory has flourished since the Vietnam War with seminal 
works such as Michael Walzer‟s Just and Unjust Wars arising from „political activism‟ 
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rather than philosophical debate in the context of the American involvement in that 
region.
72
 
 
Notwithstanding the extent of the post-war debate, it is notable that very little 
relevant academic philosophy (including Just War Theory) was published in the inter-war 
years, or during the war itself.
73
 This dearth therefore goes some way to explaining the 
absence of similar debate in the files, or Staff College exercises.  This in turn provides 
some defence against the accusation that senior commanders and officials behaved 
unethically in the development of the offensive and its conduct.  What was present 
throughout was a background level of discussion on the undesirability of repeating the 
carnage of the First World War.  Part of this was articulated in various forms of Christian 
pacifism which, in its more extreme forms, led to the criticism of the bomber offensive in 
the House of Lords by George Bell, Bishop of Chichester.
74
  The historiography of peace, 
or anti-war, movements of the inter-war years is muddled at best.
75
  A. J. P. Taylor has 
suggested that inter-war dissent existed at varying levels from which the arguments never 
coalesced.
76
  What did come together was a rush of books, novels, memoirs and plays 
between 1928 and 1930. These emphasised common themes:  
The futility and dreariness of war, the incompetence of generals and politicians, and 
the ordinary men on both sides victims of this incompetence. The lessons were 
reinforced on an academic level by American and British historians who studied the 
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diplomatic origins of the war and repeated, with a more scholarly equipment, the 
views first put forward by E. D. Morel and the U.D.C.
77
 
 
Taylor went on to describe the general opinion as believing that wars were started 
by mistake – rather than by militarism (German in the case of the First world War), by 
capitalism, by massive armament, or by grievances.  The League of Nations would resolve 
some, or all of these issues.
78
 Hobsbawm acknowledged that while pacifism had been 
„quite popular‟ in the 1930s, it had never amounted to a mass movement and had faded by 
1940.
79
  Against this intellectual backdrop of confused (or absent) thinking, it is little 
surprise that senior folk in the military, and their officials, should typically resort to 
internalisation of the laws of war with their constraints and assumptions – rather than 
philosophical reflection.
80
 
 
The standing military view on ethics in conflict can best be summarised as 
conservative and, to the military mind, appealingly pragmatic.  In a lecture to the Royal 
United Services Institute (RUSI) in February 1898, W.V. Herbert queried whether it was 
possible to have an ethical side to warfare.  He went on to discount the arguments germane 
to the professional philosopher who „will argue a soul into a stone, and beauty into the 
earthworm‟, preferring to align the discussion with „the ordinary fight-your-daily-battle 
individual like you and me‟.81  Herbert dealt with ius ad bellum as concomitant with 
nationhood and therefore inevitable.
82
  But he saw ius in bello as having changed, or 
developed, with „women and children not molested – at least, not officially‟; „open towns 
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are not shelled and poison gas is held in abhorrence‟.83  Herbert concluded with the 
suggestion that warfare had developed, and needed to continue to develop, a „universally-
accepted code to regulate its conduct‟.84 But he then went on to stress the primacy of 
actually winning: 
All said and done, „Win your war‟ is the most important, and it is the most 
primitive, maxim of the science of strategy – that is drive your opponent into such a 
corner that he is content to have the terms of peace dictated to him. The rest comes 
a long way after.
85
 
 
In an answer to a question from the floor, Herbert explained that a code of ethics could 
only be relevant between nations of an equal state of civilisation and that it could not 
reasonably be expected to apply between the English and the Zulus.
86
   
 
 This presentation was only 20 years before the end of the First World War and it is 
unlikely that attitudes would have changed markedly from the date of its delivery through 
to the years of colonial air policing and the formation of the new commands.  The need for 
parity between the levels of civilisation of the warring states would later have chilling 
overtones in the justification for a range of activities in Europe and the Far East.  The 
Germans, for example, considered the Slavs to be approaching subhuman and the Japanese 
had a similar approach to the Chinese.  The Americans in justifying their fire-bombing 
offensive of mainland Japan had a similar mindset.
87
  At a more pragmatic level, the 
language used by Herbert should not be viewed with modern mindsets of equality and 
tolerance; his was very much the language and attitude of the time.  And this was reflected 
in the official publications (acknowledging the Journal of the Royal United Services 
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Institute as only quasi-official) such as C.D 22 Operations Manual, Royal Air Force issued 
in 1922 in which chapter XI deals with „Aircraft in Warfare against an Uncivilised 
Enemy‟.88  The enemy were uncompromisingly referred to as „savages‟.89 
 
 The natural progression from a broadly accepted code of conduct, arguably an 
extension of the chivalric code, is for the required behaviours to be set out in formal 
language and agreed between nations; ideally this should take the form of a binding treaty.  
In short to transpose them into an international law of armed combat.  Adam Roberts has 
insisted that the study of [international] law must be integrated with the study of history.
90
 
A logical extension of this is that the development of air law, and indeed strategy and 
doctrine, must be examined in the context of the wider international and domestic political 
situation.  In turn, the developments in thinking must take heed of the pace of 
technological progress, and in particular the weapons on which restraint was sought.   
 
 The literature on the laws of war, and their development, is extensive.
91
  Michael 
Howard makes the point that the role of the military is to use violence with deliberation, 
with purpose and in a legitimate manner; he characterises this as force and that force 
between states constitutes war.
92
  This can be taken slightly further with the legal aspect 
expanded to include the use of force for legitimate reasons and applied in a legitimate 
manner thereby specifically encompassing ius ad bellum and ius in bello.  Within 
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Howard‟s use of „deliberation‟, he embraces the elements of choice, decision and the issue 
of orders.
93
  The latter, although Howard does not pursue the issue, is important in the 
context of subordinates being protected from charges of war crimes by the orders of their 
superiors; the understanding of international law in the inter-war years allowed such 
protection.
94
  But Howard does make the point that if control does break down, the result is 
likely to be one that contravenes the ethical and legal dimensions.
95
 
 
 The development, and application, of international law has long been problematic 
in that states have consistently sought to avoid the incorporation of laws that they consider 
likely to impinge upon their national interests; this is compounded by the absence of any 
real enforcement mechanism beyond the utterances of the International Court of Justice.
96
  
In his detailed review of Air War and the Law of War, American military lawyer Hays 
Parks cites one of the most pre-eminent international lawyers of the Twentieth Century, Sir 
Hersch Lauterpacht, as stating that „If international law is the weakest point of all law, then 
the law of war is its vanishing point‟.97 Notwithstanding this apparently cynical viewpoint 
from the legal profession, the advisers to the Air Ministry, and their predecessors in the 
War Office, took these issues seriously as will become evident below. 
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 Beyond the evolution the Just War Theory discussed above, the first significant 
attempt at the codification of the rules of warfare was completed by Dr. Francis Lieber of 
the Columbia University for issue to the Union Army on 24
th
 April 1863.
98
  The „Lieber 
Code‟ became the model for many national manuals and for the Hague Peace Conferences 
of 1899 and 1907.
99
  Attempts to prohibit specific (usually nasty) types of weapon had a 
much longer provenance with, for example, Greek, Roman and Hindu codes banning the 
use of poisons. Later, the Lateran Council of 1132 declared that the arbalest and crossbow 
were „unchristian weapons‟.100  More recently the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration sought 
to ban „explosive projectiles under 400 Grammes weight‟ (sic).101  This Declaration is also 
particularly significant in its attempt  
to alleviate the calamities of war; That the only legitimate object which States 
should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the 
enemy.
102
 
 
This was followed by the 1899 Hague Conference which was originally called under a 
Russian initiative designed to slow down the potential impact of Western technology and, 
ideally, to avoid war completely.
103
 For obvious reasons, air power was not high on the 
agenda, but Commission I of the conference agreed a 5-year moratorium on the discharge 
of explosives or projectiles from balloons.
104
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 The prohibition on the utilisation of balloons had expired by the time of the 1907 
Hague Convention which duly renewed the ban.
105
 And although manned flight had 
occurred by this time, its military utility was not uppermost in the minds of the delegates.  
Technological advances in artillery and ballistics, however, were such that the dangers of 
long range bombardment resulted in Convention IV laying down the formal Articles which 
would later influence the 1923 Convention on Aerial Warfare and the thinking of officials 
in the interim.
106
 
  
The advent of the First World War saw rapid developments in the aircraft and 
associated weapons.  As the range, and payload, of the aircraft increased so did the 
capability to carry the war deeper into the homelands of the belligerents.  Technology had, 
however, only progressed so far and there were no real navigations aids, resulting in 
inaccuracies in bombing.  For example, a German raid, by aircraft as opposed to Zeppelins, 
on 13 June 1917 against the „docks, wharves, railways, Government Stores, and 
warehouses situated in the centre of the town on the banks of the Thames‟ actually hit a 
council school in the East End of London killing or injuring 120 children.
107
  But as Parks 
points out, aerial bombing (or bombardment) was not the worst offender when it came to 
lack of discrimination.  The German „Paris Gun‟, which was used in conjunction with their 
offensive in March 1918, had a range of 75 miles and could only be aimed at the centre of 
Paris.
108
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During the First World War, the War Cabinet were clearly concerned about the 
legality of aerial bombardment of undefended (or open) towns and cities and the possibility 
of „tit for tat‟ reprisals.  The War Office accordingly produced two memoranda clarifying 
the situation.
109
  The General Staff summarised the use of aerial bombardment and outlined 
the history of the development of the law.  In the second paper, the Staff pointed out that 
the renewal (in 1907) of the Hague Declaration of 1899 outlawing the launching of 
projectiles had not been fully ratified, and not at all by the four Central Powers, thereby 
leaving it without binding force.  The paper went on to confirm that although 
bombardment of undefended towns was forbidden, there remained doubt on both sides as 
to what constituted defence, openness and the removal of legal protection when the town 
contained targets of military utility.
110
  The interplay between technological capability, the 
needs of discrimination and the desirability of tapping the potential of offensive air power 
would continue to challenge the exponents of the new air arm throughout the period 
covered in this thesis. 
 
The challenges of iterating the advantages of air power will be covered in the final 
section of this chapter.  The development of the legal thinking in how to limit, contain or 
prohibit the use of aircraft continued almost seamlessly.  There was, however, a new 
impetus as the various powers tried to recover from the shock of four years of brutal 
warfare.  The Paris Aerial Navigation Convention of 1919 did nothing to constrain 
potential belligerents.
111
 The Washington Naval Conference (more correctly titled the 
Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament) made a brief attempt to ban novel 
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forms of warfare, including aircraft, but concluded that this would not be practical.
112
 
Instead the baton was taken up by the Hague Commission of Jurists which commenced on 
11 December 1922 under the chairmanship of John Bassett Moore of the United States.
113
  
The delegation consisted of representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, 
Italy, Japan and the Netherlands; each delegation consisted of legal and technical 
experts.
114
  The delegation from the Britain included J. M. Spaight, a senior official from 
the newly formed Air Ministry.
115
  The Hague Conference finished on 19 February 1923 
with the unanimous adoption of a two-part report; the first part covered Rules for the 
Control of Radio in Time of War and the second Rules of Aerial Warfare.
116
  
 
These Rules made a brave attempt to impose some degree of humanitarian control 
on the development of air power.  But the 1923 Hague Rules were not ratified by any of 
the nations with France, the Netherlands and Great Britain particularly opposed to their 
adoption.
117
  The conventional view, therefore, was (and remains) that they were a political 
and legal failure.
118
  The reality was that the states involved were not prepared to fetter 
what was still a largely untested weapon of war that clearly had considerable potential. 
 
 That said, the Hague Rules provided a foundation level of understanding of what 
possible future laws of aerial warfare might look like, or be based upon.
119
 The Rules also 
provided a useful vehicle for the evolution of those that had been specifically drafted for 
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Land or Naval warfare.  Furthermore, rules for the third dimension acknowledged that air 
operations could operate over either environment without discrimination; by implications, 
crews could not be expected to follow one set or the other depending on their geographical 
location.
120
  Probably most importantly, in absolute terms in Britain and more specifically 
for the development of thinking in the Air Ministry, the sessions in the Hague kept the 
issues close to the forefront of intellectual endeavour.  This was due in no small part to the 
efforts of J. M. Spaight, who was a delegation member in 1923.  In addition to being a 
senior official in the Air Ministry (having transferred from the War Office on the formation 
of the new organisation), Spaight was a prolific author writing on issues such as the 
legalities of land warfare.
121
  He was also a keen advocate of air power publishing 
numerous texts including one on the likely future role of air power in a potential major war 
which was published in a series edited by Liddell Hart.
122
  Spaight‟s work has three facets 
that are both distinct, and complementary.  He was an air power advocate; an academic 
lawyer (a jurist in his own right); and a senior official.  What then is the evidence for his 
influence on the existing and future members of the Air Ministry? 
 
 The difficulties of establishing influence are considerable, particularly when those 
who should be susceptible are idealists wedded to the invincibility of their ideas or 
weapons.
123
 Nevertheless, Higham considers Spaight to be an air power theorist without 
whom no survey would be complete; he describes him as being „Trenchard‟s good 
friend‟.124  Some degree of influence may be assumed from such an association.  Spaight‟s 
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academic pedigree (including an LLD), along with his status in the, then small, Air 
Ministry also implies a degree of influence, especially over legal issues.
125
 This is seen 
quite specifically in 1921 when he proffered text and advice, which was taken in full, for 
the draft of CD22 the RAF‟s first Operations Manual.126  Spaight then took his academic 
knowledge, and experience of attending the Hague Conference, and articulated his thinking 
in Air Power and War Rights first published in 1924.
127
  In his preface to the second 
edition, he wrote of the great honour to have had his book officially recommended to 
candidates for the RAF Staff College, implying that there was a captive audience of 
potential students to be influenced.
128
 Spaight saw his intermediate work, Air Power and 
the Cities, as being part of a continuum.
129
 Beyond the rather high-flown prose of his 
published work, Spaight also produced two legal briefs for internal Air Ministry 
consumption; these are undated, but the AHB archivist‟s assumption was that they were 
written in 1927.
130
  Higham has suggested that Spaight‟s influence comes through in a 
memorandum published by Trenchard in 1928 which points up the likeness between naval 
and air bombardment.
131
   
 
 There are, however, a number of more explicit references to Spaight‟s work which 
confirm his influence.  In the CAS‟s submission to a Chiefs of Staff Meeting in 1928, the 
equivalence of naval and air bombardment was reintroduced with a specific reference to 
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the British Year Book of International Law article written in 1923 by Spaight.
132
  A similar, 
but even more explicit, reference occurred four years later in the context of Air Ministry 
proposals for amendments to the Hague Rules in which a minute to the CAS confirmed 
that: 
Some help has also been given by Mr. Spaight whose book on „Air Power and War 
Rights‟ has been considerably drawn on in framing the paper.133 
 
The minute sheet is subsequently initialled with „I agree J.M.S.‟ presumably indicating 
Spaight‟s concurrence with the paper.  It is clear from (then) Group Captain Portal‟s 
signature to a number of minutes on the file (as Director of Operations and Intelligence) 
that the future CAS was fully conversant with the debate.
134
 The fact that Spaight was 
employed at the time as Director of Accounts clearly did not limit his influence on 
international legal matters.
135
    A similar minute to the CAS on Disarmament links 
potential use of bombing with reprisals and specifically cited Spaight as the source of legal 
advice (again still as Director of Accounts).
136
            
 
 Although Spaight saw his Air Power and War Rights and Air Power and the Cities 
as being a series with the first edition of the former in 1924; the second in 1933 and the 
latter book being published in 1930, it was clear that any amendments that Spaight sought 
to make to the second edition were limited by the printing requirements of not being able 
to change the pagination.  The most significant difference between the two editions is the 
introduction of discussion on disarmament.
137
 Spaight‟s work was a readily available 
                                                 
132
 „The War Object of an Air Force‟ produced for COS 147 (69th Chiefs of Staff Meeting).  AIR 9/8 Folio 1 
Air Staff 17 May 1928. 
133
 AIR 8/141 „Rules of War, Hague Rules: Air Ministry Proposals‟, 3 November 1932. 
134
 AIR 8/141 and The Air Force List, October 1932.  
135
 The Air Force List, October 1932, p14. 
136
 AIR 8/139, Minute to CAS dated 5 May 1932. 
137
 J. M. Spaight, Air Power and War Rights, „Preface‟; and Air Power and the Cities, (London: Longmans, 
1930), page v. Spaight, Air Power and War Rights (third edition, 1947)  in which he admits to there being 
67 
 
source of legal advice for his colleagues in the Air Ministry, and those who were likely to 
become staff officers having attended the Staff College at Andover.  At the most basic 
level he provided a straightforward iteration of the Draft Rules and a guide to their 
interpretation.  More importantly, Spaight also provided detailed examples of where the 
British, French and German air forces had used air power in the First World War.  This 
was not just of historic interest, but presented clear evidence of the custom and practice of 
states – opinion juris.138 He took the analytical process a stage further by highlighting areas 
where the Draft Rules would be likely to be impractical guidelines for future commanders.  
Spaight was prophetic in his identification of the difficulty in discriminating between 
military targets and neighbouring civilian populations.
139
 He went on to highlight the 
potential difficulties for airmen in operating at considerable height and in bad weather.
140
   
 
 As a keen author on wider air power issues, as well as having the insight from his 
position in the Air Ministry, Spaight was well aware of the contemporary thinking on the 
morale-damaging potential of air attack.  He therefore commenced his chapter on 
„Bombing: (III) Civilian Property‟ with a discussion on bombing „for a political or 
psychological end‟.141        
The object of their attack will be moral, psychological and political rather than 
military: the aim will be to so to disorganise and disturb the life and business of the 
enemy community as to make it impossible for the enemy State to continue to 
resist, and at the same time to create in the enemy population as a whole a feeling 
of depression and hopelessness, to make a whole nation war-weary.
142
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Spaight then introduced a degree of realism into the jurisprudential arena by 
acknowledging that states would accept the prohibition on attacking civilian property, but 
that they would qualify it with the proviso that „common sense and practicability‟ would 
not prevent attacks from taking place.
143
  He suggested that jurists and statesmen should 
acknowledge this pragmatism and, instead of seeking outright prohibitions, they should 
attempt to impose some degree of control.  This conditional use of language is important in 
that it allowed Spaight to introduce his next theme in which there was „a right to bombard 
certain categories of purely civilian property [which] should be recognised and 
regulated‟.144   Characteristically, he then went on to describe custom and practice in land 
and naval engagements. 
 
 Spaight summed up his thinking on the subject, as a jurist seeking to influence his 
peers in the legal arena on whom would fall the responsibility of formulating revised rules, 
by bluntly stating that: 
Let there be no mistake about it: the cities will be bombed, whatever rule is laid 
down. In no other way will belligerents be able to seek to obtain the moral effect 
which they will certainly seek.
145
      
  
This set the tone for the thinking in the Air Ministry and subsequently Bomber Command.  
There was a complete acceptance that air warfare should be waged in as humane a way as 
possible consistent with the exigencies of the conflict.  This was underpinned by the 
conflicting wishes to see as fair a code of rules as could be achieved, and this was still 
being sought in August 1939.
146
   But there was also an underlying awareness that future 
conflict would not be so constrained for long.  In the interim, therefore, moral and legal 
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thinking was allowed to develop in parallel with the new Service‟s thinking on how best 
both to survive the predations of the other arms and build a unique, and potentially war 
winning strategy and doctrine. 
 
 
Air Doctrine and Strategy 
At first sight, the literature on Royal Air Force policy, strategy and doctrine is extensive.
147
  
The formal, academic, literature is supplemented by a range of works, including those by 
Spaight detailed above, that were published over the period of the inception of Bomber 
Command and these will be discussed in due course.  In order to complete the intellectual 
context, it is nevertheless necessary to examine the thinking that is likely to have influence 
those in the period responsible for the formulation of formal thinking and teaching. 
 
 As thinking about the employment of air power emerged from the First World War, 
any purity in the debate was almost instantly altered by the requirement of Trenchard, 
Sykes (as the first heads of Service) and their respective staffs to justify the new Service 
remaining in being.
148
    This required the staffs to be able to articulate what air power 
could do, what it was for, how it could be developed and, critically, why the new weapon 
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should be wielded by an independent arm.  There needed to be a consistent message to 
prevent the other two Services making mischief.  There was therefore a range of articles, 
formal publications and lectures articulating the role of air power, although these did not 
concentrate exclusively on the future of strategic bombing. 
 
 Whether or not this stream of official (and semi-official) consciousness constituted 
formal doctrine depends on the use of the term.  For the purposes of this thesis, it would 
not be appropriate to try and precisely prescribe which definition of doctrine should be 
used and how inter-war thinking fitted into this.  There were, however, several consistent 
themes, as well as some fundamental flaws, in the thinking over the period.  Whatever 
definition of doctrine is used there is an underlying assumption that, for it to be valid, it has 
been underpinned by evidence of fundamental principles that have been refined over a 
period of time.  The thinking should then have been subject a process of review and 
evaluation.
149
 Other than some experience of air power in policing operations, the actual 
inter-war experience provided no scope for the RAF to evaluate the potential of strategic 
bombing.
150
  Furthermore, there was a serious, but not always admitted, gap between the 
technological realities of the fledgling Service, and its supporting industry, and the 
aspirations of the advocates of strategic bombing.  But this combination of negative factors 
did not deter the senior military officers, and their successors who worked through the 
ranks and the Staff College process, from imbibing, internalising and reiterating the 
thinking over the period covered by the thesis.  The suggestion that the Air Staff possessed 
an „almost passionate faith in the efficacy of the bomber offensive as a major war-winning 
factor‟, coupled with the debate as to whether the belief was justified does not detract from 
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the fact that that was actually what they thought and formed the intellectual basis for their 
plans.
151
 It is also relevant to note that this faith was not merely a figment of the British 
airmen‟s imagination.  The indications from colleagues in the United States, and from 
influential authors such as Fuller and Liddell Hart encouraged them in their belief.
152
  
 
 The origins of the thinking run somewhat deeper than would seem obvious if 
examined in the cold light of technological advance in powered flight.  British thinking had 
been (and arguably still was) dominated by concerns of Empire and the use of maritime 
power to protect the trade routes.  Diplomacy was aimed at preventing continental 
engagement.  Meilinger has suggested that this maritime legacy was evident in early air 
power thinking; it is also evident in Frankland‟s use of Mahanian theory to underpin his 
analysis of the strategic bomber offensive against Germany.
153
 This allowed British 
thinkers to remain comparatively detached from the Clausewitzian insistence that defeat of 
the enemy army was the precursor to victory.  Armies could be side-stepped by air power 
aimed at the heart of the enemy interior; this mirrored the long Naval tradition of 
bombarding (and blockading) the enemy homeland.
154
   Superimposed on this high-level 
thought was a generally held deep abhorrence of the attrition and casualties of the First 
World War; future strategy would need to avoid a repetition.
155
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 The story of the formation of the Royal Air Force as an independent air arm has 
been well told, not least in the Official History.
156
  The critical document, The Second 
Report of the Prime Minister’s Committee on Air Organisation and Home Defence against 
Air Raids, dated 17
th
 August 1917, established the new Service under its own Air Ministry.  
The review was initiated by the Prime Minister (Lloyd George), and carried out by him and 
General Smuts, in order to examine the arrangements for home defence and air 
organisation generally.
157
 Its final paragraph emphasised that „air supremacy may in the 
long run become as important a factor in the defence of the Empire as sea supremacy‟.158 
But the end of the First World War saw an immediate constriction on budgets and pressure 
from the Army and Royal Navy for the reintegration of „their‟ elements of the new 
Service.
159
 Trenchard‟s response was a detailed Memorandum issued in December 1918 
iterating the Air Power Requirements of the Empire.
160
  His recommendations included 
provision of a balanced force embracing home defence, a striking force (which could be 
used for Imperial police work), specialist forces for cooperation with land and sea forces, 
kite balloon and airship services and units to undertake coastguard duties.  In Part II the 
CAS examined the strategic considerations: 
Future wars between civilised nations will be struggles for life in which entire 
populations, together with their industrial resources, will be thrown into the scale. 
Evolution has brought about the creation of air fleets to meet the demands of such 
warfare.  These will consist of home defence units and striking forces.  The object 
of the striking forces will be nerve centres, the armies and navies of the opponent, 
the population as a whole, his national moral and the industries, without which he 
cannot wage war.
161
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The following years saw repeated attempts by the other two Services to disband the Royal 
Air Force, stimulating considerable correspondence and Cabinet debate.
162
  The ensuing 
doctrinal approach therefore evolved with serious political, financial and bureaucratic 
influences, but contained three enduring themes. 
 
 The first of these was the vital importance of air superiority, involving the defeat of 
the enemy air force and providing the home defence that public and political pressure 
insisted upon.
163
 Practical experience of day, and especially night, air defence of the United 
Kingdom had highlighted the considerable difficulties involved.  Furthermore, adequate 
defence required close liaison between army and air force units – between fighters, search 
lights and anti-aircraft artillery.  Although this had descended to a bureaucratic level by 
1924 (with formation of the Romer Committee), the Headquarters of Air Defence of 
England (under command of an Air Marshal) included fighter and bomber squadrons.
164
  
This latter point acknowledges the key Trenchardian dictum that air power was considered 
to be an essentially offensive weapon.
165
  The third element of the doctrinal thinking was 
the emphasis on the psychological impact of air power being more significant than the 
physical effect.  It was conventional thinking to cite the Napoleonic dictum that the moral 
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was to the physical as three to one.
166
  Trenchard conveniently expanded the arithmetic to a 
factor ten to one for air power (and on one occasion even twenty to one).
167
     
 
 These thoughts, not surprisingly, found their way into the earliest doctrine manuals. 
The opening sentence of CD22 – Operations Manual, Royal Air Force, stated that the 
„Royal Air Force will be trained in peace and led in war in accordance with the doctrine 
contained in this volume‟.168  Parton makes the tacit assumption that the writing, and 
subsequent publication, of CD22 actually resulted in a doctrine manual.
169
 It is evident that 
the Air Ministry intended that it should be circulated to every officer in the Royal Air 
Force of Flight Lieutenant rank and above.
170
  The nature of the content of the manual 
meant that it had to remain classified at „Confidential‟ meaning that it had to be stored in a 
locked steel chest which would be specially issued for the purpose!
171
  At a time of 
financial stringency, this gives some idea of the Air Ministry‟s determination to 
disseminate thinking on Air Power to the widest corners of the new Service.
172
 
Notwithstanding the limited track record of air power prior to publication it is clear that 
much effort went into distilling the experience of those who had flown in the First World 
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War; the first Staff College Course at Andover spent a considerable period of time going 
through the document making detailed amendments.  
In the fine library I was present at a Conference engaged on the „Operations 
Manual of the Royal Air Force‟; and here round a long table were collected ten 
officers each of whom had won very great distinction in the late war.  They had 
before them a first draft of the Manual and were amending it sentence by sentence 
in the light of experiences in the field.
 173
            
 
Considerable use was made of the document with 75 copies going to the Royal Naval 
College at Greenwich; the RAF Staff College Commandant confirmed to the Air Ministry 
that it was „the basis for instruction‟ and that students were „constantly told to refer to 
it‟.174 The Manual also became the basis for the officers‟ promotion examination.175  
 
 The Manual consisted of eleven chapters, the first six of which were adapted from 
the Field Service Regulations, Volume II, 1920 by permission of the Army Council.
176
  
Chapter seven dealt with „Aerial Operations and Aerial Fighting‟ with the next three 
covering co-operation with the Navy and the Army and then combined operations.  The 
final chapter dealt with „Aircraft in Warfare against an Uncivilised Enemy‟.  The critical 
chapter on Aerial Operations had only a short section on „Bombing‟ which is described as 
„the long range artillery of the air‟.177 Its operational uses were summarised as: 
(i) Destruction of fighting personnel. 
(ii) Destruction of material on land and sea. 
(iii) Morale effect upon enemy populace. 
(iv) Incendiary effect.                                          
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The section on attack on enemy towns was immediately made subject „the rules which may 
be laid down as the result of international agreement in regard to the bombardment of 
towns from the air‟.178 Similarly, bombardment for the sole purpose of attacking morale 
and in the absence of legitimate objectives was considered not to be justified; both the 
Hague and Geneva Conventions were specifically detailed as constraining the 
commander.
179
   The advice on the use of incendiary bombs was limited to the 
practicability of damage to military buildings and is a far cry from the carnage inflicted on 
Hamburg, Belgrade and Tokyo.
180
 
 
 A similar layout was used in the successor document, Air Publication 1300, Royal 
Air Force War Manual; Part I Operations first published in 1928.
181
 There was, however, 
no mention of reliance on Field Service Regulations and the opening chapters have 
considerable variation.  The sections devoted to operations with the Army and Royal Navy 
and Combined Operations were retained.
182
  The air power element in this manual was 
split into four chapters covering Air Warfare, Air Bombardment, Air Fighting and Air 
Attack on Aerodromes.
183
 The opening paragraph stated that „the special responsibility of 
the air forces in war is security against hostile air power‟.  But that this „cannot be assured 
by defensive measures alone; it ultimately depends upon a successful air offensive‟.184 The 
Manual goes on to emphasise that the range and powers of evasion allow aircraft to strike 
directly at „the enemy‟s means of resistance... such as naval or military organisations, or 
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centres of production‟.185  The principle of offence being better than defence was 
emphasised throughout, as is the severe effect of bombardment on moral.
186
 Furthermore, 
sustained attack would cause the enemy to divert aircraft to home defence.
187
   The need 
for air superiority ran through air power sections as a continuous thread, albeit with the 
caveats acknowledging the difficulty of home air defence against a determined and 
disciplined bomber formation.
188
 Overall the themes remained generally constant, but it is 
significant that AP1300 (unlike its predecessor) stressed the primacy of the strategic 
bombing offensive over the battle for air superiority.  It is also significant that both 
manuals cover a lot of ground in addition to the primacy of the bomber, thereby explicitly 
acknowledging that the RAF had other things to do.  
 
 The consistent „Trenchardian‟ doctrinal themes were reinforced through the full 
circle in lectures not only to the Staff College students, but also more widely.
189
  The Staff 
college lectures on air power were, however, few in number and, significantly, delivered 
by the Commandant in person.
190
 Similar lectures were delivered to the other Staff 
Colleges.
191
 As is evident from the Air Publications giving samples of student essays, the 
students were exposed to a wide range of subjects and were not „strange though it may 
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seem) nurtured on the pure milk of Douhet‟.192  A similarly catholic variety of titles is 
evident in the subjects chosen for publication in the RAF Quarterly. This was first 
published in 1930 under the editorial guidance of Squadron Leader C. G. Burge, who it 
would appear, also published articles under the pseudonym „Squadron Leader‟.193  
Although the degree of influence is hard to quantify, it is noteworthy that a number of 
middle-ranking officers, who would rise to senior positions during the Second World War, 
chose to contribute to journals such as the RAF Quarterly and the Journal of the Royal 
United Services Institute.
194
  These journals were also strongly recommended to candidates 
aspiring to attend the Staff College at Andover.
195
 
  
The current and future leaders were not only subject to official (and semi-official) 
indoctrination on air power, but were also exposed to a range of external stimuli 
advocating the use, or even primacy, of air power.  Liddell Hart, for example stressed that  
Victory in air war will lie with whichever side first gains the moral objective... 
 
And.. 
 
If.... the decisiveness of the moral objective is admitted, is it not the height of 
absurdity to base the military forces of a nation on infantry which – even if 
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unopposed – take weeks to get to reach Essen or Berlin, for example, when aircraft 
could reach and destroy both in a matter of hours.
196
   
 
Similarly, Fuller emphasised the vital importance of control of the air, but went on to 
suggest that air warfare would allow economic destruction to replace the carnage of the 
trenches.
197
 He also stressed the agility and manoeuvrability of aircraft over the infantry 
concluding that „THE TRADITIONAL SOLDIER IS DOOMED‟.198  These works were 
duly added to the RAF Staff College reading lists.  
 
 Other authors, such as L. E. O. Charlton, used the experiences of the First World 
War to predict the likely course of the next conflict.  His book, War over England, 
described (in a fictional setting) the early air raids on London, concluding that air defence 
was a lost cause. He then went on to describe the horrors of air attack on the civilian 
populations.
199
  For the potential future leaders, Charlton‟s work was significant because 
he was a recently retired Air Commodore and had worked with many of them in the Air 
Ministry.    
 
 For better, or worse, the risk of untold horrors from the air was pervasive.  During 
the discussions on disarmament in 1932 – both in Ministerial meetings (which as Lord 
President of the Council he chaired on behalf of the Prime Minister) and internationally -  
Stanley Baldwin became increasingly concerned about „the appalling consequences of a 
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future war conducted from the air‟.200 His biographers lament that this became something 
of a passion with Baldwin allowing the emotion in his speeches to impinge on the logic.
201
 
In the House of Commons on 10 November 1932, Baldwin admitted that disarmament 
would not stop war, but could make it less dangerous.  He then went to shock his listeners: 
I think it is well also for the man in the street to realise that there is no power on 
earth that can protect him from being bombed.  Whatever people may tell him, the 
bomber will always get through.  The only defence is offence, which means that 
you have to kill more women and children more quickly than the enemy if you 
want to save yourselves.
202
 
 
Baldwin then went on to devolve the responsibility for the potential annihilation of 
European civilisation onto the heads of those who advocated air warfare.
203
 
 
 The consistent themes of air power being an essentially offensive tool and the 
importance of air superiority thus gained widespread currency and became firmly 
embedded in the thinking of the existing and future leaders.  They were reinforced by 
public speeches and external journal articles.
204
 But the central belief in the primacy of 
offensive bombing operations (with the disproportionate impact on morale) had to be 
balanced against the public and political requirements adequately to defend the home base.  
Furthermore, the RAF could not just sit and await the coming of the massive bombing 
fleet; exercises had to be carried out with the other Services and the work of imperial 
policing had to continue.  These seemingly conflicting priorities explain the variety of air 
power issues included in the doctrine publications, the Staff College syllabi and in journal 
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articles.  The diversity of the challenges also impacted on the development of the 
institutional structure of the Air Ministry and its subordinate commands.    
 
 This chapter has set out the intellectual context in which the future leaders of the 
bomber offensive were professionally developed and has provided an explanation as to 
why their thinking may have evolved.  This has then to be set in the context of the 
organisations in which they worked as more junior officers and for which they would 
eventually become responsible.  In particular, the formation of the Air Ministry and how it 
grew to meet the likely challenges will be examined in the next chapter.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
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Chapter Three 
 
THE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT 
 
  
The previous chapter set out the intellectual context in which the future leaders of the 
strategic bomber offensive either commenced or continued their professional development. 
This chapter develops some of the key themes by describing how the organisation into 
which they were introduced evolved.  As their careers moved forward, these leaders built 
on the foundations and their progress became inextricably linked with the development of 
the organisation.  No organisation arrives on the scene fully fledged, or without some 
evidence of an evolutionary process; indeed Barnard, in his classic text on the subject, has 
argued that organisations specifically emerge as a result of individuals co-ordinating their 
efforts in furtherance of a common purpose.
1
  Furthermore, once formed, the organisations 
are open systems vulnerable to the vicissitudes occasioned by changing events, especially 
at the interfaces with other entities.
2
  These may be inside an organisation where different 
parts, or divisions, may have competing priorities. The interfaces exhibit friction during 
times of stress or competition for resources.  Even a superficial examination of the conduct 
of the war from 1914 to 1918 reveals such tensions between the War Office and the 
Admiralty, and across wider government.  Superimposed on all of this was the rapid 
growth of air power with the concomitant requirement for its organisation, supply and 
utilization.
3
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This chapter will not attempt to replicate the extensive literature (detailed in the 
previous chapter in the context of the intellectual background) on the birth of the Royal Air 
Force, and its evolution through to 1936.  Nevertheless, there are certain key elements of 
the debate and controversies at the interfaces that had a direct impact on the growth of the 
new organisation, and its subsequent employment in battle.  Furthermore, they also had an 
impact on thinking that, once internalised, underpinned the development of subsequent 
structures.  The first of these was that the growth of air power came about through an 
inexorable cycle of technological innovation fuelled by increased operational demands for 
ever-improved equipment.
4
  Neither the Admiralty nor the War Office seemed sufficiently 
agile in meeting these challenges, particularly when the German Fokkers were in 
ascendency.
5
  The second enduring theme was the seemingly paradoxical demand for air 
power to be utilised primarily for the defence of the United Kingdom in general, and 
London in particular, while the operational priority was for unremitting offensive in 
support of the army in France.  Inextricably intertwined in this was the public and political 
clamour for reprisals in the face of German air attacks.
6
  The final theme was the growing 
realisation that air power was capable of independent action beyond that envisaged by the 
two older Services.  All these themes would recur from the onset of the problems in 1916 
through to the end of the Second World War and it is therefore worth examining their 
provenance. 
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This chapter will outline the legal and political frameworks in which Departments 
of State conducted their business in peacetime and, in particular, during times of crisis.  It 
will then go on to examine the formation of the various organisational mechanisms that 
were introduced in turn to try and remedy some of the perceived deficiencies in the status 
quo leading to the formation of the Air Ministry and the Royal Air Force as an independent 
Service.  Following the consistent themes described above, and in particular the priorities 
of offence against defence of London, the chapter will then look at the early years of the 
new organisation and at the friction at the interfaces; in the light of ensuring that the new 
service had a real purpose and was fit to carry this out, the chapter will look at Trenchard‟s 
role.  
 
The Constitutional and Legal Basis 
A brief explanation of the legal position of Departments of State will help to explain a 
range of issues from the use of Orders in Council, through the role of the Cabinet 
Committee structure, to the role of the Air Council in „directing‟ Bomber Command 
leaders on the course of action to be taken.  This latter issue was subsequently a bone of 
contention with Harris who, when he was DCAS (November 1940 – May 1941), stopped 
the practice of his subordinates writing to Commanders-in-Chief saying that they „were 
directed‟ to act in a given way; Harris 
looked upon Commanders- in-Chief in the field as responsible people who were not 
to be bothered by the trumpery opinions of young Jacks-in-office who felt that they 
could blow themselves up with the full authority of the Air Council. But the same 
thing began again when I left the Air Ministry and was myself a Commander-in-
Chief.
7
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From this brief quotation, it can be seen that Harris was something of a lone voice in 
bemoaning a system that was clearly well entrenched. 
 
 The essence of the constitutional status of Departments of State is that the authority 
is derived from the Crown.  Over time, English legal thinkers had conceived a duality 
between the King as a person and the Crown as being „suggestive of a more general public, 
governmental or administrative sphere‟.8  This evolved into the Crown as a corporation 
embodying the King; the King in Council; and the King in Parliament comprising the 
Lords and the Commons.
9
  Out of these elements, the English (sic) Constitution maintains 
that Parliament is sovereign in that it can make and unmake laws; that none of these are 
absolutely binding on successive Parliaments; and that all laws can be dealt with in the 
same way (i.e. there are no special status constitutional laws).
10
  The unwritten nature of 
the Constitution has allowed it to evolve and adapt to circumstances, at least until the 
advent of European legislation.
11
  Notwithstanding resulting complications, the situation 
for the period in question in this thesis was straightforward.  Despite the lack of a formal 
document there was, however, a series of rules, practices and conventions for the guidance 
of the Prime Minister and her or his Government.
12
  In practical terms, an Act of 
Parliament would be ushered through the Commons and the Lords in accordance with the 
practices and conventions prior to receiving Royal Assent.  In the normal course of events 
Parliament would ensure that the law-making elements of the Act were clearly iterated in 
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the text.  But there would be a tacit acknowledgement that not every eventuality could be 
foreseen so a clause would be added allowing that „His Majesty might by Order in Council 
direct...‟ thereby allowing the Minister and his officials to turn the Act into a practical 
means of administrating the Department.
13
  The combined process also allowed the 
Ministers, and bodies such as the Air Council, to take on legal powers under the original 
Act.  It was from this chain of authority that Harris‟ young „Jacks-in-office‟ derived their 
authority, ultimately from Parliament, but through the exercise of the power of the Crown 
and the authority hence vested in the Secretary of State at the head of the Air Council. 
 
 The conventions of the Constitution effectively regulated the workings of the 
Cabinet, providing the essential rules.
14
  The critical element was that the Cabinet was (and 
remains) responsible to Parliament „for the general conduct of affairs‟.15 But, in practical 
terms, the volume of business facing the Prime Minister and her/his colleagues has long 
been such that the full cabinet alone would have been swamped with business and this led 
to the delegation of specific work to specialist committees.
16
  Of these, the Committee of 
Imperial Defence is the most important and has the longest history.
17
  The role of this 
Committee, and its successors, along with the Chiefs of Staff Committee is again an 
essential backdrop to the organisational context. 
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The Cabinet Committees and the Chiefs 
The control and responsibility of the military has been close to the heart of English 
constitutional thinking since at least the accession of William of Orange; prior to that, the 
sovereign was solely responsible for the defence of the realm and military affairs.
18
 As 
Parliament gradually asserted its sovereignty, and real power vis-a-vis the Crown, so the 
concept of „civil control‟ of the military gained in credibility.19  In Britain, in particular, the 
shadow of Cromwell ensured that never again would the civil authorities risk the military 
being allowed the scope to become too powerful; in essence, this was done by placing 
command of the military in the hands of officers who were responsible to the Crown and 
the administration under civil ministers reporting to Parliament.
20
  This latter facet would 
occasionally have a deleterious effect on operational efficiency, or even worse, would 
allow encourage politicians to impose their version of strategy.
21
  A standard pattern 
emerged in which the Prime Minister and his close colleagues would formulate military 
strategy in the context of the diplomatic situation; the only records would usually be the 
Prime Minister‟s reports to the Sovereign.22  Inevitably, and typical of the British 
Constitution, the situation was rarely as straightforward as this with complicating factors 
such as a senior member of the Royal Family acting as the Commander-in-Chief and the 
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abundance of advice available in the House of Lords from ennobled senior military 
personages.
23
 
 
 Events in the Nineteenth Century, such as Crimea, the scale of the American Civil 
War, and the rise of the Prussian war machine with its victories over Austria and France 
ensured change in the process of the formulation of military strategy.
24
 The Cardwell 
Reforms (which had been in progress since his appointment in 1868) and Disraeli‟s 
formation of the Colonial Defence Committee in 1877 was the start of a process of 
evolution.
25
  It nevertheless required further failure in the Boer War to stimulate Lord 
Elgin‟s Royal Commission which duly gave the view that the principal cause of failure was 
that inter-departmental communication had been inadequate with the Army unaware of the 
Foreign and Colonial Offices efforts.
26
  Balfour set up a Cabinet Defence Committee in 
December 1902, but gave it considerably more credibility by chairing it himself and 
inviting the professional heads of the Army and Navy to attend; Hankey (who was to be 
Secretary of the successor Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) for many years) has 
made the point that „in strict constitutional theory, the Prime Minister was the only 
member‟.27  The ensuing debates, however, were far from harmonious not least because the 
two Services had diametrically opposed outlooks on strategy with the Navy favouring an 
elegant Maritime strategy based on Command of the Sea (which would have distinct 
echoes in the inter-war period when the RAF struggled to survive). The Army, on the other 
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hand, was unable to string together a coherent case and their dire straits were made worse 
by the Elgin Commission‟s criticism of the War Office‟s poor management.28  Balfour 
asked one of the Elgin Commission‟s members, Lord Esher, to review the situation and the 
War Office was reformed along the lines of the Admiralty with an Army Council.
29
  This 
set the pattern that the Air Ministry followed in the years from 1917.  The other important 
output from the Esher Committee was the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) which 
came into being on 4 May 1904. 
 
 The Esher Committee reported that: 
The British Empire is pre-eminently a great Naval, Indian and Colonial Power.  
There are, nevertheless, no means of co-ordinating defence problems, for dealing 
with them as a whole, for defining the proper functions of the various elements, and 
for ensuring that on the one hand, peace preparations are carried out upon an 
consistent plan, and, on the other hand, that in times of emergency, a definite war 
policy, based on solid data, can be formulated.
30
 
 
The challenges that the Esher Committee sought to tackle, in making the high level 
machinery of defence „fit for purpose‟, were to remain relevant through the  First World 
War and during the preparations for the Second.
31
  Having the machinery in place and 
actually exercising it to its full utility were, however, different matters.  In attempting to 
make the system work, an important facet of the new Committee was the establishment of 
a permanent secretariat (under Sir George Clarke who had been a member of the Esher 
Committee).
32
  The penchant of successive Prime Ministers for inviting senior 
establishment figures to sit on the Committee, even though they had no direct departmental 
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responsibilities, tended to make the body somewhat cumbersome, but once installed their 
removal would have seemed „discourteous‟.33  This led to the proliferation of sub-
committees, especially where there were enquiries to be conducted.
34
  Again, these sub-
committees would have a significant role to play in the development of policy through to 
the Second World War.  In particular, the work of the Air Defence Standing Sub-
Committee, which was endorsed by the CID on 25 April 1912, led to the formation of the 
RFC later in the same year.
35
 
 
 Jackson and Bramall have suggested that by the outbreak of the First World War, 
the efforts of the Esher Committee had resulted in a system that was technically fit for 
purpose, „if used properly‟.36  In particular, Hankey‟s so-called „War Book‟ ensured that 
the CID had co-ordinated Defence policies and priorities and that the War Office had been 
brought into the twentieth century in terms of its organisation being relatively fit for 
purpose.
37
  Jackson and Bramall, however, went on to lament what they considered to be 
failures in progress in that the Secretariat had not developed into a full blown „Great 
General Staff‟ along the Prussian lines and that there was no overall „supremo‟ – beyond 
the Prime Minister in „Supreme Command‟.38  Sir William Robertson (as CIGS) 
commented that the Cabinet either had no confidence in the General Staff or did not know 
how to use it.
39
  Hankey effectively acknowledged this, and the accusation that that 
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Asquith allowed the machinery of defence to slide into haphazard cabinet discussion.
40
  In 
terms of the development of the system, as opposed to its specific workings, it will not be 
necessary to follow the detail of the First World War.  It is merely sufficient to say that the 
CID barely functioned as intended over the period.
41
 
 
 Lloyd George, who had developed his own system of government in the latter days 
of the War, continued with his War Cabinet until November 1919.
42
  The (now) three 
Chiefs of Staff were frequently „at loggerheads‟ especially during the period 1920-23, 
primarily over the role of air power in the contexts of the future of the battleship, the 
reformations of the RNAS and Imperial Policing; these debates were all the more bitter 
because resources were so scarce.
43
 The Sub-Committee on National and Imperial Defence 
of the CID played host to the discussions which queried the very existence of an 
independent air force.
44
 Almost inevitably, it required the three harbingers of change to 
provide the next catalyst for further organisational development.  The issues of economy 
and the perpetual balancing act between Imperial priorities, Defence requirements and 
Treasury conservatism over the economy remained a constant backdrop.  From the 
operational perspective, Britain had very nearly gone to war with Turkey over the „Chanak 
affair‟.45  Lloyd George sought the views of the Chiefs and that was exactly what he got – 
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three separate viewpoints each from a predictable single Service viewpoint.
46
 The 
momentum for change was inescapable with the notion of a unified Ministry of Defence 
again raising its head as an option in a memorandum from Viscount Haldane entitled „The 
Direction and Staff Work of Imperial Defence‟.47  Haldane also considered that in 
providing advice to the CID the „three Chiefs would have been in full consultation before 
coming to sit with it, and they would come with views which they had worked out with 
their respective Ministers‟.48  This was taken further with the publication of the Salisbury 
report which sought, among other things, to regularise the ad hoc Chiefs of Staff 
Committee that Hankey had been encouraging.  The report saw no reason to take the issue 
of a combined Ministry of Defence any further, considering that it had been fully 
debated.
49
 The report went to state that: 
[T]he existing system of co-ordination by the Committee of Imperial Defence is not 
sufficient to secure full initiative and responsibility for defence as a whole and 
requires to be defined and strengthened.
50
 
 
In addition to the functions of Chiefs of Staff as advisers on questions of sea, land 
or air policy respectively, to their own Board or Council, each of the three Chiefs of 
Staff will have an individual and collective responsibility for advising on defence 
policy as a whole, the three constituting, as it were, a Super-Chief of a War Staff in 
Commission.  In carrying out this function they will meet together for the 
discussion of questions which affect their joint responsibilities.
51
 
 
The critical issues in this were the emphasis on the collective nature of the Chiefs‟ 
endeavours and advice and that they effectively became a unified entity.  The Chiefs of 
Staff Committee met formally on 17 July 1923 for the first time.
52
  It is beyond the scope 
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of this thesis to study the efficacy of the COS committee in detail, but Beckett and Gooch 
have commented that „what might have proved a beneficial development became little 
more than an arena for inter-service wrangling over roles and resources‟.53  As will become 
clear during the subsequent treatment of Disarmament and re-armament, these issues 
would be central to the development of the RAF and of its bomber force in particular. 
 
 For the period up to the formation of Bomber Command as a distinct entity in 1936, 
the direction from the government, and the reciprocal function of providing advice, would, 
for better or worse, be channelled through the Chiefs of Staff and, where necessary, 
endorsed by the CID.  In the interim the responsibility for provision of advice and setting 
up the staff functions to support the CAS lay within the Air Ministry. 
 
The Air Ministry 
From its inception in 1912, it was inevitable that there would be competition between the 
component parts of the „Flying Corps‟ (consisting of a „Naval Wing, a Military Wing, and 
a Central Flying School for the training of pilots‟) for resources and over operational 
policy issues.
54
 This „marital bliss of 1912 was, however, short-lived‟ when the Naval 
Wing became the Royal Naval Air Service and its Military counterpart, the Royal Flying 
Corps.
55
  Further major change towards a unified air entity would require the impact of 
Jackson and Bramall‟s harbingers of change: defeat, cost and public opinion.56  For 
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military aviation, these came to a climax at the end of 1915 and into 1916 at the height of 
the so-called „Fokker scourge‟.57  This represented a sufficiently serious defeat to have 
been able to convince people that „something was seriously wrong with our air 
administration and that nothing short of radical change would set it right‟.58  The effects of 
the „Fokker scourge‟ were exacerbated by the apparent impunity with which the German 
Zeppelins were able to drop their bomb loads on British targets.
59
  These raids caused two, 
quite specific, reactions from the public that would have far-reaching consequences for the 
organisation of air power in the inter-war years.  The first of these was the outcry that the 
raids should be stopped by interception prior to them reaching London (in particular); and 
the second was the demand that Germany should suffer similar treatment.
60
  The debate, in 
Parliament in particular, was inflamed by the use of high rhetoric with, for example, 
accusations that RFC pilots were being „murdered by the government‟ in having been sent 
to fly in sub-standard machines.
61
  Inevitably, the furore was taken up by Lord Northcliffe 
and his Daily Mail.
62
 
 
                                                 
57
 See C.G. Grey, A History of the Air Ministry (London: Allen & Unwin, 1940), pp. 51-54.  Grey was an 
interesting character; he was editor of the Aeroplane magazine and often expressed views that were 
extremely critical of the government on air issues.  For a more pragmatic source, and one which is effectively 
an „inside voice‟ as a member of the Air Ministry see J. M. Spaight, The Beginnings of Organised Air Power, 
p.32. 
58
 Spaight, ibid. 
59
 See Cooper, The Birth of Independent Air Power, p 42 
60
 See Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality, pp. 22-24, Cooper, The Birth of Independent Air Power, p43. For an 
example of contemporary reporting, see „Air Debate‟, The Times, 17 Feb 1916 in which the First Lord of the 
Admiralty ( Balfour, on behalf of the Prime Minister) confessed to Parliament just how far behind the UK is 
in the aerial prowess.  
61
 See Grey, A History of the Air Ministry, pp.55-56 for the exploits of Mr. Noel Pemberton Billing M.P. who 
was the Member for East Hertfordshire.  Billing had an early interest in aviation and founded the 
Supermarine Workshops in 1911; he was allowed to resign from the RNAS in 1916 (as a Squadron 
Commander) to enter politics to lobby on behalf of the flying services – which he did with „vehemence and 
plain speaking‟. 
62
 Ibid.  See J Lee Thompson, Northcliffe: Press Baron in Politics 1865-1922 (London: Murray, 2000). 
95 
 
 Although technological developments were in the „pipe-line‟ to defeat the „Fokker 
scourge‟, the momentum for change was too great and the government set in place an 
enquiry under the chairmanship of Mr Justice Baihache KC to investigate the perceived 
„maladministration‟.63  In practice, this enquiry made little headway with the Admiralty 
refusing to give evidence and a collective lack of support for its aims.
64
  In parallel with 
this enquiry, the Joint Air War Committee was set up in March 1916 under the 
chairmanship of the Earl of Derby (who was not in the Cabinet at the time, but „would 
have the closest possible contact with it);
65
 its main objective was to tackle the competition 
between the Army and the Royal Navy for aircraft which Hankey (as Secretary to the CID) 
described as a „matter of utmost difficulty‟ and over the limited output of engines as 
„almost a scandal‟.66  Internal disagreements prevented this entity ever functioning.67  The 
crucial factor, however, was the Committee had no executive powers with which to force 
one side or the other to concede hard won ground.
68
  It was therefore replaced by an Air 
Board under the chairmanship of Lord Curzon (Leader of the House of Lords).  The 
unsatisfactory state of affairs continued with both Services ordering their own material 
without consultation, and frequently without even informing the Air Board.
69
  The 
acrimony was described by Lloyd George as follows: 
When Lord Curzon put forward his plan along these lines [for the formation of a 
department with the sole and complete control over production of machinery for 
aerial warfare], he was in turn challenged by Mr. Balfour [First Lord of the 
Admiralty] in a very caustic and amusing memorandum.  To this Lord Curzon 
replied in suitable terms.  It was clear that if the controversy did not conduce to the 
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provision of aeroplanes it at least provided excellent entertainment for those who 
were privileged to read these documents and to hear the discussions.
70
 
 
Furthermore, it is evident that the Prime Minister (Asquith) was unwilling to bring the 
matter to a head.
71
  It has nevertheless been suggested that by dogged determination, and 
continuing to exist, Curzon‟s Air Board set a blueprint for future co-ordinated aircraft 
supply which could be taken forward by its successor.
72
  For future generations, the legacy 
of Curzon‟s „bludgeon‟ (against Balfour‟s rapier) was the gradual attrition of the 
Admiralty‟s grip on air policy.73  In effect, Curzon took on Trenchard‟s line that the RNAS 
should concentrate on work with the Fleet while the RFC did everything over the land 
(including strategic bombing and the possible reprisals demanded by public opinion).
74
 
 
 The lack of formal standing of Curzon‟s Air Board was remedied in the New 
Ministries and Secretaries Bill, which became law on 22 December 1916, and provided 
that the President of the Board „shall be deemed to be a Minister appointed under this Act‟ 
and hence the Air Board became a Ministry.
75
  But as Spaight went on to point out, this 
Act did more than give statutory existence to the old board; it became a real Ministry, 
albeit one with limited powers.
76
 Furthermore, Curzon was at pains to suggest that this new 
Ministry would be permanent, and not just for the duration of hostilities.  The membership 
of the new Board was set out in an Order in Council of 6 February 1917 with Lord 
Cowdray (an industrialist who had been a Liberal MP and was created Viscount Cowdray 
in order to take this post) at its head; the powers ascribed to the Board have been described 
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as „elastic‟.77  To some extent this, along with the transfer of responsibility for production 
to the Ministry of Munitions reduced the chaos, and friction, over the supply of aircraft and 
engines.
78
  Indeed, the Air Board, and its growing staff in the Hotel Cecil (on the Strand, 
but now demolished), became something of a supply ministry with added responsibility for 
personnel and general administration.
79
  But there was a critical gap in the field of policy, 
in particular in the balance between air defence and offence.
80
 
 
 The major accusations against the efficiency, or relevance, of the Cowdray Board 
stemmed from its apparent inability to prosecute raids against Germany or, as events were 
about to show, to defend London against German attacks.
81
  The attack by German Gotha 
bombers on 7 July 1917 on London, „without any effective challenge‟, inevitably caused 
considerable concern.
82
 The ensuing debate in both Houses of Parliament covered the now 
traditional issues of retribution and improved home defence.
83
  Accordingly, Lloyd George 
decided that, although the House had broadly accepted his explanation that the Army in 
France came first, he considered that „we must go far more thoroughly into the matter, with 
a view to ensuring the best possible use of the air weapon alike and for defence‟.84  Lloyd 
George had also developed a marked distrust of his military advisers and used the 
opportunity to „break the strategic stranglehold of the military command‟.85  He therefore 
set up a formal committee consisting of himself and Lieutenant-General Jan Smuts who 
was to confer with representatives from the Admiralty, the General Staff, C-in-C Home 
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Forces and „such other experts as we might desire‟.86  Smuts produced two reports for the 
War Cabinet and the literature deals with his progress in considerable detail.
87
  Smuts‟ 
Second Report (Committee on Air Organisation and Home Defence Against Air Raids (2
nd
 
Report) dated 17
th
 August 1917) denounced the Air Board as being „merely a 
Conference‟.88  Smuts emphasised that although the Board had „nominal authority to 
discuss questions of policy, it had no real power to do so‟.89 
 
 Smuts‟ report then went on to contrast (as opposed to the normal practice of 
drawing parallels in the functions of) the Air Service with the use of artillery; in this he 
emphasised that the air arm could „conduct extensive operations far from, and 
independently of, both Army and Navy‟.90  This ability, and arguably desirability, of 
independent operations was to become a cornerstone of Trenchard and his Air Ministry‟s 
rhetoric for the period up to the formation of Bomber Command.  Smuts acknowledged 
that the „subjection‟ of the Air Board and service could be justified in its infancy, but saw 
every reason why it should now be raised to the status of an independent Ministry in 
control of its own war service‟.91  The report also considered that the „maintenance of three 
Air Services is out of the question‟.92  Of the eight specific recommendations in the report, 
number 2 is important for the context of the organisation that was subsequently to evolve.  
It recommended that:  
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under the Air Ministry an Air Staff be instituted on the lines of the Imperial 
General Staff responsible for the working out of war plans, the direction of 
operations, the collection of intelligence, and the training of the air personnel; that 
this Staff be equipped with the best brains and practical experience available in our 
present Air Services, and that by periodical appointment to the Staff of officers 
with great practical experience from the front, due provision be made for the 
development of the Staff in response to the rapid advance of this new service.
93
 
 
The War Cabinet discussed the report a week later and accepted the recommendations of 
the report, despite a lengthy discussion initiated by the First Lord of the Admiralty 
(Geddes) who was prepared to accept the new Ministry, but wanted to keep the RNAS 
intact within the Admiralty.
94
  This viewpoint was one that would return, with considerable 
vigour, in the interwar years with direct connotations for the future of the new service and 
its component commands. 
 
 In addition to accepting the recommendations, the War Cabinet appointed a further 
Committee, under Smuts‟ chairmanship, to bring the new service into being and prepare 
the necessary legislation „for submission to Parliament at the earliest possible date‟.95  The 
new Committee proceeded with its work reporting to the War Cabinet on a regular basis 
and finally recommended that the legislation was ready at the meeting on 6 November 
1917.
96
  The Air Force (Constitution) Bill became law on 29 November 1917 and had two 
„remarkable characteristics‟.97  The first was that the „Air Force Act‟ under which the 
discipline of the new service would be based, and its commanding officers empowered, 
was merely a schedule to the „Constitution Act‟; this made it the only Act on the Statute 
Book with no date and the only one to have entered law by this unorthodox means.
98
  The 
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second issue would have more significance as the new organisation took shape in that it 
was largely an „enabling measure‟ providing a structure around which the real detail would 
be added by Orders in Council.
99
  In the House of Lords, Lord Curzon acknowledged that 
it was „a skeleton upon which the flesh and blood will have to be reared as time goes 
on‟.100  As Spaight has emphasised, the debates in Parliament showed clear intent that the 
new Air Council was to be a permanent fixture and not there merely for the duration of the 
War.
101
  The Lord Privy Seal (the Earl of Crawford) stated in his opening address that: 
Aircraft can no longer be regarded as a sub-department of the Admiralty or of the 
War Office.  The air is one.  It is a unity, far more than the sea is and a hundred 
times more than the land is.
102
 
 
Although the intent of Parliament was clear, especially to a lawyer like Spaight, it would 
not prevent the Admiralty from returning to the fray.  The Air Council was based on the 
Army model, not least because it was „thoroughly well understood by the vast majority of 
the officers concerned‟.103  Furthermore, Major Baird, the Under-Secretary of State for Air, 
detailed the role and responsibilities of the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) as being: 
The Chief of the Air Staff is charged with advising His Majesty's Government as to 
the conduct of air operations in all questions of air policy affecting the security of 
the Empire, including Home defence. He is further charged with liaison with the 
Allies, with the Admiralty, and with the Army Council as regards policy, 
operations, and intelligence.
104
 
 
The first part of this requirement was self-explanatory, but the second element stressed the 
key role of senior leaders in managing the interfaces between their organisation and those 
others with which they must make common endeavour.
105
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One of the other key facets of leadership at the highest levels is the requirement 
that an organisation must be fit for purpose. In this context, the building blocks were 
theoretically in place.  But as will become evident when dealing with the strategic air 
offensive in the latter years of the Second World War, even the most perfect organisation 
(if such thing exists) can only function as well as the personalities (and egos) allow it so to 
do, especially when the system is under stress.  In the case of the embryo Royal Air Force, 
Lloyd George singularly failed to recruit a workable „top team‟ and the inevitable strife 
ensued.
106
  Notwithstanding the turbulence over Secretaries of State and the resignation of 
Trenchard from his post as CAS, the Air Ministry sought, not only to find suitable 
accommodation, but also to build an Air Staff along the lines of that in the War Office.
107
  
Given that one of the reasons for the establishment of the new Ministry was to allow air 
policy to be formed outside the traditional bastions of the Admiralty and the War Office 
where it had been subservient to the demands of the parent services, it is not surprising to 
see moves towards this end.  Sir William Weir replaced Lord Rothermere as Secretary of 
State on 25 April 1918 and was to „prove to be a dedicated proponent of the doctrine of 
strategic air power‟.108  Trenchard had been replaced by Major-General Sykes as CAS and 
one of Weir‟s first acts was to force Trenchard into accepting command of the Independent 
Force in France.
109
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The Independent Force
110
 
Although Weir and his new CAS were keen advocates of the strategic potential of air 
power, their thinking was based more on intuition than on established, or detailed 
theoretical work.
111
  Sykes came into post acknowledging that the „final blow against a 
great land power must be the Army‟, but victory „could be won with the assistance of an 
overwhelming strategical [sic] bombing force‟.112  The detailed strategy was to follow and 
was to be embellished as time went on, not least to justify the continued existence of the 
RAF and its potential for independent offensive air operations.  The reality at the time was 
that the government had long been under remit from public opinion to take the air war to 
the German people as retaliation.  Sykes saw the role of the new entity as being „to strike 
far, wide and hard at the enemy‟s manufacturing centres, submarine bases and 
communications‟ and pressed on with his „cherished project‟.113 
 
 It should not, however, be imagined that work on this scheme only commenced 
when Weir and Sykes took office.  In October 1917, when the War Cabinet discussed the 
„forthcoming offensive, reference was made to the great and growing demand on the part 
of the British public for retaliation.  The War Cabinet: 
Approved the arrangements outlined  above in regard to machines and objectives, 
and the Prime Minister impressed on General Trenchard the importance of making 
a success of the forthcoming air offensive, having regard to the effect that such a 
success would have on the moral [sic] of the people at home.
114
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The scheme was based on the deployment of two squadrons (one for day and the other for 
night operations) to Ochey (near Nancy) under the command of Colonel Newall (later to 
become CAS).  Targets were to include the „Lorraine iron-works, and, when conditions 
were favourable, Mannheim and Stuttgart‟.115  Notwithstanding the Prime Minister‟s 
direction to Trenchard, the withdrawal of the aircraft from Haig‟s offensive (3rd Ypres – 
„Passchendaele‟) sparked immediate protest from the CIGS and further debate in the War 
Cabinet.
116
  The reality within Newall‟s VIIIth Brigade was that the demands from the 
Army were such that priority was given to communications targets behind German lines 
(in France) and aerodromes near the lines.
117
   
 
Matters improved little when Trenchard took command of the Force on 6 June 
1918, not least because German defences continued to exact a heavy toll on the bombers 
necessitating diversion of resources into attacking the defenders‟ airfields.118 In his final 
despatch (dated 1 January 1919), Trenchard had seen his two real alternatives as being: 
1. A sustained and continuous attack on one large centre after another until each 
centre was destroyed, and the industrial population largely dispersed to other 
towns; or 
2. To attack as many of the large industrial centres as it was possible to reach with 
the machines at my disposal.
119
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Trenchard chose the latter option largely because of the small numbers of aircraft and their 
limitations „imposed on long-range bombing by the weather‟.120  Trenchard further 
justified his choice: 
By attacking as many centres as could be reached, the moral effect [sic] was first of 
all very much greater, as no town felt safe, and it necessitated continued and 
thorough defensive measures on the part of the enemy to protect the many different 
localities over which my force was operating. At present the moral effect of 
bombing stands undoubtedly to the material effect in a proportion of 20 to 1, and 
therefore it was necessary to create the greatest moral effect possible.
121
 
 
It is an interesting postscript to this despatch to note that Weir, whose term as Secretary of 
State was limited to the duration of the war at his own request, had advised Trenchard to 
keep the „final operational despatch educational for the benefit of the armchair critics‟; 
Weir also shared his own views of the success of the Force.
122
 The clear implication was 
that Weir saw Trenchard returning to high office and was keen that he should not burn his 
boats. 
 
It is a difficult task to analyse the effectiveness of any bomber offensive, even one 
as limited in scale as that carried out by the Independent Force.  In the first instance, the 
desired effect has to be plainly stated.  If the rationale for the Force was merely retaliatory 
then the very fact that it was formed and operated may be said to have implied success.  
Measuring the effect on enemy morale was (and is) all the more difficult.  It is instructive 
to note the views of those directly involved in this limited offensive action.  Trenchard was 
unequivocal and trenchant in his private views: 
Thus the Independent Force comes to an end. A more gigantic waste of effort and 
personnel there has never been in any war.
123
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Although these words from Trenchard‟s (private) diary written on 11 November 1918 have 
been widely quoted, it could be argued that they reflect his personal frustration at finishing 
the War in what he perceived to be an operational backwater, rather than directing the main 
force in support of Haig‟s army.  Furthermore, his attitude belies the fact that much of the 
Force‟s activities were in support of the army either against communications targets or 
enemy airfields.  While there may have been some efficiencies had the force operated 
within Salmond‟s organisation (what had been the RFC in France under Trenchard for 
much of the War), these could hardly be described as „gigantic‟.  According to his 
biographer, Salmond‟s view was that the war would have been won and lost on the north-
western front and that the army needed the support of every aircraft that could be used.
124
  
In his defence of his strategy, Sykes was at pains to point out that he was working to 
Cabinet direction and that it was not his role to demur from this.
125
  He went on to say that 
the „sudden emergencies‟ would have been catered for by the switch of resources.126  
Sykes was also keen to elaborate on the strategy.  His autobiography was published in 
1942 in which he defended his actions from criticism in Slessor‟s work Air Power and 
Armies.
127
 Sykes effectively said that even if the „sole object of war is the destruction of 
the enemy‟s army‟, then destruction of armaments factories, fuel supplies and 
communications were perfectly valid aims.
128
  Given the animosity between Trenchard and 
Sykes, there is a risk that the former‟s language had more to do with their clash than the 
reality of the situation; by the same token, Sykes had clear views on „Trenchard‟s 
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predilection for the tactical offensive‟.129 The implication in this is that Sykes saw himself 
as the more clear-sighted, especially with hindsight.  
 
In terms of the wider literature in assessing the operational effectiveness of the 
Independent Force, the Official History was predictably upbeat about its performance and 
defended Trenchard in particular for his prioritisation of airfield targets in that his organic 
assets were all that were available for the task.
130
  The War in the Air also confirmed that 
the results justified Trenchard‟s policy.131 The debate among scholars is interesting 
because it reflected (and continues to reflect) debates which were to recur over the 
effectiveness of the strategic air offensive against Germany in the Second World War.  
Although C. G. Grey only dealt with the Force in passing, he implied that it had value 
purely because its operations were independent of the War Office and the Admiralty.
132
 
Furthermore, because they were directed from the Air Ministry, these operations were in 
theory, independent of Haig; but in practice, Trenchard could be relied upon to work very 
clearly within his erstwhile master‟s intent. As a keen advocate of the potential of strategic 
bombing, Jones lamented the lack of opportunity for the Force to prove itself and, by 
implication, was critical of the commanders for being insufficiently far-sighted in applying 
the necessary resources thus not exploiting the possible advantages, instead choosing to 
fight an air war which favoured the Germans.
133
 Cooper was altogether more pragmatic 
emphasising the practical and technological limitations of the aircraft, their ordnance and 
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the ability of the crews to bomb accurately by day and especially by night.
134
  He 
highlighted the delays that occurred in production, but is sceptical about the impact on 
morale.
135
  Webster and Frankland have stressed in the introduction to their four-volume 
contribution to the Official History of the Second World War, The Strategic Air Offensive 
against Germany 1939-1945, that the Independent Force was „no more than aspiration. Its 
significance was in the future, not in the struggle of 1918‟.136 
 
This review of the Independent Force not only provided the precedents for many of 
the historiographical debates that were to follow the strategic air offensive in the Second 
World War, but it also set the tone for the often heated discussions that were to follow in 
Whitehall in the aftermath of the First World War and through into inter-war years.  The 
immediate months saw Churchill, as Secretary of State for War and Air, unceremoniously 
bundle Sykes off to be Controller of Civil Aviation „and console him with a GBE‟.137  
Trenchard was then in post as CAS from 1919 to 1930 and oversaw, first the survival of 
the new Service, and then its development towards the organisation that would wage the 
strategic air offensive. 
 
 
Organisational Survival 
  
The literature encompassing the policy, strategy and development of the RAF in the 
interwar years, on the face of it, has covered the ground comprehensively.
138
 Yet closer 
examination has revealed that some of this is highly parochial, and other works have 
placed an interpretation on events that does seem too simple to have arisen from the 
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complexities and ambiguities of the time.
139
  Part of Trenchard‟s task was to operate within 
these difficulties working the interfaces between his Service and its older equivalents; the 
other government departments, and the Treasury in particular; the political arena which 
was no simpler for Trenchard than any other leaders over time; and in the context of the 
wider diplomatic and international events.  In short, he faced the full gamut of challenges 
facing a senior or strategic leader.  The major factors likely to bring about change will be 
briefly dealt with in turn. 
 
 In the immediate aftermath of the First World War, it was inevitable that all of the 
Forces would face a period of severe financial retrenchment, at least until the emergence of 
a new and credible threat, or threats.  But even in this area, there are a number of myths as 
to the targets and severity of the cuts.  Ferris and Biddle have both pointed out that the 
RAF was not as severely mauled as the Royal Navy and the Army, at least until 1925.
140
  
Furthermore, Lloyd George‟s fiscal policy was based on there being no war for the next 5 
to 10 years and that the 10-year rule did not appear until 1926 when its impact was felt on 
all the Services alike.
141
  In framing its own assumptions a mere two days after the 
Armistice, the Air Ministry considered it „reasonably safe to adopt a moderate policy‟: 
a.  That the military situation foreshadows a probability of real and enduring 
peace, not merely a suspended state of war. 
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b. That between the first class powers war will not take place within 20 years.142 
 
Throughout the period, Trenchard imposed his own, overarching, doctrine on the 
RAF, that of the vital necessity of economy.
143
  In a Memorandum submitted to the 
Secretary of State for Air (Churchill) „on the Scheme for the Permanent Organization of 
the Royal Air Force‟, Trenchard produced a very pragmatic document dealing with issues 
fundamental to the future of the Service such as units, reserves and the vital importance of 
training.
144
  Trenchard‟s „White Paper‟ stands in contrast to the arguably more visionary, 
and much more expensive, versions produced by Sykes.
145
  This emphasis on economy had 
virtue beyond the obvious necessity.  Not least it served to avoid any criticism from the 
other two services, and the Treasury, over perceived profligacy on the part of the 
newcomer.  But Trenchard was also firm in his belief that what available funding there was 
should be concentrated into those areas where the most substantial foundations for the 
RAF could be laid, such as its Colleges.
146
  These preparations were put in place in 1920 
during a period of what Trenchard‟s biographer has called a period of „armed truce‟ 
between the CAS and the First Sea Lord (Beatty).
147
  Over this period, Trenchard went no 
further in his advocacy of air power than political support was available to cover his 
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position, and played the potential of strategic bombing against the economies offered by 
substitution of air for ground forces in what Ferris has termed „an indirect approach‟.148 
 
 The state of truce, during which Trenchard refrained from attacking the other two 
services, was broken in 1921 when the next round of drastic economies hit the planning 
process.
149
  The requirement for deep cuts was so great that senior politicians, including the 
Prime Minister (Lloyd George), were seriously contemplating disbandment of the RAF, 
leaving Trenchard with no option but to put the case for air power in strong terms.
150
 In 
May 1921, Trenchard briefed the CID that in any future war civilian morale would be the 
key target.  This could only be done through strategic bombing and, on the experience in 
practice and in terms of public opinion, the only counter to this was having the ability and 
determination to respond in kind.
151
  Inherent in Trenchard‟s assertions was that only an 
independent force could execute these missions.  The upshot was that Balfour (as Lord 
President of the Council, chairing the CID) agreed that the RAF should have prime 
responsibility for home defence.  Furthermore, the concept of strategic bombing had 
become firmly embedded in the Whitehall psyche.
152
  That said, neither the Army nor the 
Navy were prepared to accept these conclusions, leading to a running battle between the 
Air Ministry and the Admiralty (in particular due to their demands for their own air arm) 
lasting several years and occasioning a considerable amount of staff work.
153
  The row 
continued to simmer with the Cabinet asked to kill the issue because, according to the 
Secretary of State for Air „the constant attacks upon the independent Air Ministry, both 
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officially and unofficially, during the last twelve months had rendered the administration 
of the Air Force increasingly difficult‟.154  Inevitably, no conclusion was reached other 
than to discuss the matter further.
155
 
 
 During the process of debate on the „Role of the Air Force in the Future of Imperial 
Defence‟, Trenchard had been happy to point to almost any number of likely instances in 
which substitution could be used, but was at first reticent to point to a potential foe capable 
of engaging in a strategic bombing duel.  Nevertheless, as relations with France 
deteriorated over British long-term commitments to French security, all three services 
attempted to exploit the situation, but as Ferris has noted, the RAF had the most to gain 
and Trenchard cynically used the issue.
156
 Trenchard was able to point to the apparent 
disparity between the strength of the RAF and the French air force which was within 
striking range; in Cabinet, it was agreed that „the French air development constituted a 
formidable danger to this country‟.157  Although Trenchard adduced no evidence of French 
aggressive intentions, the spectre of defeat (again one of Bramall and Jackson‟s catalysts 
for change) was enough to produce an alarmist reaction among the politicians resulting in 
Cabinet approval for a modest increase in RAF strength.
158
  In the meantime, Trenchard 
was allowed to deploy aircraft and support personnel (including RAF armoured cars) to 
Iraq in substitution of large and ponderous ground forces; this is well covered elsewhere in 
the literature and will not be discussed at length here.
159
 
 
                                                 
154
 CAB 23/29, Cabinet Conclusions, 8 March 1922, p.8. 
155
 Ibid., p.15. 
156
 Ferris, „The French Air Menace‟, pp.66 and 71.  The latter shows the degree of intelligence manipulation. 
157
 CAB 23/29, Cabinet Conclusions 15 March 1922, p.5. 
158
 Montgomery Hyde, British Air Policy between the Wars 1918-1939, pp. 110-111. 
159
 Ibid., pp.120 for Iraq, 205-207 for Kabul; see also Philip Anthony Towle, Pilots and Rebels; The Use of 
Aircraft in Unconventional Warfare 1919-1988 (London: Brassey‟s, 1989) and David Omissi, Air Power and 
Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919-1939 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1960). 
112 
 
 The issue of the role of the RAF in Imperial Defence was referred to a sub-
committee of the CID chaired by Lord Salisbury. This began its meetings, reporting 
regularly to the CID and the Cabinet, on 15 March 1923 and continued through until 
October 1923.
160
  Salisbury was able to bring some sense to the issue of French air strength 
reporting to the Cabinet on 9 May 1923, with the Cabinet agreeing that: 
The Lord President of the Council, in the course of the debate on Lord 
Birkenhead‟s Motion on Aerial Defence in the House of Lords, should make clear 
that that the Government deprecate any talk of aggression by France towards this 
country; that they understand that, in the present state of tension on the Continent 
of Europe, France is bound to take every precaution for her security; that we have 
no knowledge as to the what the ultimate French armaments will amount to, but 
that we can conceive of nothing worse than a competition with France and this 
country;.... 
 
And, further, that Lord Salisbury should be authorised to announce that the Cabinet 
are conscious that a considerable increase in the Air Force will in all probability be 
required.
161
 
 
With his work still ongoing, Salisbury returned to the Cabinet on 20 June 1923 with an 
Interim Report; Montgomery Hyde has described the ensuing Cabinet decision as being „of 
great historical importance‟.162 Given its importance to the survival of the RAF at such a 
vulnerable time, and the foundation that this agreement laid for the future organisation and 
structure of the Service it is worth to repeat in full (noting the Cabinet‟s reluctance to make 
the decision!): 
That, though regarding it as a melancholy necessity, they had no alternative but to 
approve the Interim Report, the recommendations of which are as follows: 
 
(1)  In addition to meeting the essential Air power requirements of the Navy, 
Army, Indian and overseas commitments (in regard to which a Report will be 
furnished later), British Air power must include a Home Defence Air Force of 
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sufficient strength adequately to protect us against Air attack by the strongest 
Air Force within striking distance of this country. 
(2) That the Air Staff be instructed to draw up detailed proposals for the creation of 
such a Home Defence force, to be organised, in part, on a regular and 
permanent military basis, and, in part. On a volunteer or reserve basis, but so 
arranged as to ensure that sufficient strength will be immediately available for 
purposes of defence.  The fullest possible use to be made of civilian labour and 
facilities. 
(3) That the first stage of the Air Ministry‟s scheme, which will absorb our entire 
capacity for aerial expansion in the immediate future, should provide for a 
strength of 600 first-line machines equal to the Independent Striking Force of 
the strongest Air Force within striking distance of this country.
163
 
 
The full consequences of this report render the Cabinet‟s reluctance to agree them 
unsurprising given the inevitable costs that would accrue.  Nevertheless, the agreement 
ensured that British air strength would not be left in a condition of inferiority in respect of 
any country within striking range of Britain.  In the short term, this would be France; but 
Salisbury‟s recommendations would underpin policy when Germany was resurgent after 
1933.  It is also noteworthy that the total British air strength, comprising bombers and 
fighters, should equal the strength of the competing bombing force.  This led, inevitably to 
considerable debate in the Air Ministry as to the balance between fighters and bombers 
with Trenchard invariably favouring preponderance of the latter.
164
 
 
 At its first meeting in March 1923, the Salisbury Committee, probably very wisely 
given the moment of their main work, decide to defer the detail the dispute between the 
Admiralty and the Air Ministry to a separate sub-committee under Balfour‟s chairmanship.  
At the heart of the issue was the Air Ministry‟s determination to keep all air assets and 
operations under a unified command and not divided into penny packets in the other 
services (which would have probably resulted in the eventual demise of the RAF).  The 
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Navy was adamant that it should have its own organic air assets.  The Balfour Committee 
duly reported and the issue was discussed in Cabinet on 31 July 1923.
165
 „After a 
prolonged discussion the Cabinet „agreed (by a Majority) – (a) to adopt the covering 
report...‟.166  The majority decision is noteworthy in itself, but given the strength of feeling 
in the Admiralty, not surprising.  Both the Secretary of State for Air and the First Lord of 
the Admiralty „undertook to do their utmost to carry out the decision of the Cabinet in a 
spirit of goodwill and co-operation‟.167 
 
 Over a period of five years, Trenchard had survived the storm, and the RAF had 
emerged, not just intact, but with peacetime Cabinet approval for its role in the Home 
Defence of the Great Britain.  Furthermore, the principle of substitution, by air power, had 
been attempted and was working sufficiently well for the costly return to manpower 
intensive garrisons not to be contemplated.  Under classic senior leadership theory, 
Trenchard would have been expected to provide and communicate the vision and purpose 
of his new organisation.
168
  He would also have been required to make the organisation fit 
for purpose; react to other organisations at the interfaces of his own; and put in place an 
appropriate succession plan nurturing young talent.
169
  At face value, Trenchard succeeded 
in each of these challenges, and excelled in most, to earn the soubriquet of „Father of the 
RAF‟.   But real strategic leadership is actually more complex than the checklist approach 
advocated by the likes of Adair, or the modern consultancy „gurus‟.  Trenchard epitomised 
the complexity.  In terms of producing a vision for the fledgling Service, it could be argued 
that Sykes was the more far-sighted; he certainly believed that to be the case.  But vision is 
                                                 
165
 CAB 23/46 Cabinet Conclusions 31 July 1923.  Report also at CAB 24/12, CP 349 (23) 27 July 1923. 
166
 Cabinet Conclusions, p.2. 
167
 Ibid. 
168
 Adair, Effective Strategic Leadership, p.95. 
169
 Ibid.                         
115 
 
less useful if not couched in a form mindful of the practicalities prevailing at the time. 
There is no doubt that Trenchard had an extremely strong and forceful personality which 
Malcolm Smith has described as one of the new Service‟s greatest assets.170 Beyond this it 
was clear that he could be intransigent, stubborn and fierce in defence of his 
„organisational patch‟.171  Similarly, Ferris has described Trenchard as a „ruthless and 
cunning bureaucratic infighter‟.172  These traits, identified by modern authors, are borne 
out by comments from politicians such as Sir Samuel Hoare (later Viscount Templewood) 
who was Secretary of State for Air four times.  Templewood has described his first 
meeting with Trenchard as being his first ever with a „really great man‟ with evident 
physical and vocal (hence the nickname „Boom‟) presence.173  Templewood saw Trenchard 
as visionary and waxed lyrical in his autobiographical summary of the period, citing 
Pushkin‟s poetry as justification for calling the CAS „a major prophet‟ with himself as the 
„interpreter‟.174  Arguably, Trenchard‟s greatest strength was his ability to react to the 
challenges at each of the interfaces between his organisation and the wider environment in 
a flexible and creative manner and without merely articulating a standard dogmatic line.
175
  
He effectively created the climate for survival and subsequent evolution; had Trenchard 
insisted on single-minded adherence to, say, strategic bombing, the Air Ministry would 
have been defeated in detail on that issue alone.  By also extolling the virtues of 
substitution and home defence with a shrewd emphasis on economy over his rivals 
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Trenchard set the direction for change without being overly prescriptive.
176
  This is very 
much a different Trenchard from the person who has been caricatured as a man more 
remembered for the volume of his voice than the subtlety of his argument.  
Notwithstanding this complex picture Trenchard, at his core, was a man who favoured the 
offensive, many fold, over the defensive.  This was a view that was accepted and 
internalised by virtually all RAF personnel who came into contact with Trenchard, and as 
he was in post until 1930, certainly set the tone for future development.
177
  His 
organisation was neither single minded, nor obsessive, over strategic bombing, but when 
the storm clouds started gathering over Europe the need for a command structure that 
would be fit for purpose gained in importance.  This theme will be taken forward in the 
next chapter which will look at the formation of Bomber Command and its early 
relationship with the Air Ministry in the context of the expansion of the RAF. 
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Chapter Four 
 
FROM DISARMAMENT TO THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 
  
 
Having set out the intellectual and organisational contexts, this chapter will take forward 
the challenges facing the senior leaders charged with ensuring the continued survival of the 
RAF, and of designing and then executing the strategic bombing offensive.  As has been 
discussed, Trenchard left the Service with an ingrained sense of economy; reliance on a 
well crafted hardcore establishment for the training of officers, apprentices and future staff 
officers; and total confidence that air power should be concentrated on the offensive.
1
  His 
successors did not have to fight the inter-service battles for the survival of the RAF under 
quite the same circumstances as those that brought out the best from Trenchard, but their 
challenges could hardly be described as „tame‟ (and therefore solvable through linear 
processes, whereas „wicked‟ problems are complex with no clear or correct solution).2  
Trenchard had been able to provide a concrete, and cost-effective, role for the RAF by its 
use in imperial policing, but as Meilinger has suggested, this kept the Service „alive‟ for 
only the first post-war decade.
3
  The following decade produced the extremes of coping 
with the potential abolition of military aviation put forward at the Geneva Disarmament 
Conference, which would have inevitably led to the demise of the Service, through to the 
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rapid rearmament and the outbreak of hostilities in 1939.  This chapter will outline those 
challenges.   
 
The Geneva Disarmament Conference 
The Geneva Conference enjoyed cross-party support in the United Kingdom with Lloyd 
George, MacDonald and Baldwin firmly behind the main issues.
4
  They considered the 
country to be bound by Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations in which: 
The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the 
reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national 
safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.
5
 
Furthermore, the preamble to Part V of the Treaty of Versailles required Germany „strictly 
to observe the military, naval and air clauses‟ in „order to render possible the initiation of a 
general limitation of the armaments of all nations‟.6  Baldwin saw this also as a matter of 
honour.
7
  Unfortunately the vast majority of States represented, and especially the more 
powerful, „did not care what came out of the Conference, for good or ill, provided their 
own interests were safeguarded‟.8  Furthermore, „the whole Conference was impractical in 
its approach to realities, and tendentious suggestions increasingly flowed from the various 
delegations‟.9 Londonderry (Secretary of State for Air) concluded that „[the Conference] 
never had a chance of success from the very beginning owing to the fact that, with 
exception of ourselves, no Power, small or great, had any intention of reducing its armed 
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forces‟.10 Nevertheless, the task had to be tackled.  The inherent contradictions did little to 
make the task easier for those entrusted with giving effect to government policy, or to 
building a bomber force that could potentially achieve the desired deterrent features. 
  
The leadership challenges facing Lord Londonderry, Salmond (and subsequently 
Ellington) provide a valuable case study into the role of the strategic leader who, by 
definition, is responsible for the functioning of the organisation at the political and geo-
political levels, as well as at the interfaces with other organisations.
11
  The issues 
concerned are almost invariably complex, fraught with ambiguity and intellectually 
challenging.
12
  In the case of Geneva, Salmond and his Secretary of State were dealing 
with very strong and experienced characters in the Cabinet and beyond (MacDonald as 
Prime Minister; Baldwin as Lord President of the Council; Sir John Simon as Foreign 
Secretary; and Eden as Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs and especially latterly, directly 
involved with the talks in Geneva).  In reality, the Service Ministers and Chiefs were in 
direct conflict with their colleagues, at Cabinet and official levels, for the period leading up 
to and while the Conference was in session (1931-1934).
13
  The former believed that 
Britain, not least through economies and the infamous ten-year rule (under which, for 
financial planning purposes, it was assumed that Britain would not be involved in a war for 
ten years), had already disarmed beyond a prudent level.
14
  The latter group believed 
passionately in disarmament (albeit with some accepting that unilateral disarmament would 
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be folly) on the basis that possession of great armaments inexorably led to war.
15
  These 
views were widely shared by the British public whose „post mortem‟ on the First World 
War had left a „deep psychological lesion‟.16 
 
 The higher levels of strategy (often called Grand Strategy) were arguably more 
complex and developed, at different rates, over time.  A full diplomatic history of the 
Conference is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the following examples give an 
indication of the issues at stake.  Germany was becoming stronger, more trenchant in her 
claims for „equality of status‟, and „growing in spirit‟.17  Concern was therefore growing in 
France with inevitable demands for mutual security assurances and strident assertions that 
her armaments were at the lowest level commensurate with national security.
18
  The whole 
plot was further complicated by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and the Japanese 
government‟s subsequent inability to control the army.19 
 
 Given that the rationale for the Conference was based (at least in part) on 
alleviation of suffering inflicted on the huge scale in evidence during the First World War, 
it may have been reasonable to assume that each of the military environments was equally 
at risk of forced reduction, or abolition.  Allied fleets had been responsible for the blockade 
of Germany and, it was estimated, the deaths of three-quarters of a million civilians.
20
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Similarly, Terraine offered „a grim commentary‟ in his tables of casualties during the First 
World War challenging the myth that the defensive was less costly than the offensive.
21
  
The irony therefore was that it was the potential of air power, rather than its proven 
destructive capacity and ability to inflict suffering, which brought it to centre-stage in 
Geneva. Arguing from this tenuous viewpoint added to the complexity of the leadership 
challenge.                                                             
 
 After some seven years of preliminary discussions, the Conference opened formally 
in Geneva on 2 February 1932.
22
  Fifty nine states sent delegations and this rose to sixty 
one before the end of the proceedings; each state carried an equal vote leading countries 
that did not have a particular capability to vote for the abolition of weapon systems that 
they did not possess (such as air power or submarines).
23
  Inevitably continental states saw 
the offensive, or defensive, nature of weapons from their own geo-strategic viewpoint; for 
example, the United States viewed them as first lines of defence , whereas the Japanese as  
an island maritime nation (albeit with wider designs) saw large surface fleets as 
aggressive.
24
  The British approach was to encourage an all round reduction in armaments 
and was prepared to set the example even though British air strength was lagging behind 
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that of Italy, France, the Soviet Union and America.
25
  The Chiefs of Staff Annual Review 
for 1932 made grim reading in its description of the effects of the ten-year rule and dire 
economic situation.
26
  But the Foreign Office saw this as what today would be described as 
„best practice‟ with Britain demonstrating real commitment to treaty obligations. The 
official Foreign Office policy submission to the Cabinet was based on the so-called 
„Leeper memorandum‟, named after its author in the department.27  The proposals in this 
document included the submission that German claims for parity of treatment should be 
acknowledged; that the British policy should be based on qualitative disarmament; and that 
HMG should consider proposing „the complete prohibition and outlawry in all 
circumstances of the dropping of bombs from any aircraft on the territory or shipping of 
another Sovereign State‟.28  It was axiomatic to the Foreign Office that Britain should play 
a leading role at the Conference.
29
 
 
 Notwithstanding the years of preparatory work, or possibly because of them, 
progress in the actual Conference was „slight‟.30  This was due, in part, to the crisis in the 
Far East. But the Conference also suffered from considerable bureaucratic challenges as 
well as the sheer complexity of the technical issues at stake and discussed in minute detail 
in sub-committees.
31
  Furthermore, from the earliest stages, it was clear that the issues of 
German demands for parity of treatment and French concerns for security guarantees 
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would remain troublesome.
32
  By the end of May, these issues had not improved drawing 
the Foreign Office to conclude that „even the most optimistic observer cannot maintain 
either that past progress has been rapid or that future prospects are bright‟.33  There was 
therefore a requirement to expedite the work of the Conference so that „Governments 
should be – at least temporarily – freed from the endless complexities of the disarmament 
problem‟ in order to concentrate on economic recovery.34  The proposals for the „total 
abolition of military aircraft and the international control of civil aviation‟ would „if 
adopted... furnish the tangible result‟ required and would „constitute an impressive success‟ 
for the Conference.
35
  From the Foreign Office perspective, therefore, significant progress 
on the abolition of military aviation would offset the bureaucratic difficulties and 
demonstrate that Britain was in the forefront of the progress of humanising warfare. 
 
 The strategic leadership challenges facing Londonderry and his CAS actually went 
deeper than this inter-departmental policy tussle.  The fear of the „knock-out blow‟, 
delivered from the air, from which the victim nation could not recover was widespread.  A 
previous Secretary of State for Air, Sir Samuel Hoare (then Secretary of State for India) 
strongly advocated to his Cabinet colleagues that a restriction „of military bombing 
aeroplanes‟, especially in metropolitan air forces, could reduce the chances of success of a 
first strike and thereby reduce the prospect of it being attempted.
36
  The longer standing 
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concern was exacerbated by events in Manchuria and the Japanese use of air power at 
Shanghai in particular.
37
   
 
 In Cabinet on 4 May 1932, the Prime Minister (Ramsay MacDonald) pointed out to 
his colleagues that „nearly every nation had made proposals‟ on the subject of air warfare 
and the absence of a statement on the United Kingdom position was very likely to be 
remarked upon.
38
  Various suggestions, including the introduction of a new law of war 
prohibiting „bomb-dropping on the territory and shipping of another Sovereign Signatory 
State‟, and the abolition of heavy bombers, had been raised, but subject to much 
criticism.
39
  Baldwin took matters considerably further with the radical, but heartfelt, 
suggestion that if nations were really serious, they  
ought to agree to scrap all military and naval aviation.  Civil aviation also would 
have to be dealt with, possibly by abolishing the costly subsidies devoted to this 
purpose.
40
 
 
He went on to acknowledge that his views were unlikely to find favour, either with 
colleagues, or internationally.  But Baldwin stressed that if his ideas were feasible the 
abolition would „remove one of the main elements of that fear that was the disturbing 
feature in the international situation‟ [emphasis in the original].41  The Cabinet were 
reported to be „impressed‟ by the proposal and no objection of principle was raised.42  A 
more pragmatic note crept in with the acknowledgement of likely rejection and the 
                                                 
37
 Middlemas and  Barnes, Baldwin, p.727 in which Baldwin describes Shanghai as „a nightmare‟. 
38
 CAB 23/71, Cabinet Conclusions 26(32), 4 May 1932, p.3. 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Ibid., p.4. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Ibid., p.5. 
125 
 
concomitant requirement to have policy at hand to cope with the many other proposals 
tabled.
43
 
 
 This Cabinet level sanction, and the need for stimulating real progress in Geneva 
discussed above, resulted in the Foreign Office producing „Draft Proposals for Air 
Disarmament‟ which was circulated by Simon on 26 May 1932.44  Baldwin‟s words were 
turned into official policy language onto which was added the desirability that these 
measures should be „accompanied by the conclusion of an International Convention to 
prohibit bombing from the air as a method of warfare‟.45  Furthermore, HMG considered 
that this Convention would be unlikely to be effective unless it was part of an overall and 
„comprehensive plan of air disarmament‟.  These measures would also bring financial 
relief to all States represented at Geneva!
46
  In a prophetic paragraph, the Foreign Office 
drafter outlined the legitimate military objectives of the draft 1923 Hague convention, but 
pointed out that the impact of national and industrial mobilisation that would inevitably be 
part of „defensive preparations‟ in most nations and that civilian populations could not 
escape „casualties, terror and suffering in the event of a bombardment‟ [emphasis added].47  
The draft acknowledged that alternatives did exist to such an extreme measure, including 
limitations on size and weight; prohibition of bombing civilians; or the abolition of 
bombers alone.
48
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 Baldwin‟s realisation that a total abolition of military aviation was unlikely to find 
favour was quickly realised.  The Prime Minister raised the issue informally with the 
French who „would have none of it‟.49 The Air Ministry response was inevitably hostile, 
both to the impracticality of both abolishing all air forces and imposing control over civil 
aviation.
50
  The former point was eventually acknowledged by the Cabinet which agreed 
that other methods would be required.
51
  Nor was the Air Ministry convinced that a 
prohibition of bombing would result in a meaningful reduction in the threat to world peace.  
The CAS stated in a letter to Londonderry that, in the event of war, reliance on a written 
pact would have little chance of observance, not least because war was supposed already to 
have been renounced by just such a pact.
52
  Furthermore any country at risk of aggression 
would use „every weapon it could lay its hands on‟.53 Finally, Salmond pointed out that 
reliance on a „paper pact‟ would be dangerous for the protection of „military objectives in 
this country, including those in London‟ and that this point had been accepted by the 
Cabinet sub-committee chaired by Baldwin.
54
  A complete abolition of bombing also 
required qualification to allow its limited use in air policing in India, Aden and Iraq as had 
been tentatively acknowledged by Leeper and featured in most Air Ministry submissions.
55
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 The strategic leaders in the Air Ministry therefore preferred there to be a strict 
convention on the circumstances under which bombing from the air could be considered 
acceptable.  They were totally content to see an „entire prohibition of all air attack upon the 
civilian population‟ and restrictions in numbers and weights.56  The Air Staff files show the 
depth of the debate on these issues with advice being forwarded from J.M. Spaight, to the 
highest levels of leadership within the Air Ministry,  on what had already been covered 
during the discussions on the Hague Rules in 1923.
57
  These suggestions varied from a 
requirement for all potential military targets to be situated a specified distance from 
civilian populations through to an acknowledgement that a general prohibition of bombing 
was not considered legally workable.  The essence of the Air Ministry thinking was that a 
complete abolition would render rules nugatory meaning that once conflict commenced, 
bombing would be unrestricted; it would be better to acknowledge the probability of 
bombing being used, but to circumscribe its use by clear rules.
58
  In the Second Edition of 
Air Power and War Rights, J.M. Spaight wrote: 
It seems to be unsafe to disregard the verdict which history has pronounced from 
the Second Lateran Council onwards, upon such attempts to ban completely the use 
of new and more scientific weapons of war.  Such attempts are foredoomed.  Rules 
regulating and restricting bombing, but not prohibiting it absolutely, are likely in 
the writer‟s opinion, to be honourably observed by civilised states.59 
 
 These debates continued throughout the life of the Conference in a manner that was 
described by a Foreign Office official, who quoted the French delegation as saying that 
„the Disarmament Conference was like a merry-go-around – the same old wooden horse 
kept coming round and round again‟, but that he was afraid „that it is the French 
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themselves who supply the motive gyratory power‟.60  Germany withdrew from the 
Conference in mid-September 1932, not to return until January 1933.
61
  Hitler‟s accession 
to the Chancellorship on 30 January 1933 ensured that the demands for parity of treatment 
would grow along with French concerns over security.
62
  Germany finally walked out of 
the Conference chamber on 14 October 1933 and subsequently resigned from the League 
of Nations, effectively bringing matters to an end (even though the delegations remained in 
Geneva for some months further).
63
 
 
 It is clear from the Cabinet Discussions, and side meetings in Geneva, that the 
Foreign Office and the Air Ministry had major differences in their agendas and these have 
been covered above.  But there are also significant differences in the organisational culture 
of the two organisations and the approaches taken which reflected on the leadership styles 
exhibited.  The Foreign Office took a very clear line that it owned the policy lead for the 
Conference and „such questions of policy were outside the scope of the Experts in the 
Service Departments‟.64  It is significant that this view was not challenged by the strategic 
leaders in the Air Ministry; Londonderry proceeded to take on the detail as he and his CAS 
had done throughout.  Beyond this, however, Londonderry was concerned, not for the first 
time, that the Foreign Office was taking policy beyond what had been agreed in Cabinet.
65
  
Simon‟s response was that the Cabinet had also insisted that Britain should not be isolated 
at the Conference by the stance taken on a particular issue (in this case total prohibition of 
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bombing) with the implication that diplomatic tactics took precedence over the principles 
at stake.
66
 Londonderry subsequently complained that the whole Conference was 
„overshadowed by political constraints‟.67  This brief interchange is illustrative of the Air 
Ministry taking a less than strategic approach and accepting a subservient role.  Temperley 
queried whether Londonderry‟s loyalty to the Air Ministry might have been at odds with 
his political and personal convictions.
68
  If so, the doubts of conscience do not appear in 
the files or in Wings of Destiny; in fact the reverse may be true, for example, when he 
insisted in having his dissent formally recorded following a serious disagreement at a 
Ministerial Policy Committee.
69
 
 
 From the documents, and the Cabinet Memoranda in particular, it could be argued 
that the Air Ministry consistently advocated a more strategic approach to the Conference, 
emphasising the challenges to the security of London and the wider Empire.  But it could 
also be argued that it did so in a pedantic and dogmatic way with little appreciation of the 
subtleties of diplomacy.  This would suggest a linear approach to a complex, or wicked, 
problem and not what would be ideal from a strategic leadership perspective.  This view 
does not appear to have been appreciated during Salmond‟s tenure, but is evident 
immediate afterwards.  In a minute to Ellington (just after his appointment as CAS), his 
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deputy (DCAS -Ludlow Hewitt) lamented „the well-worn path of direct attack‟ which „up 
to the present has led nowhere‟.70  The DCAS went on to surmise that this approach had 
caused exasperation with Ministers and probably done damage to other causes and interests 
of the Service.  But he also acknowledged that, for much of the time, direct attack was the 
only option.
71
 Whether this admission stemmed from pragmatism, a lack of intellectual 
capacity, or an institutional (partly cultural) inability to think at the genuinely strategic 
level is not clear; but it is typical of the dialogue in the minutes. Given that an abolition of 
military aviation, or even prohibition of bombing aircraft, would have led to the demise of 
the RAF, it is hardly surprising that Londonderry and Salmond fought as they did.  Both 
were certainly conscious of the deleterious effect the Conference was having on Service 
morale.
72
 
 
 The „Interlude at Geneva‟ with its focus on the abolition of bombing from the air, 
inextricably reinforced the survival and future growth of the Service with this form of 
warfare.
 73
  Geneva also served to reinforce the creed within RAF circles that the security 
of London could best be achieved by the deployment of a bomber force that would be able 
to take the offensive to the enemy. The presence of Portal, and latterly Harris, as Group 
Captains in the Air Ministry would have had a similar impact on these officers and their 
staffs, many of whom would later serve in Bomber Command, or back in the Air Ministry 
responsible for the senior leadership and direction of the strategic air offensive.  As 
Hitler‟s power increased the realisation of the extent of German rearmament became more 
evident: the focus therefore shifted from the frustrating and surreal atmosphere of Geneva. 
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The Need for Rearmament  
From a simple leadership perspective, it would have been ideal had there been some hard 
and clear point at which the Service Chiefs, their political masters and the hard-pressed 
staff officers could have switched from disarmament to remedying the deficiencies that 
were evident in each of the areas of defence.  The reality, unfortunately, was that the issues 
at stake were ambiguous and complex.  The senior leaders had, therefore, to cope with a 
further period of uncertainty.  As has already been stated, the COS Annual Review for 
1932 made grim reading.
74
  But its recommendations included, almost as an addendum, 
„That the assumption governing the Estimates of the Defence Services, that from any given 
date there will be no major war ten years should be cancelled‟ – in short, the cancellation 
of the „ten year-rule‟.75  In their subsequent discussion on the Review on 23 March 1932, 
the Cabinet accepted the recommendation but  
recognised, however, that this must not be taken to justify an expanding 
expenditure by the Defence Services without regard to the very serious financial 
and economic situation that still obtains.  The Cabinet felt, also, that the whole 
subject, which was closely connected with the question of Disarmament, required 
further exploration.
76
 
 
Some 20 months later, the Cabinet Minutes of the meeting on 15 November 1933 ran to 7 
pages on Disarmament compared to a side and a half on 1933 COS Annual Review.
77
  The 
Cabinet did, however, accept a number of key assumptions that should guide the COS Sub-
Committee in preparing „a programme for meeting our worst deficiencies for transmission 
to the Cabinet.‟  The assumptions included priority for expenditure on: „the Defence of our 
possessions and interests in the Far East; European Commitments; the Defence of India‟; 
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but there should be no expenditure on the basis of defence against attack by „the United 
States, France or Italy‟.78  The ensuing Report was circulated on 5 March 1934 and 
reiterated the Cabinet‟s tasking and assumptions.79  But by this stage the Report considered 
that there would be „an ultimate policy of accommodation and friendship with Japan‟, but 
this should be balanced with a „provisional policy of “showing a tooth” for the purpose of 
recovering the standing which we have sacrificed of recent years‟.80  The Report 
considered Germany to be „the ultimate potential enemy against whom our “long range” 
policy must be directed.‟81  For the RAF, the most immediate priority was the building of 
the Home (or Metropolitan) air force to 52 Squadrons, which had been an aspiration since 
1923.
82
  By July 1934, the planned number of squadrons had increased to 75 due to the 
„international situation and the trend of public opinion in this country‟.83  The Committee 
further considered that the announcement of this proposed increase  
would act as a deterrent to Germany and inspire confidence at home. To this we 
attach the utmost importance.
84
 
 
This emphasis, in what subsequently became known as „Expansion Scheme A‟, on 
Home Defence and public opinion reflected the concerns over the need to defend against 
the potential bomber threat from Germany that had been experienced in the First World 
War; this remained a constant refrain as it became increasingly evident that Germany was 
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re-arming in breach of the Versailles Treaty.
85
  That, and the potential cost of the 
expansion, had resulted in a lengthy series of meetings between the issue of the initial 
Report in March and the main document in July1934.
86
  Nor was it fully accepted that 
rapid rearmament was the only solution; the prospect of legislation against bombing, or 
specific limitations to air forces raised its head again.  Sir John Simon proposed an „Air 
Pact‟ in which the States of Europe should agree never to drop bombs on the territory of 
another member state; the retribution for non-compliance would be a concerted bombing 
offensive against the transgressor.
87
 Although discussions on these lines started in May 
1934, the idea was effectively dropped in the conclusions of the main Report in July 1934 
acknowledging that: 
There were great difficulties in putting forward a European Convention against air 
bombardment in a form which we could recommend either as practicable or 
acceptable to public opinion in this country.‟88 
 
Notwithstanding the perceived impracticalities of such a scheme it was resurrected in the 
guise of „French Air Proposals for a Treaty of Mutual Guarantee‟ and had arisen from 
Anglo-French Conversations.
89
 The Chiefs of Staff were, quite reasonably, concerned with 
the military implications of such a pact, not least because the mutual assistance element of 
the proposed Pact would, they considered, inevitably draw the UK into wider warfare with 
the spectre of Britain being required to field a continental army.
90
  The other, inextricably 
interlinked, item on the agenda was „Unrestricted Bombing of Civilians and Non-Military 
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Targets‟.91 It is interesting to note that „for the first time for two years the Chiefs of Staff 
had found that they were not unanimous‟.92  The First Sea Lord and the CIGS were agreed 
that all should be done to „avoid unrestricted warfare against the civil population‟ as a 
stand-alone subject with no real connection to the issue of the air pact.  Ellington, on the 
other hand, stated that he had no real objection „to any reasonable rules, but felt that to 
attempt to negotiate such rules in connection with the proposed Air Pact‟ would cause 
tremendous delay and might, in fact, mean that no agreement would ever be reached.‟93  In 
a supporting paper produced to counter the Joint Note by the CNS and CIGS, Ellington 
stressed that he would be „the first to welcome any practicable agreed regulations‟, but 
doubted they would „stand the test of war‟ and that the suggested provisions of the Pact 
would make no difference either way.
94
  Although the concept of the Air Pact eventually 
stalled on Hitler‟s unwillingness to accept any paper agreement that would constrain the 
Luftwaffe, and French insistence on the Pact including binding bilateral arrangements,
95
 it 
is instructive to note that senior RAF leaders were consistently prepared to do so even 
though, in their hearts, they did not think that any belligerent would diminish chances of 
national survival by playing by the rules.
96
 
 
 The institutional process of reaching a consensus of views on what some sort of 
limitations in armaments might look like in the European arena drew increasing official 
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attention to the scale of German rearmament.
97
 Not only was the extent of this build up a 
cause for concern, but the depth of German aspirations and the implications for security 
highlighted the dilemma for senior decision makers as to whether they should bank on 
limitations being agreed and adhered to, or go all out for parity (or supremacy) with the 
inherent risk that this would inexorably lead to war.
98
 It was clear that Ellington and his 
colleagues did not see Germany accepting anything less than parity with France‟s 
Metropolitan air force, with the complicating factor that air assets in North Africa could, 
with the inherent flexibility of air power, be brought into a European conflict with relative 
ease.
99
  With distinct echoes of the discussions in Geneva, the potential for limitation 
would also be complicated by the difficulties in prescribing types of aircraft and in the 
military potential of civil aircraft.
100
 
 
 The extent of German rearmament was publically acknowledged in November 
1934 and the consequences openly discussed in the Imperial Defence White Paper of 
March 1935 and the accompanying debates.
101
  This openly admitted that the Disarmament 
Conference „had virtually come to a standstill‟ and that all major nations except Britain had 
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been actively increasing their armaments.
102
  The White Paper expressed concern over the 
rate of German rearmament and the impact that this would have on her neighbours; the 
Paper added that any peaceful sounding statements by the leadership of that country were 
offset by „the spirit in which the population, and especially the youth of the country, are 
being organised‟.103  In its sections on each of the forces, the Paper emphasised the 
principal role of the RAF was to provide for „the protection of the United Kingdom and 
particularly London against air attack‟.104   It went on to confirm that: 
Up to now, however, the only deterrent to an armed aggressor has seemed to be the 
possession of adequate means of counter-attack. In view of the time required to 
provide the necessary forces, and the obscurities of the international situation, no 
Government mindful of its responsibilities could neglect to provide such defence as 
it deemed necessary to secure the safety of the country.
105
 
 
The Government‟s concerns were exacerbated by the official summons of Military 
Attaches in Berlin to be told, officially, that Germany already had „an air force in being‟.106  
This led to Simon and Eden being sent to see Hitler for a series of meetings, at one of 
which Hitler confirmed that Germany had already reached air parity with Britain and 
aimed to reach parity with France (including aircraft in North Africa).
107
  The Foreign 
Secretary and his entourage returned to London „considerably alarmed‟.108  At the same 
time, the alarm spread to the British public following a broadcast by the BBC stating that 
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„there was good reason to believe that the German Air Force has now attained equality 
with our own‟.109 
 
 Faced with a leadership dilemma, neither wishing to appear alarmist nor 
complacent, Londonderry and Ellington replied in measured terms on 15 April 1935.
110
 
The CAS pointed out that the previous year, the Air Staff had provided evidence on 
German air expansion which had resulted in the Cabinet deciding to increase the size of the 
RAF to 75 squadrons for Home Defence Force use; this had been based on the assumption 
that Germany would have 500 „first-line aircraft‟ by October 1935 and ultimately intended 
to create a force of three or four times that.
111
  No fresh evidence „of a reliable character‟ 
had been received prior to the Hitler/Simon talks.
112
 Both Londonderry and his CAS 
considered the claims to be worrying, but gave „no grounds whatsoever for anything in the 
nature of panic‟.113  They pointed that there was more to „Air Warfare‟ than numbers of 
machines; it required time to „convert a mass of aeroplanes and pilots into a first-class 
fighting machine such as we possess in the Royal Air Force‟.114  Londonderry considered 
that, in terms of efficiency, the RAF was three years ahead of the Luftwaffe „in 
efficiency‟.115  But the CAS went on to express „grave concern‟ for the future stating that 
measures authorised thus far were „in danger of proving seriously inadequate‟.116  In 
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addition to numerical estimates, Ellington pointed out that the Air Staff was aware that the 
German industry was organising for mass production of aircraft and engines with a factory 
output sufficient to make good 50% wastage in war; similar efforts were underway with 
pilot training in the Air Sports Association.
117
  To match the likely rate of German 
expansion, Ellington proposed an expansion of the Metropolitan Force to 119 squadrons 
(from 75 – this became the short-lived Expansion Scheme B).118 
 
 At first sight, after years of fighting for the survival of the Service, it could be 
thought that the prospect of rapid expansion to meet a clear and relatively quantifiable 
enemy would be met with unalloyed enthusiasm.  But, with a degree of experience and 
foresight befitting strategic leaders, it is clear that Londonderry and his CAS could see the 
pitfalls of an overly rapid expansion that could lead to the accumulation of „obsolete or 
obsolescent machines‟.119  Londonderry maintained (in his memoir) that it had been really 
important „not to increase our home forces at such a rate that the quality of the training, 
maintenance, personnel and aircraft would have to be lowered.
120
  The arguments that both 
senior leaders adduced in playing down Hitler‟s „fantastic claim of parity‟ consistently 
emphasised the second and third order factors that went beyond a mere comparison of 
numbers of airframes.
121
  In short, the numbers were less important than the quality of the 
force as a whole, or its „efficiency‟ as Londonderry used in shorthand.122  But it was clear 
that these arguments did not weigh with the public, the press (especially the Rothermere 
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faction) or, and arguably more important for Londonderry‟s own future, with many 
members of the Government.
123
 
 
 The Cabinet therefore appointed a small committee (Sub-Committee on Air Parity) 
chaired by Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister (later Viscount Swinton – he succeeded Londonderry 
as Secretary of State for Air on 7 June 1935) to recommend, „in consultation with 
representatives of the Air Ministry... to implement the policy stated in the House by the 
Lord President [Baldwin], that in air strength and in air power this Country should not be 
inferior to any Country within striking distance‟.124  Its Interim Report, which was 
produced with commendable speed, tackled the issue of parity arguably from a position of 
political expediency rather than the more strategic approach adopted by Londonderry and 
Ellington.
125
  The Report‟s authors assumed “parity” to mean „numerical equality with the 
total German Air Force.
126‟ The Report acknowledged that as Germany had a much larger 
army, she would require far more army co-operation aircraft than Britain.  It also admitted 
the contention that „the really important consideration is the number of bombing aircraft 
which Germany could employ against this country‟. But the Report effectively considered 
it impossible to exclude any aircraft unless there were the „most absolute and unanswerable 
reasons for doing so‟.127  In concert with the Air Ministry, the Sub-Committee concluded 
that Germany was likely to have the industrial capacity to build an air force of 
approximately 1500 first-line aircraft by 1 April 1937; this would give parity with the 
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French Metropolitan and North African forces.
128
  The Sub-Committee therefore 
recommended that Londonderry and Ellington‟s proposed expansion needed to be 
accelerated, but acknowledged that Germany, by „taking secret measures for the training of 
personnel and the reorganisation of their aircraft industry over the past few years and to 
that extent they have got a start on us‟.129  In total, orders for some 3800 aircraft, of all 
types, would need to be placed in order to ensure a front-line strength of 1500 by 1 April 
1937 with commensurate increases in personnel, airfields and staff buildings in London.
130
  
Interestingly, the Sub-Committee recognised that contracts would have to be altered to 
allow overtime and night shifts and that competitive tendering would have to be dispensed 
with.
131
  This report and its recommendations formed the basis of Expansion Scheme C.
132
  
A second report followed 9 days later and included detail on aircraft types and the balance 
between heavy and light bombers, the Cabinet not having been satisfied with the potential 
striking power of the force.
133
  Importantly, the Sub-Committee recommended that, in the 
interests of expediency, production be authorised for „certain types of aircraft‟ before 
„prototypes have been tested‟.134  The Ministerial Committee on Defence Requirements in 
their recommendations to Cabinet added a degree of fiscal probity to the recommendations, 
but did nothing to dampen the enthusiasm for acceleration in the programme of 
expansion.
135
  The Cabinet gave the go-ahead to the revised expansion scheme on 21 May 
1935.
136
 
                                                 
128
 Ibid., paras.20-26. 
129
 Ibid., paras. 27-29. 
130
 Ibid., para.48. 
131
 Ibid. 
132
 See Montgomery Hyde, British Air Policy, p.339. 
133
 AIR 41/39,  p.93. CAB 24/255, D.C.M. (32) 143, Sub-Committee on Air Parity: Second Interim Report, 
dated 17 May 1935. 
134
 Ibid., „Summary of Conclusions‟. 
135
 CAB 24/255, C.P. 106(35), German Air Programme: Proposed Further Expansion of the Royal Air 
Force, dated 20 May 1935. 
136
 CAB 23/81, Cabinet 29(35) dated 21 May 1935. 
141 
 
 
 The end of May also saw Baldwin return as Prime Minister following MacDonald‟s 
retirement due to ill-health.
137
  This change in Premiership directly resulted in 
Londonderry‟s removal from the Air Ministry; Middlemas and Barnes have commented 
that Londonderry was „loyal to his advisers and they to him‟, but that he had not tried to 
work on sufficiently good terms with Baldwin to remain in office.
138
  They also make the 
point that when „even the most insensitive must have realised the mood of the Cabinet 
following Hitler‟s claim to air parity‟ Londonderry had robustly stuck with Ellington and 
the Air Ministry analysis.
139
  That MacDonald had had to bring in an external Sub-
Committee then certainly left Londonderry exposed and Baldwin duly replaced him with 
Cunliffe-Lister.
140
  Part of the rationale was that Baldwin wanted the Secretary of State for 
Air to be in the Commons, but a bare six months later elevated him to Lords as Viscount 
Swinton.
141
  Inevitably, Chamberlain was able to use this as an excuse in his removal of 
Swinton in May 1938.
142
  In terms of senior leadership, it could be argued that 
Londonderry, with Salmond, Ellington and their staffs in support, were sound in the 
disarmament period when their role was essentially one of technical defence of the status 
quo.  But when expansion was the order of the day there appears to have been a distinct 
lack of capacity, flair, vision or originality.
143
  Swinton later commented that Londonderry 
„had had a thankless and impossible task‟ and that he and „his professional colleagues 
deserve credit for having maintained the spirit, the tradition and the training of our small 
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Air Force in those disappointing days‟.144  He also stated that Ellington (and Sir Cyril 
Newall, his successor) were „good at selecting a team, and equally good at working in a 
team‟.145  A direct consequence of the rapid expansion envisaged by Expansion Scheme C 
was that Ellington, and his team, had to examine whether the existing Metropolitan 
organisation would be able to cope with the numbers of aircraft, squadrons, personnel, real 
estate and training tasks; in short was it „fit for purpose‟? 
 
The Formation of Bomber Command 
On 5 June 1935, Ellington minuted the DCAS (AVM C. L. Courtney) seeking his views 
(and those of the Air Member for Supply and Organisation (AMSO)) on a proposal to 
„separate the defence part of the organisation from the offensive part‟; an ostensibly simple 
leadership tactic to make the organisation „fit for purpose‟.146  The DCAS replied some 
days later stating that grouping the „bombers, fighters, A.D. [Air Defence] formations and 
Observer Corps under a single Commander‟ would result in too many subordinate 
Commanders.
147
  Furthermore, the imposition of a „super-C-in-C over the offensive and 
defensive parts of the organisation‟ would be too top-heavy and would impinge on the 
functions of the CAS.  The DCAS also anticipated that an over-arching C-in-C would be 
overstretched with the two roles to contend with, especially if involved in briefing the War 
Cabinet.  He confirmed that the two organisations would, in war, be performing „quite 
separate functions‟: 
The one is the defence function pure and simple: the other is endeavouring, by 
bombardment, to weaken enemy resistance and his power to continue the war, and 
will be assisting the defence.  A separation will allow each Commander to 
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concentrate upon his aim without any preoccupation with another and different 
operational aim. 
 
The DCAS also made the point that some of the bomber elements could be fighting abroad 
thus complicating the command and control issues.
148
  The DCAS concluded that there 
should be separate Cs-in-C each responsible directly to the Air Ministry in which the 
officer responsible for „co-ordinating the conflicting claims of the two C-in-Cs‟ should be 
increased to AVM level.
149
 
 
 The Air Member for Personnel (AMP - Air Marshal Sir Frederick Bowhill) agreed 
the tenor of the DCAS‟s arguments, but added that the CAS would become „Commander-
in-Chief in wartime as far as home defence goes‟.150  Furthermore, the AMP surmised that 
the Air Ministry would have to have a co-ordinating function „to give the main directions 
of the campaign‟, in „spite of the obvious objections‟.151 He acknowledged that it would be 
fatal for the Air Ministry to interfere with „the operational control of any of the fighting 
units‟.152 
 
 In a detailed Memorandum, the Director of Organisation (D of O – Air Commodore 
W. L. Welsh) concluded that the Air Ministry would have to decentralise the six Bomber 
Areas onto a separate Bomber Command Headquarters, with its own operations room and 
Senior Air Staff Officer (SASO) to whom the C-in-C could delegate operations.
153
  In 
broader terms of the organisation being „fit for purpose‟, Welsh admitted that the 
                                                 
148
 Ibid. 
149
 Ibid., paras. 3 and 5. 
150
 AIR 2/8875, Minute AMP to CAS dated 18 July 1935, para.1. 
151
 Ibid, para.3. 
152
 Ibid.  
153
 AIR 2/8875, Memorandum by D.of O. On the Organisation of the Home Commands – 1935 Expansion 
Scheme C, dated 19 June 1935. 
144 
 
exigencies of peace had been such that the Air Ministry, and the broader staff organisation, 
was „barely adequate for its peace work, and quite incapable of undertaking mobilisation, 
or of filling the numerous additional appointments which would be necessary immediately 
on the outbreak of war‟.154  He therefore recommended that staffs in peace should be so 
established as to have some spare capacity for coping with outbreak of war; the peace and 
war establishments should be as closely aligned as possible to ensure a smooth transition; 
and that as much administration as possible should be decentralised.
155
  This latter point 
was endorsed by the AMP who added that each Command should be given its own finance 
director.
156
  This theme was developed further such that routine administration (and 
authority) would fall on the C-in-C‟s staff ensuring that there was only one filter between 
the Air Ministry and stations; Groups would be responsible for operations and training.
157
 
 
 The chief opposition to the proposals came from Air Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding 
(Air Member for Research and Development) who argued, in three pages of immaculately 
hand written prose, that the proposals were flawed, and claimed not to have been informed 
of them at an early stage.
158
  Dowding also believed that confusion would occur between 
the levels in the new organisation and that it would be impossible to „find the individuals to 
man Command and Group staffs for years to come‟.159  Air Marshal Sir Cyril Newall 
(AMSO) replied acknowledging that this may be the case, but that it was no reason not to 
proceed; he pointed out that the „main reason underlying this proposed organisation is the 
necessity for speeding up the administrative machine, for giving officers responsibility 
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concomitant with their rank and appointment and to free Commanders of certain details of 
administration to enable them to devote more time to operational training‟.160  There was 
also some controversy over the idea that there may have been a Supreme Air Commander, 
but this was strongly opposed by Dowding and Air Marshal Sir John Steel (C-in-C Bomber 
Command on its formation in 1936) on the basis that it would hamper their direct access to 
the CAS; the idea was dropped in 1937 and will therefore not be discussed further.
161
  
Notwithstanding the opposition, the proposals were duly refined and the King was 
informed of them on 21 April 1936 and an Air Council Letter was issued to the two Cs-in-
C on 4 May 1936.
162
 
 
 Under the new organisation, the Air Ministry had Fighter, Bomber, Coastal, and 
Training Commands and retained control directly of the RAF College at Cranwell.
163
  
Fighter and Coastal Command had three Groups apiece and Bomber Command six.
164
  It 
all fell into place in July 1936 with further changes to Expansion Schemes to cope with.  
The uniformed members of the Air Council had shown considerable moral courage in 
proposing such a seemingly radical departure from the existing single command structure 
for the Air Defence of Great Britain (ADGB).  The reality, however, was that the new 
organisation gave them a natural structure around which to satisfy the ever-present 
requirements for the air defence of Britain, and London in particular.
165
  And it also gave 
the future commanders of the bomber force the room to prosecute the enemy in the time-
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honoured manner emphasising the primacy of the offensive.  The new structure had also 
sought to eradicate duplication; give commanders real delegated authority; and build in 
sufficient spare capacity for the inevitable surge in activity that would accompany the 
outbreak of hostilities. 
 
The Road to War – Vision and Purpose of the Bomber Force 
As the international situation continued to worsen through 1936, the task facing the senior 
leaders became more urgent. The leadership challenges remained „wicked‟, complex and 
any quest for linear solutions would have been wishful thinking. The politicians, the Air 
Ministry and the new command had to transition from thinking about its role and purpose 
being inextricably interlinked with the survival of the Service to actually considering how 
the bomber force would be developed to fight in a war with Germany.
166
 Areas of specific 
concern included the failure of the League of Nations to have any meaningful influence 
following the Italian aggression in Abyssinia; German re-occupation of the Rhineland in 
March 1936; the formalisation of the Rome-Berlin axis; and the complicating issues of the 
Spanish Civil War.
167
  In terms of the mercurial chase for „parity‟, the situation was 
exacerbated by growing suspicion that Germany actually aimed at achieving numerical 
parity with the USSR.
168
  Furthermore, it was clear that industry had failed to make 
adequate progress on Expansion Scheme C and to meet the growing threat the Air Staff 
reworked the Expansion Schemes submitting D, E and E
1
; none were adopted and the 
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focus transferred to Scheme F which was the limit of what could be done without a radical 
change to industrial policy.
169
 
 
 The vision and purpose for the utilisation of the new force had to be predicated on a 
foundation of sound planning.  This work had originally been initiated by the Chiefs of 
Staff as early as 1934 and the Joint Planning Committee had worked on it intermittently, 
reporting provisionally in August 1935.
170
  The basic appreciation examined a number of 
courses of action which could have been open to Germany, each of which would have 
policy implications for each of the Services; to get round the inevitable in-fighting, the 
Chiefs broadly agreed that a „worst case‟ situation should be identified and agreed upon.171  
Working at the interfaces of a senior leader‟s organisation is one of the key tasks of 
strategic leadership and it is clear from the literature that the „Chiefs of Staff do not appear 
in a very favourable light in their first attempts to grapple with the enormous problems‟, 
and „showed no sign of viewing the problem from a common strategic or even tactical 
viewpoint‟.172  Regrettably, the matter has not been helped from a historiographical point 
of view by some authors taking partisan positions.
173
  
 
 The essence of the „worst case scenario‟ was that Germany would exploit its 
relatively high military readiness and attack Belgium and France; from the occupied areas 
the Luftwaffe would be able to attack Britain from the air „with the object of demoralising 
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our people and/or disorganising our food supplies‟.174  The ensuing assumption was that 
the main weight of effort would fall upon the RAF to hold the initial attack and mount a 
bomber counter-offensive on the Luftwaffe bases.
175
  The signatures on the bottom of the 
report were those of Captain Tom Philips RN (who subsequently died when HMS Prince 
of Wales was sunk), Colonel Sir Ronald Adam (later Adjutant-General) and Group Captain 
A.T. Harris.
176
  The report acknowledged that an „organized (sic) air defence system 
should take a considerable toll of attacking aircraft‟ with a cumulative effect on German 
aircrew morale as the losses grew‟.177  The report then went on to state that in the initial 
stages of the conflict, neither the Navy nor the Army would be in a position „to impose 
upon Germany any form of immediate pressure‟.178  In the timescales envisaged (the first 
few weeks), the only types of air attacks likely to have any impact would be reprisals 
aimed at demoralising the German people; attacks on vital German interests that cause 
diversion of assets to their defence; and direct attacks, in the air or on the ground, on the 
enemy bombers and the maintenance organisation.
179
  Bomber forces would also be called 
upon to support the Navy in maintaining the security of „shipping approaching our 
ports‟.180  And thirdly, the bombers would be called upon to support land forces in their 
attempts to repel the German invasion.
181
  The literature on this report varies somewhat in 
tone, but it is clear from all interpretations that much of the work on this appreciation was 
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executed by the air staff.
182
  The appreciation, and its recommendations, were discussed at 
some length by the Chiefs and their paper of 15 February 1937 entitled „Planning for a War 
with Germany‟ has been regarded as one of the „most important defence documents of the 
inter-war years, for it summed up the considered views of the Services upon the character 
of British Defence Policy and laid down clearly the broad lines which British Strategy was 
to follow after 1939‟.183  Webster and Frankland have added that the appreciation and 
subsequent papers „led the Chiefs of Staff to order definite plans to be made to carry out 
the strategy laid down‟.184 
 
 By this stage, the Air Ministry and Bomber Command had had some time to agree 
on a modus operandi by which the two organisations would neither interfere with each 
others‟ jurisdiction, nor duplicate staff work.  In anticipation of the COS conclusions, the 
air staff met with representatives from Bomber Command (Air Commodore Evill, SASO) 
to discuss the preparation „of a series of plans for air operations‟ for possible 
implementation in the event of war.
185
 The essence of the proposal was that the air staff 
would draw up an Intelligence Appreciation which would then feed into a Strategic 
Appreciation; following consultation with the C-in-C (Steel) who would advise on the 
practical aspects, the Appreciation would approved either by CAS or the COS Sub-
committee.
186
  These plans would then be activated through „Directifs‟ (sic) from CAS in 
the event of war.
187
  The C-in-C would then apportion the effort to his Groups.
188
  The 
SASO expressed his C-in-C‟s preference that „he should have no dealings with politicians 
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and that he should receive all orders from the CAS who alone should have to bear the brunt 
of any attacks directed by the politicians or public opinion against the policy being 
pursued‟.189  These broad proposals were subsequently refined by the DCAS who believed 
that formulation of the appreciation allowed the Air Ministry to have a greater degree of 
control than was desirable.
190
  The preference was for „Aims‟ to be drawn up in four broad 
categories: paralyzing the German war effort; co-operation with the Navy; co-operation 
with the British or French armies; and co-operation with France, say to reduce the impact 
of an air attack on Paris.
191
  The detail would be arranged by an Air Targets Sub-
Committee.
192
 These discussions reflect a genuine desire to balance the efforts of the staffs 
in each headquarters, but it is interesting to note the C-in-C‟s desire to remain purely at the 
operational level; time would show that removal from the political arena would be 
impossible (especially with Churchill) and arguably not desirable. 
 
 The four broad categories were expanded into 13 Western Air Plans (by 1938) 
which expanded to 16 by the start of the war.
193
 The official historians have made the point 
that this process, once actually enjoined, brought the planners „down to earth‟ because they 
had no clear idea of how the Command would be equipped and therefore what would be 
operationally possible.
194
 The realisation inside the Air Ministry that, with the assets 
available to them, they would physically not be able to have the required effect on 
Germany allowed them more easily to accept the political expedient of giving priority to 
fighter defence (with radar, the „Biggin Hill Interception scheme‟ and new fighters coming 
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on stream this was proving increasingly viable).
195
  As the staffs continued their 
deliberations, the meagre payloads, and the vulnerability of the light and medium bombers, 
highlighted the need for accelerated development of the heavy bombers.
196
  The result of 
this was that there was a growing realisation that, if war broke out in the 1939 timescale 
upon which planning had been predicated, Bomber Command would not have the ability to 
carry out its „defeat-averting‟ role.197  Rather, it would become a „war-winning‟ weapon 
albeit on the later timescales coincident with the arrival of the heavy bombers in 1941-
42.
198
 
 
 Expansion Scheme F, however had provided for 750 medium bombers and 240 
heavies.
199
  Yet another programme was developed to redress this balance and Scheme J 
was the result with provision for an „all-heavy bomber‟ force of 90 squadrons with 1442 
aircraft.
200
  This would provide a, minimum insurance against the potential enemies of 
Germany, Italy and Japan, but was dependant on a radical shift in government policy 
towards bringing industry onto a genuine war footing with the financial consequences.
201
 
The Air Staff, however, were unable to convince the Cabinet in general and Sir Thomas 
Inskip (Minister for Co-ordination of Defence) in particular and it was accordingly 
rejected.
202
  More importantly than the need to start grinding away on the staff work for 
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Scheme K, was that it represented a marked change in policy with the abandonment of the 
quest for „parity‟.203 This was contrary to the Air Ministry‟s consistent line of needing to 
build „a striking force not inferior to that of Germany‟.204  The German occupation of 
Austria in March 1938, and the increased likelihood of war, resulted in Cabinet rejecting 
Scheme K in favour of a more aggressive programme.
205
 The discussions around Scheme L 
confirmed that „parity‟ was not obtainable and that what extra resources that there were 
should be allocated to fighters.
206
  While industry increased its capacity to produce aircraft 
of all types (but heavy bombers in particular), the existing Bomber force would have to be 
conserved.
207
  The realisation that, following the German occupation of Austria, Hitler 
would turn his attention to Czechoslovakia implied that some of assumptions inherent in 
the planning, specifically that there would be an escalation in the use of air power, and the 
potential for an attempted knockout blow, led the air staff to question what would be a 
legitimate target.
208
 
  
The Legalities and Legitimacy 
It has been emphasised previously the importance of senior leaders establishing a just 
cause – especially in the event of the exact legal situation remaining unclear as it was with 
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aerial bombardment.  Consistent with much of the legacy from the bombing of London 
during the First World War, and intervening rhetoric, planning for the forthcoming conflict 
was heavily influenced by the concern that London would be subject to heavy 
bombardment by the German air force and that the RAF was not in a position to match 
blow for blow.  It was therefore in British interests for bombing to be restricted to 
genuinely military targets and for restraint to be shown in regards to the means of 
production.
209
  There is therefore something of a contradiction in that there was 
considerable demand for the bomber force to be expanded, yet its usage would be severely 
curtailed if the proposals came to fruition. Similarly, approval had been given for the 
design of heavy bombers even though any likely convention would limit the weight of 
aircraft and their payloads.
210
 The inherent contradictions also curtailed the lifespan of the 
Report issued by the Malkin Committee into how to take these proposals forward, 
including formal revision of the Hague Rules.
211
 More importantly, the Sub-Committee on 
the Limitation of Armaments concluded that „conditions had so changed since they were 
charged with the duty of examining the question of the restriction of air and other 
armaments as to make the prospect of obtaining any international agreement on these 
matters extremely remote‟.212 
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 The complexities of the situation were extensively aired in Parliament on 21 June 
1938.
213
  The use of air power in Spain (and in particular against Barcelona in March 1938 
where bombardment had been used with the threat that it would be repeated every three 
hours until the city surrendered) and by the Japanese in China was cited as evidence that 
„the only way to humanise war is to abolish it‟.214  The Prime Minister (Chamberlain) 
admitted that the advent of air warfare had introduced „new methods, new scope and new 
horrors which have, in fact materially changed its character‟.215 He went on to admit that 
there was „no international code of law with respect to aerial warfare which is the subject 
of international agreement‟, but that the underlying principles of the law as it applied to sea 
and land warfare were applicable to the air „and are not only admitted but insisted upon by 
this Government‟.  These principles included that it was  
against international law to bomb civilians as such, and to make deliberate attacks 
upon civilian populations. 
 
In the second place, targets which are aimed at from the air must be legitimate 
military objectives and must be capable of identification. 
 
In the third place, reasonable care must be taken in attacking those military 
objectives so that by carelessness a civilian population in the neighbourhood id not 
bombed.
216
 
 
This expression of formal Government policy was reiterated to Bomber Command 
in response to a query from the C-in-C on 30 August 1938 that in attacking German 
aircraft factories, a proportion of bombs would fall outside the immediate designated target 
area causing serious casualties among the civilian population.
217
  The Air Council replied 
on 15 September 1938 having taken advice from Malkin.  The Air Council admitted that 
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„there are certain objectives, particularly among aircraft factories, which it would be 
impossible to attack, even by day, without causing loss of life to the civilian population in 
the neighbourhood‟.  The operational limitations were again acknowledged, but „for 
reasons of policy, however, which the Council feel sure you will readily understand, it is 
essential that in the opening stages of a war your action should be rigorously restricted to 
attack on objectives which are manifestly and unmistakably military on the narrowest 
interpretation of the term; and that even such objectives should not be attacked initially 
unless they can be clearly identified and attacked with a reasonable expectation of damage 
being confined to them‟.218   The policy was based on the need not to alienate neutral 
opinion (not stated, but presumably America as Roosevelt had appealed for such restraint 
in the past and was to do so formally on 1 September 1939) and to avoid giving any 
„genuine pretext for retaliatory action‟.219  Attacks would therefore have to be concentrated 
on targets such as railways (but not trains unless positively identified as military), formed 
bodies of troops and concentrations of transport.  Newall, in submitting this directive to 
Swinton for approval concluded that these restrictions were unlikely to last long, stating: 
„but we obviously cannot be the first „to take the gloves off‟‟.220 
 
Chamberlain‟s acknowledgement of the parallel nature of some of the laws of war 
came into focus in 1939 when the Admiralty raised the question of bombardment of targets 
on the shore including coastal defence works and docks.
221
 The CAS wrote to his naval 
counterpart (Admiral Sir Dudley Pound) suggesting that Malkin chair a meeting with 
representation from each of the Services to discuss setting rules to prevent loss of civilian 
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life.
222
  The meeting went into considerable detail and outlined a two-stage approach with 
first restricting bombardment to a very narrow interpretation of military objectives and the 
second allowing a broader approach consistent with the lines agreed with French in Staff 
Conversations.
223
  The instructions, which Army commanders were to be required to obey 
in spirit, reiterated the key principles of bombardment of civilians being illegal.
224
  In the 
event, foreign policy issues intervened with Lord Halifax of the opinion that the original 
„Stage One was too restrictive and would alarm our allies‟.225  These were duly issued by 
the Air Council to Air Officers Commanding at home and overseas on 22 August 1939, 
followed by a further letter enclosing „Air Ministry Instructions and Notes on the Rules to 
be observed by the Royal Air Force in War‟.  In setting the foundations for the future 
direction of war, the Air Ministry letter included the following general statement: 
The policy governing the selection of targets for air attack is a matter for decision 
by the government. This policy will be made known, through the Air Ministry, to 
Commanders-in Chief and will be reflected in operation orders‟. 
 
  
The practicalities of who would be allowed to what and when were discussed by 
the Chiefs of Staff and subsequently in the CID on 1 September 1939. The essence of the 
discussion was that if Germany initiated unrestricted air attacks at the outset of hostilities, 
Bomber Command would be used to attack the German oil resources.  If, however, 
Germany was to restrict attacks to military objectives, the RAF would attack the German 
Fleet at Wilhelmshaven; attack warships at sea when found within range; undertake 
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widespread propaganda (leaflet) drops at night; and „conserve resources until our hands are 
freed‟.226 
 
Bomber Command therefore went to war with bombing policy predicated on the 
foreign policy requirements consistent with President Roosevelt‟s message to all potential 
belligerents that their „armed forces shall in no event and under no circumstances 
undertake bombardment from the air of civilian populations or unfortified cities, upon the 
understanding that the same rules of warfare shall be scrupulously observed by all their 
opponents‟.227  The other constraint (imposed by Halifax) was that the rules should not 
appear overly restrictive lest allies (France in particular) thought that Britain was being 
overly cautious in the interests of its own defence.  But throughout the process, it is clear 
that the serving officers, at least from Group Captain and above were prepared to follow a 
restrictive approach.  It could be argued that this was a merely mechanical reaction based 
on the, admittedly high, likelihood that the gloves would indeed have to come off at some 
stage.  But the evidence suggests that if those in the Air Ministry were cynical about the 
whole issue, they had the sense not confide their doubts to the files destined for the 
archives!  But as Hays Parks has pointed out, even the international lawyers of the day 
doubted the applicability of the international law of war to the modern means at the 
disposal of nations on an unprecedented scale.
228
  Interestingly, Parks acknowledges the 
failures in diplomacy, but has hard words for the failure of international lawyers and moral 
philosophers of the time „who failed to adjust international law and moral thinking to 
major technological changes in society and warfare‟.229 Nor could the scholars claim that 
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the issues had not been raised.
230
 That said, neither governments, nor private citizens, had 
much faith in international agreements providing them with protection.
231
  The reality of 
the international experience of the 1930s where Britain had attempted to set the example 
by unilaterally disarming had been shown to be false logic.  International agreements 
appeared to mean little to the new breed of dictators as events were proving. The ready 
examples of the use of air power in Abyssinia, Spain and China suggested that the analogy 
of „removing gloves‟ was mild in the extreme. 
 
Munich to War 
The Munich crisis resulted in yet another decision by the Cabinet to extend and accelerate 
Scheme L, and to an easing of the financial limits on the Services and on what they could 
upon industry to produce.
232
  The Cabinet were content to order more fighters, and that the 
Secretary of State for Air (now Kingsley Wood) „should give further consideration to the 
policy of concentrating on the development and construction of the large high performance 
bomber capable of carrying a very heavy bomb load‟.233  Furthermore, there should be 
sufficient orders for bombers „to avoid substantial dismissals in the aircraft factories‟.234  
Although this hardly appears to be a ringing endorsement of the policy of the offensive 
having primacy over home defence, it at least provided the foundations for an all heavy 
bomber force to be achieved by 1942, providing resources could be husbanded.
235
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 At the operational level of planning, there remained doubt as to where the real 
balance of authority actually lay.
236
  At the root of the problems, at least during the 
Czechoslovakian crisis, was the deep uncertainty as to how a potential war might 
develop.
237
  The Air Staff, based on discussions in COS, believed that it was still possible 
that Germany would seek to attempt to remove France and Britain from the war with a 
knock-out blow, but it was more probable that Germany would utilise its air power in an 
invasion of Czechoslovakia.
238
 This possible eventuality clouded the issue as to what 
Bomber Command could be used for; accordingly the C-in-C was tasked to investigate 
what his Command could achieve against the German air force and the German army and 
its lines of communications, but within the Air Council‟s constraints on attacking 
civilians.
239
 The complexity and ambiguity of the situation were obviously clear to the 
CAS, but the tone of the correspondence suggested that although the C-in-C was content 
for his staff to get on with the planning as tasked, he was uncomfortable with the lack of 
clear direction and tended to concentrate on the planning processes.
240
 
 
After Munich, the air staff thought that the pendulum had swung in their favour 
over target selection in particular with Bomber Command responsible solely for the 
methods by which they would be attacked.
241
  The C-in-C favoured a more general, or less 
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specific, sort of direction allowing him more latitude in the selection of targets.
242
  For 
example, at a meeting held in the Air Ministry on 30 November 1938 (chaired by ACAS – 
AVM Sholto Douglas but with the C-in-C in full attendance), the C-in-C stated 
that what he wanted from the Air Ministry was a memorandum rather than a plan. 
If he could have a reasoned statement showing the best targets to go for and their 
order of importance, he would then decide which of these it was possible to attack 
and the best method of execution.
243
 
 
On behalf of the Air Ministry the Deputy Director Plans (Slessor) pointed out that even 
something as general as a memorandum would require a degree of operationally coherent 
planning if it was to make sense,
244
 The C-in-C was also very cautious as to how far into 
Germany he would be prepared to send his crews, lest there be a „major disaster‟.245 The 
meeting accordingly decided to base plans on degree of bomber penetration.
246
 
Interestingly, this was overturned by the CAS on the basis that decisions on groups of 
targets had to be based on the effective contribution to the strategic aim.
247
 There were also 
serious issues in devising „Restricted‟ or „legitimate‟ versions of the Western Air Plans that 
would contain sufficient purely military targets that could be attacked without undue risk 
of civilian casualties.  The realities of the situation were that whichever of the element of 
the plans that were considered in the context of real targets, such as German naval vessels, 
the practicalities raised by Bomber Command were usually greater than the legitimacy of 
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the target.
248
  A similar morass of correspondence ensued over the proposals to use 
Bomber Command aircraft to drop leaflets over Germany as part of WA14.
249
 
 
The relationship between Air Ministry staff, some of whom like Slessor, were of 
the highest calibre, and Bomber Command Headquarters was a leadership challenge that 
would continue throughout the strategic air offensive.  Part of the issue was that Cs-in-C 
were concerned that they would be called upon to execute plans that were technically 
impracticable.  But, more importantly, there were serious concerns that those at the 
operational level did not grasp the wider strategic picture, or were unwilling to 
compromise for greater benefit.  The reality was that it took leaders of the highest order to 
be able recognise the importance of the interfaces and sub-ordinate their internal priorities. 
 
Conclusions 
Over the period covered by this chapter, the leadership challenges relating to the 
forthcoming bomber offensive facing the Secretaries of State (Londonderry, Swinton and 
Wood), and their CASs (Salmond, Ellington and finally Newall), ranged from maintaining 
the very survival of military aviation in the face of determined abolitionists through 
making an organisation fit for the rapid expansion occasioned by the rise of Germany to 
preparing for war.  Throughout the period, the parallel refrains of defence of London were 
reiterated along with the best form of defence being offensive action. As has been shown, 
the financial restraints under which they had to operate were relatively strict up until 
Munich with considerable limitations on industry.  Furthermore the timescales for the 
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development of weapons that would prove capable of realising the rhetoric were such that 
it would almost certainly take until 1942 before the heavy bombers came into service.   
 
The limitations as to what Bomber Command was likely to be able to accomplish 
was allied to the continuing debate over what was legitimate for it to attempt.  It is to the 
credit of the senior leadership, admittedly under the unequivocal direction of the Prime 
Minister, that they endeavoured to adduce a set of rules that would ensure that the targets 
chosen were genuinely military and there would be no gratuitous bombardment of the civil 
population. The motivation for the worked carried out may well have been a tightrope 
between Roosevelt‟s admonition to the prospective belligerents and the expectations of 
French allies.  But the attempts were made nonetheless. 
 
Although serious efforts were made, from the outset, to ensure that the 
organisational relationship between the Air Ministry and Bomber Command was free from 
duplication and friction it is clear that there was a marked degree of overlap between the 
two that would continue throughout the conflict.  To some extent this was inevitable as 
many of the crucial interfaces with other organisations were in London resulting in the 
centre of gravity tending towards the Air Ministry.  But having set up these Commands, 
and put senior men in charge, it was equally inevitable that they would guard their „turf‟. 
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Chapter Five 
 
FROM THE OUTBREAK OF WAR TO AREA BOMBING 
  
 
The expiry of Britain‟s ultimatum to Germany on 3 September 1939 saw Bomber 
Command still struggling to shake off the lethargy of the years of disarmament and to 
build on the opportunity to form a coherent force capable of realising the rhetoric that had 
characterised the previous era.  The senior leaders in the Air Ministry and at the Command 
Headquarters were aware that Germany had „a formidable superiority in air strength‟ and 
that it would take until 1942 for the RAF to acquire the heavy bombers necessary to carry 
out a credible offensive.
1
  From 1939 through to the time when the Command would have 
sufficient aircraft, crews and the capability to do serious damage to the German war 
machine, the leadership challenges were, again, complex and ambiguous with no simple 
solutions available.  The logical way forward, at almost any time in this period, was to 
conserve aircraft and experienced aircrew until such time as their engagement with the 
enemy could have the optimum impact.  The reality, however, was that the needs of the 
moment were such that Bomber Command was repeatedly called upon to support the 
British and French armies in France; help to deter an invasion of the United Kingdom; and 
support the Battle of the Atlantic.  The situation was further complicated by the 
determination of all concerned not to be seen to be the first to instigate indiscriminate 
bombing of non-combatant personnel, although all were aware that the gloves would have 
to come off sooner or later. 
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 This chapter will seek to explore some of the senior leadership challenges of this 
period.  Rather than attempt to present a sequential account of the period, it will examine 
some of the facets of strategic leadership as they applied to the direction of the bomber 
offensive.  The first of these facets is the interface with other players at the strategic level, 
particularly potential, and actual, allies.  As they are key facets of leadership at the highest 
levels, the chapter will then look at the vision and purpose of the strategic air offensive, 
how it developed and how it was directed; it will tackle each of the main phases evident 
during the period examining the challenges of conservation of effort versus dire need for 
action. The chapter will then explore the issues of legality and morality surrounding the 
potential offensive through until the Directive of February 1942 (although wider discussion 
will finish at the end of 1941); even though the official historians suggested that restraint 
was more „a matter of expediency as much as morality‟, this section will show that the 
situation was altogether more complex.
2
   
 
Finishing the period in question at the end of 1941 is an artificial convenience.  As 
will become evident, the process of evolution towards area bombing was both gradual and 
incremental.  It could be argued that each successive Directive from the Air Ministry to 
Bomber Command could have been depicted as a watershed; but these either reflected a 
swing of the pendulum of war, or another step forward to area bombing without restriction.  
The German invasion of Russia in June 1941, after which Britain no longer stood alone, 
could also have marked a watershed; but it had little immediate relevance to the bomber 
offensive.  The entry of the United States into the war as a belligerent could have an even 
greater claim to the status of being a turning point and closing this chapter at the end of 
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1941 coincides with this.  In classic historiographical terms, the arrival of Harris as C-in-C 
in February 1942 would have been a traditional depiction of the changes in events and 
fortunes of the Command.  But, as will be shown, most of the changes had already been set 
in train by Portal and it was to be Harris‟s duty to put into effect the policies that had 
already been decided upon and with the equipment that was already on stream.
3
 
 
Relationships with Allies 
 
The United States of America.  At the very beginning of the period covered by this 
chapter, the major strategic input from the United States was a telegram from President 
Roosevelt imploring all likely belligerents not to bomb civilian targets, and this will be 
dealt with under the section on legality and morality.  For much of the rest of the period, 
relations between Britain and the USA were limited by neutrality, notwithstanding 
agreements to train pilots and sell aircraft.
4
  Heavy bombers were included in the quest for 
aircraft and the American attitude was conditioned by Roosevelt taking as proactive a 
stance as possible without Congressional reproach.
5
  The situation was further complicated 
by Roosevelt‟s electioneering stance during 1940, having promised the electorate that 
isolationism would continue and that young Americans would not be sent abroad to fight.
6
 
Churchill subsequently described Roosevelt‟s successful re-election as „an indescribable 
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relief‟.7  Up until November 1940, Britain had paid for all its purchases in the US from an 
ever-dwindling supply of dollars.
8
 Lend-lease „transformed immediately the whole 
position‟.9  All elements of the military machine benefited from this process, including the 
supply of aircraft for Bomber Command.  Although the real interface in the direction of the 
strategic bombing campaign did not commence until after America‟s entry into the war, 
Portal was involved in a highly sensitive visit by a group senior American officers who 
visited Bomber Command in August 1940.
10
  The group was visiting Britain nominally to 
look at the question of „standardisation of arms‟ whereas the real purpose was to hold „staff 
conversations‟ and the Prime Minister had authorised all involved „to be completely frank 
and withhold nothing from them‟.11 The momentum behind staff conversations and 
reciprocal visits soon started to increase culminating in the major Washington Conference 
soon after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor; this process will be dealt with in a coherent 
whole in the next chapter. 
 
Poland.  Although in May 1939 Britain had made it clear that Polish independence was to 
be guaranteed, it was equally evident that little could actually be done in the event of a 
significant land attack.
12
  The only means of supporting Poland physically would either be 
by means of a strategic bombing offensive, or a major Anglo-French land offensive in the 
west designed to relieve the pressure on Poland.
13
  But given the impracticalities of such an 
event taking place so early in the conflict, it was not seriously considered.  Indeed, Allied 
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unwillingness to „remove the gloves‟ meant that while Poland was subject to 
indiscriminate bombing, Bomber Command replied against Germany with little more than 
leaflets – a response that caused „bitter comment‟ in Poland.14  These events did not pass 
unnoticed in the Air Ministry with the Director of Plans (Air Commodore Slessor) 
conducting a detailed analysis of the situation to ascertain whether German air action 
justified the relaxation of the restrictions on aerial bombardment.
15
  The Note 
recommended that the RAF „should not be stampeded by Polish appeals into frittering 
away our air strength on ineffective and uneconomical tasks, merely for the sake of being 
able to say that we are doing something‟.16 
 
Norway.  In the strict sense of operating with allies at the strategic interfaces, air 
operations during the Norway campaign do not fall within the scope of this thesis.  For 
completeness, it is worth recording that Bomber Command flew sorties against German 
naval units in Norwegian waters and against airfields in an attempt to reduce German air 
activity.
17
  Operations were severely impeded by the extremity of the ranges at which the 
aircraft were operating; by very poor weather preventing target identification; and by 
almost non-existing weather reporting.
18
 
 
France.  The alignment of objectives at strategic interfaces is, by definition, a key task of 
the senior leader, and working with the situation following the German invasion was to 
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stretch all involved.  The complexities were exacerbated by the requirement to conserve 
men and equipment countered by the desperate need to support an ally in peril. Anglo-
French Staff talks had continued through the last year of peace and the differences between 
the British viewpoint and that of their continental allies became all the more strained 
following the outbreak of war.
19
  As the AHB Narrative makes very clear, and the official 
history agrees, the circular arguments were so repetitive, that it was just not worth doing 
more than summarising them.
20
 At the root of the problem was that France, which was „ill-
equipped in the air‟, believed that all bomber forces should be used in direct support of the 
army.
21
  Demonstrating both a lack of understanding of the other potential uses of large 
bombers, and the unsuitability of these aircraft for that role, the French higher echelons 
(General Gamelin as Supreme Commander and General Vuilleman for the French Air 
Force) were unswerving in their military (i.e. army) defensive outlook.
22
  The British 
alternative was based initially on the premise that the initiative lay with Germany and the 
Cabinet paper that AVM Evill took with him to France echoed Slessor‟s views that „we 
should not fritter away our striking force on unprofitable objectives in deference to a public 
clamour for retaliation or public criticism at inaction‟.23  But the paper then went on to 
confirm that „if enemy action against France or ourselves looks like being decisive‟ then 
„our striking force must be employed at all costs in the manner which holds out the best 
hope of obtaining decisive results against Germany‟.24  Furthermore, the most profitable 
use of the force, in the event of indiscriminate German bombing, would be to attack the 
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Ruhr, but that „we should not be the first to take the gloves off‟.25  The French were 
strongly opposed to attacks on the Ruhr, as they considered their equivalent industrial areas 
to be more vulnerable.
26
  Likewise, the French were extremely reluctant to plan on 
attacking German road and rail communications for the same reasons: Gamelin was 
reported to be „obsessed with fear of attack on his own road and rail communications‟.27 
 
 Ironically, it was the misfortunes of war, rather than French opposition, that led to 
the shelving of the „Ruhr Plan‟ following severe losses to formations of Wellington aircraft 
in December 1939.
28
  A formal conference held in the Air Ministry on 22 February 1940 
resulted in the CAS ruling that Bomber Command would only be called upon to attack the 
Ruhr in the most extreme circumstances; other options would therefore have to be 
considered.
29
  The ambiguity of the situation, following the invasion of Denmark and 
Norway, was immediately evident in the Directive issued by the Air Ministry (from 
Director of Plans – still Slessor) to the new C-in-C (now Portal).30  The Air Ministry based 
their thinking on two hypotheses, the first being that authority would be granted for 
unrestricted air action.
31
  The alternative was that Germany invaded either Belgium and/or 
Holland.
32
  Likely targets included troop concentrations, marshalling yards into the Ruhr 
and oil plants in the Ruhr.
33
 To complete the picture of uncertainty, Slessor added a 
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manuscript PS reminding the C-in-C that neither set of plans could be implemented 
without an executive order from the Air Ministry, presumably because War Cabinet 
approval would be required for whatever course of action was decided upon.
34
 
 
 The German army removed some of the doubt for those contemplating the future 
direction of the air offensive as they moved into the Low Countries early on the morning of 
10 May 1040.  The official historians have pointed out that any wishful thinking that the 
Germans may have applied a more civilised „code of morals‟ on their western neighbours 
than on Poland and Czechoslovakia was quickly and cruelly „shattered by the mass 
bombing of Rotterdam‟ following which it was clear that the „gloves were off‟.35  Webster 
and Frankland bluntly accused the government of acting in a hesitant manner over such a 
critical period.
36
  In many ways, this was not surprising, albeit less than desirable.  The 
Chamberlain government was rendered largely ineffective after the vote of censure on 8 
May, even though the government actually won the division.
37
  The period between this 
vote and Churchill assuming the premiership on 10 May 1940 saw Chamberlain vacillating 
between trying to soldier on, resign immediately or attempt to form a new administration.
38
 
Chamberlain chaired his last two Cabinet meetings on 10 May following the German 
invasion.
39
  At the latter meeting he confirmed that the Labour members would not serve 
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under him in a coalition and he would tender his resignation to the King that evening.
40
  
Bombing policy was discussed at both Cabinet meetings with reports at the earlier one 
suggesting that German aircraft had bombed targets in „open towns‟ and that RAF attacks 
on the Ruhr would be likely to follow; but the decision to go ahead was deferred until the 
second meeting.
41
  At this meeting, there was still doubt as to the scale of German attacks 
on the civilian population, but the CAS strongly advocated immediate attacks on the Ruhr 
and emphasised the psychological impact that they were likely to have on Germany.
42
  
Again, the decision was deferred.
43
  The matter was again deferred on May 12, but it was 
acknowledged that moon conditions would not be favourable for a further 4 days hence 
urgency in decision-making was not vital.
44
  A further, lengthy, debate took place the 
following day with the pros and cons discussed in detail and again it was concluded that 
the decision should be deferred pending developments on the Continent.
45
  A further 
deferral on 14 May was followed the next day by further bad news from France and 
gloomy predictions for the prospects of the French holding out.
46
  The CAS briefed on the 
extensive air operations by both fighters and medium bomber aircraft on the Continent, and 
on the high loss rates.
47
 The discussion on the deployment of the heavy bombers was again 
protracted; it was emphasised that they were not suitable for night time use against 
communications targets in support of land forces, but could be used against both oil 
refineries and marshalling yards.
48
  At this meeting the Prime Minister (i.e. Churchill) 
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concluded that „it was clear that the War Cabinet were united in favour of taking 
immediate action in delivering a hard blow at Germany‟.49  The minutes further record that 
C-in-C Bomber Command had confirmed that a force of 100 aircraft would be available 
for attacks east of the Rhine that night and authorisation was duly given for the strategic air 
offensive at last to begin.
50
 
 
 The rapid pace of events in France and the Low Countries was such that the British 
policy for the use of the striking force prevailed over French preferences. Hopes for 
German restraint proved unfounded, thus French objections based on the fear of reprisals 
were swept aside.  Interestingly, the causal link made by the official historians between the 
bombing of Rotterdam and authorisation for attacks east of the Rhine is not borne out in 
the recorded Cabinet discussions on that day.
51
  It is also worthy of note that Churchill was 
altogether more aggressive in his condemnation of the enemy, who, „by the many atrocities 
he had already committed, had given ample justification in the eyes of the world for an 
attack on the Ruhr.‟52  He was likewise convinced of the inevitably of an attack on Britain 
irrespective of any actions (or restraint) shown by the RAF.
53
  The discussions in the War 
Cabinet also included the wider debates on the reinforcement of fighters for France and 
take the historiographical debate beyond the cinematic portrayal of Dowding steadfastly 
refusing to deplete his Command; in a reply to a direct question from the Prime Minister, 
the CAS „said that he would not, at the moment advise the despatch of any additional 
fighters to France‟ (emphasis in the original).54  Although not directly related to the 
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employment of the heavy bombers these decisions saw the twin themes of offensive action 
and the defence of the United Kingdom, and London in particular, return to central focus 
as dominant influences for the strategic decision makers. 
 
 Although the War Cabinet had authorised operations over the Ruhr, and elsewhere 
east of the Rhine, there was no immediate alleviation of the frustrations caused by Bomber 
Command being pulled in all directions.  The problems were caused, in part, by the 
interface between Bomber Command and the Air Ministry being, in practice, a significant 
overlap between the operational and strategic levels.  On 17 May 1940, Portal wrote to the 
DCAS which expressed the full range of operational and strategic issues facing his 
Command.
55
  At the practical level, Portal queried as to whether it would be possible to 
have a „general directif (sic) for the Heavy Bombers, and then be left to get on with it‟.  
Furthermore, he complained about the frequent changes in plan necessitating changes in 
flying programmes and bomb loads.  At the heart of the problem was that the Air Ministry 
sought to „combine the functions of laying down policy and controlling actual operations‟ 
which Portal opined as being a grave mistake.
56
  But at the same time, Portal‟s appreciation 
of the use to which his aircraft were being put was a concise and masterly appreciation of 
the strategic situation.  He pointed out the sterling efforts of the Blenheim Group operating 
in direct support of the land forces in France, but was clearly not convinced about the use 
of heavy bombers beyond the two squadrons originally tasked (partly to meet French 
demands).
57
  Portal detailed the considerable difficulties his crews experienced in attacking 
lines of communication which were heavily defended and what damage was caused was 
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relatively easily circumvented.
58
  Instead, Portal advocated heavy attacks on the Ruhr (and 
elsewhere) which would lead the enemy to withdraw fighters for defence of those vital 
assets.
59
  Furthermore, retaliatory attacks on Britain by the Luftwaffe would ease the 
pressure on the land forces in France and allow RAF fighters the chance to destroy them.
60
  
A similar argument applied to the almost certain withdrawal of flak.
61
 This 
conceptualisation of the vital battle for control of the air was one to which the senior 
leaders would return over the course of the war, and in particular in the context of the 
invasion of North West Europe. 
 
 A detailed account of the role of the RAF in France (as with Norway) is beyond the 
scope of a thesis based on the strategic air offensive and is well covered elsewhere.
62
 It is, 
however, instructive to acknowledge that whatever agreement may have been made at „3-
star‟ level between Pierse and Portal, the Chiefs of Staff and the politicians beyond them 
had a say in what actually happened.  For example, following a minute from Peirse to 
Newall on the outcome of an Air Staff conference on 19 May 1940, CAS wrote at the 
bottom reminding his deputy that „on no account must we go back on what we have 
promised the French‟.63 From 10 May onwards, Churchill was ever more prone to 
involving himself at the tactical level thereby complicating the organisational overlap 
described above.  A classic example of this occurred following his visit to France on 16 
May during which he agreed to increased use of heavy bombers against the Meuse 
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crossings and directed the War Cabinet by telegram.
64
  The CAS readily agreed to the use 
of Bomber Command and saved his ammunition for the continuing debate on whether 
more fighters should be sent to France.
65
  The AHB Narrative records the difficulty in 
apportioning exactly the numbers of aircraft attacking specific categories of target, but it is 
clear that after the peak caused by Churchill‟s visit when some 50% of the bomber effort 
was in direct support it decreased markedly thereafter to about 35% on 19 May.
66
  Other 
targets attacked over the period include road and rail communications at Maastricht, 
Aachen and Munchen-Gladbach (sic); the coking plant at Hamborn; docks and marshalling 
yards at Dusseldorf; railway sidings at Hamburg; and the aerodrome at Duisberg.
67
  
 
Inevitably, the situation continued to ebb and flow depending on the tactical 
situation and the state of the moon. Daylight raids by heavy bombers, and especially the 
medium bombers, were subject to high loss rates and operations were concentrated at night 
either against „self-illuminating targets‟ such as coking plants, or during the lighter moon 
phases.
68
  This ambiguity continued throughout the Battle of France and was reflected in 
the Directives sent by the Air Ministry to Barratt (AOC-in-C British Air Forces in France) 
copied to Portal on 30 May and again to Portal on 4 June 1940 in which it was „necessary 
to give priority to the operations in support of French land forces‟.69  Beyond this, the latter 
Directive included attacks on oil as being „the primary aim‟ and the German aircraft 
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industry as the next most important target set.
70
 A further Prime Ministerial visit to France 
on 13 June caused another flurry of bomber activity to bolster French morale, but arguably 
more significantly, the French had reversed their objections against bomber operations 
against Italy and RAF Servicing Units were to be returned to France.
71
 Italy had declared 
war on 10 June and operations (codenamed Haddock) had been planned against Italian 
targets from southern France, but were thwarted by the locals in Provence who, fearing 
reprisals, drove lorries onto the airfields to block the runways.
72
  Following a change of 
heart, raids were launched against Salon on 15 June and then Milan on 17 June by which 
time France‟s request for terms with Germany necessitated their withdrawal.73 
 
USSR.  For the few months in the period covered by this chapter when the USSR counted 
as an ally following the German invasion, the impact of the strategic bomber offensive on 
Germany and its support to the conflict in the east was minimal.  Indeed the Air Staff 
looked at the issue from their own perspective conducting an appreciation of what the 
impact of the air war in the east would be on their own operations, with particular 
emphasis on the withdrawal of fighters.
74
 
 
 
Vision, Purpose and Direction – Portal and Invasion 
No matter what the nature and size of an organisation, it is essential that the senior 
leadership have a shared vision and understanding of the purpose of their enterprise.  This 
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in turn must be communicated to all involved, including those at the strategic interfaces. 
Following the German attack on Scandinavia, the Chiefs of Staff had reviewed the 
situation, anticipating either an attack on France or a knock-out blow against Britain.
75
  
The Chiefs concluded that if Germany was intent on achieving a decision that year our 
„strategic policy and military preparations, both for offence and defence, should, therefore, 
be based on this assumption‟ with the „corollary that „we shall have to undertake an air 
offensive against Germany some time during the coming months‟.76  In the event, the fall 
of France produced the worst of all possible scenarios with Germany occupying a coastline 
from the Arctic Circle down to the Bay of Biscay and able to operate against the United 
Kingdom with relative impunity.
77
  In concert with Ministry of Economic Warfare, the 
Chiefs of Staff had completed a subsequent Review in which they came to the view that 
Germany might be defeated by the bombing of economic and psychological objectives 
and, along with the economic pressures of a blockade would result in serious economic 
pressure and widespread revolt against the Nazi regime.
78
  With the benefit of hindsight it 
could be argued that the Chiefs were grossly optimistic, especially with the resources at 
their disposal.
79
  But the strategic context at the time gave them little option, other than the 
unthinkable (under Churchill) of seeking terms with Hitler.  Yet, as the official historians 
acknowledged, the policy outcomes from the review would subsequently be „an important 
factor in the defeat of Germany‟.80 The prospects for victory were summarised by 
Churchill on the anniversary of the outbreak of war: 
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The Navy can lose us the war, but only the Air Force can win it.  Therefore our 
supreme effort must be to gain overwhelming mastery in the Air.  The Fighters are 
our salvation, but the Bombers alone provide the means of victory.  We must 
therefore develop the power to carry an ever-increasing volume of explosives to 
Germany, so as to pulverise the entire industry and scientific structure on which the 
war effort and economic life of the enemy depends, while holding him at arm‟s 
length in our Island.
81
 
 
From this short analysis, and a very clear iteration of the „supreme commander‟s‟ intent, 
the senior leaders charged with the policy formulation and the execution of the strategic air 
offensive were left in no doubt as to what was expected of them. 
  
 Even without the uncertainty that had been engendered by the need to support land 
forces in France, the Air Ministry continued to issue Directives to Portal on a regular basis 
until his promotion to CAS on 4 October 1940. The official historians have taken this as 
evidence that, judging from their number and form, the Air Staff intended „to exercise the 
closest supervision over operations carried out by Bomber Command‟.82  In fact, Portal 
himself in his Despatch on the operations in Norway confirmed that: 
The control of the operation of my Command was virtually assumed by the Air 
Ministry. Although my advice was often sought, I was not responsible for the 
selection of objectives, nor for deciding the effort to be employed against each.
83
 
 
To some extent, this is not altogether surprising in that the War Cabinet under Churchill, 
the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Staffs in each of the Service Departments acted as 
clearing houses for information and requests for support, acting de facto as an operational 
level headquarters.  But their attention to detail was clearly irksome to the Commander-in-
Chief. 
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 With the task of supporting allied land forces in abeyance for some time to come, 
there should have been scope for the strategic air offensive to gain real momentum, but 
again the policy for the employment of the force was mixed.  The need to ward off the risk 
of a German invasion had been thought about as early as 7 May with Portal attending an 
inter-service conference in the Air Ministry to advise on the most appropriate use of air 
power.
84
  A further such conference on 19 June resulted in a new Directive being sent to 
Portal confirming that the „primary offensive of the Air Striking Force must be directed 
towards those objectives which will have the most immediate effect on reducing the scale 
of air attack on this country‟.85  Portal was therefore also given a list of potentially 
profitable targets in the German aircraft industry and key communications targets such 
marshalling yards and major canals.  But the Command was also required to continue 
operations laying mines in coastal waters (using Hampdens in a role known as 
„gardening‟); attacks on oil targets; and destruction of crops and forests.86  As the risk of 
invasion increased, discussions between the Air Ministry and Portal resulted in yet another 
Directive this time elevating attacks on shipping to the highest priority with emphasis on 
Kiel, the Scharnhorst and the Deutschland and any other capital ships in port there.
87
  
Docks at Hamburg (where the Bismarck was reported to be), Bremen and Rotterdam along 
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with other ports in Holland where there were concentrations of barges and other invasion 
shipping. „Gardening‟ operations were also to be increased.88   
 
Following this series of re-prioritisations, the Air Staff concluded that operations 
had hitherto been too dispersed and for the forthcoming period of moonlight, the 
Command should concentrate its efforts on fewer targets, but with greater weight of effort 
with „a view to complete destruction rather than harassing effect‟.89  Five aircraft depots 
and five airframe assembly factories were given the highest priority, complete with the 
required bomb loads necessary to achieve the destruction desired.
90
  Portal responded with 
a detailed criticism, pointing out the practical difficulty in getting to these targets as they 
were at extremes of range and then actually hitting them; he reckoned that only three of the 
ten could be found by an average crew on a good moonlit night.
91
  In what was to become 
a highly important factor in future bombing policy, Portal went on to say that as almost all 
of the targets were isolated, the bombs that did not hit directly „would do no damage and 
cause minimum disturbance‟; the Air Staff‟s response to this was that only real damage 
had been considered.
92
  What can be seen from this is one of the first steps towards an area 
bombing policy in which targets were specifically chosen to have significant secondary 
effects (what today would be called collateral damage).
93
  Portal also challenged the degree 
of destruction necessary suggesting that the effect required was to stop the factory working 
and that the extra effort required to destroy the target completely could have been used 
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elsewhere.
94
 In a follow-up letter to the DCAS, Portal reminded the Air Staff that his 
Command was the „one directly offensive weapon in our whole armoury, the one means by 
which we can undermine the morale of a large part of the enemy people, shake their faith 
in the Nazi regime, and at the same time and with the very same bombs, dislocate the 
major part of their heavy industry, much of their chemical industry and a good part of their 
oil production‟.95  Portal concluded with his opinion that it „was entirely wrong‟ to use his 
Command for bolstering Fighter Command and the other elements of home defence until 
operationally proven essential.
96
 
 
A Conference in the Air Ministry on 22 July resulted in the issue of a further 
Directive on 24 July which did little to change the priorities, but greatly expanded the 
range of targets; the aircraft industry was again highest priority with oil and then 
communications following on.
97
  The list was further expanded a week later to include 
more power targets.
98
  This interlude depicts the Air Staff as relishing an operational level 
role while the C-in-C had clearly grasped the strategic policy necessary to make the best 
use of the offensive potential of the Air Striking Force.  Although Churchill‟s words of 
„intent‟ quoted at the beginning of this section actually followed this period by some 
weeks, it is again clear that both senior leaders were in accord.  A shared aggressive spirit 
was also in evidence.  On 20 July, Portal spent the night at Chequers and was challenged 
by Churchill as to what could be done about bombing Berlin by 1 September; Portal‟s 
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response was that plans were ready for the heavy bomber force to make such an attack at 
twelve hours notice at any time after 1 August.
99
 When the Luftwaffe inadvertently 
bombed central London on 24 August, Bomber Command responded the next night and 
again the following week.
100
  How much this goaded Hitler into launching his all-out 
attack on London rather than maintaining the pressure on Fighter Command is debatable, 
but the incidental effect actually met some of Portal‟s predictions from the days of the 
Battle of France.   
 
The pattern of responses that had been evident in the First World War, with 
demands for adequate air defence of London and reprisals against Germany, were then 
repeated with increasing pressure, not least from Churchill, to retaliate against German 
cities.
101
  For example, the CAS briefed the War Cabinet on 10 September 1940 on 
German air action against London; the Prime Minister expressed the view that the bombing 
had been indiscriminate and suggested that British aircraft should not bring back their 
ordnance if they had failed to locate their prescribed target (the direct implication being 
that bombs could be dropped, to useful effect, anywhere in Germany).
102
  Discussion the 
following day was based on a suggestion that Britain should threaten Germany with 
reprisals against „any one of twenty German towns (to be named) if the indiscriminate 
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bombing of London continued‟.103  It was agreed, however, that the bomber force should 
be used only on military targets.
104
   The preference not to jettison bombs in a haphazard 
manner over German, or occupied, territory was further emphasised by the Secretary of 
State for Air (Sinclair) in a letter to Churchill later the same day.
105
 Churchill recorded a 
note sent to General Ismay on 19 September for the Chiefs of Staff to consider floating the 
idea (and was frustrated that nothing was done about it for over a month following „one  
objection after another‟).106 Interestingly, the official historians have made the point that 
Portal suggested the same reprisal of attacking any one of twenty named towns, which they 
list, to the Air Staff also on 11 September; but they did not make the connection with the 
Cabinet discussion.
107
  
 
Elements within the Air Staff, at this stage, still believed that selective attacks 
would bring about the required damage to key target sets in general and oil in particular.
108
 
This was still very evident in the Directive of 21 September which focused on the 
continuing need for attacks on invasion shipping and new targets within the aircraft 
industry; operations against the German submarine industry were also instigated.
109
 
Attacks on Berlin were to be continued „from time to time‟ with particular emphasis on gas 
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and electricity plants in order to dislocate the life of the community; an individual factory 
manufacturing electric cables was singled out for special priority.
110
 
 
Portal, in his final days at Bomber Command before taking over as CAS on 4 
October 1940, produced a Review of Bombing Policy in which he acknowledged that 
attacks on industrial targets would „produce shortages in things essential to the enemy‟s 
war effort‟ such as oil and aircraft.111  He added that these attacks would obtain 
„incidentally, a considerable morale effect on all Germans who live near a target‟ or on the 
routes to them. Portal admitted that although these attacks „may ultimately be decisive‟, 
they would have no immediate effect. He therefore queried whether there should be a 
„temporary change in our policy, directing our offensive primarily against the will of the 
German people to continue the war‟.  Portal went on to advocate „very heavy material 
destruction‟ interspersed with light attacks that would produce panic and exaggerated 
reports. In the face of censorship, rumours would flourish, producing an atmosphere of 
gloom and uncertainty.
112
  In a draft letter for the consideration of the Air Council, Portal 
effectively sought to reverse extant policy, making the enemy will to win the war the 
primary target and the „destruction of his means to win the war as an incremental or 
indirect task‟.113 
 
Assessment. In the short period that Portal spent as C-in-C, he demonstrated a very clear 
understanding of the strategic imperatives as well as a masterful grasp of the complete 
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range of tactical details.
114
  It is also clear that his offensive mindedness was in direct 
concert with the thinking of Churchill who described him as „the accepted star of the Air 
Force‟.115  Portal also retained the close patronage of Trenchard.116  From diary references 
and memoirs, it is clear that Portal also made a considerable impact on his staff.  As a 
Group Captain in the Bomber Command Operations Room, Hugh Lloyd (later AVM Sir 
Hugh Lloyd) confided to his diary that „I like the new C-in-C; (Portal), young friendly, 
active and makes up his mind quickly‟.117  This was in marked contrast to his predecessor 
(Ludlow-Hewitt) was „a hopeless bungler and fuddler; unable to make up his mind and will 
change it five times in as many minutes‟.118  Portal knew his own mind; understood the 
complexities of senior command; and grasped what the bomber force could and could not 
do.  His emphasis on attacking German morale became fundamental to the following 
campaign. 
 
Vision and Purpose – The Coming of Area Bombing 
The promotion of Portal to CAS (the right man for the job, but for the wrong reasons 
according to a recent historian) saw Sir Richard Peirse move from VCAS to C-in-C 
Bomber Command.
119
  ACM Sir Wilfred Freeman became the new Vice-Chief with effect 
from 5 November 1940 and was to be a useful sounding board for Portal.
120
  With the 
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threat if imminent invasion receding, it was considered to be an appropriate occasion on 
which to review bombing policy for the winter months.
121
  The new Directive 
acknowledged that the events had hitherto necessitated a dispersion of Bomber Command 
effort, but that it would now be appropriate to concentrate on two principal objectives, 
namely oil and „concentrated attacks on ... objectives in large towns and centres of industry 
with the primary aim of causing very heavy material destruction which will demonstrate to 
the enemy the power and severity of air bombardment and the hardship and dislocation 
which will result from it‟.122  This would be part of a definite attempt „to affect the morale 
of the German people when they can no longer expect an early victory‟.123 Berlin should be 
attacked whenever conditions allowed.
124
 Other towns selected as targets should include 
those of an appropriate size and containing important objectives; they should be attacked 
with high explosives, incendiaries and delayed action bombs with sequencing arranged to 
put the maximum pressure on the emergency service.
125
  So what had started as a C-in-C‟s 
Review of Policy became a formal Directive with Portal imposing his vision in concert 
with Churchill‟s higher intent.  The AHB Narrative unequivocally labels this section as the 
„beginning of Area Bombing‟.126  In the War Cabinet, Churchill explained that objectives 
should be military targets, but that „the civilian population around the target areas must be 
made to feel the weight of the war.
127
  He saw this as a „broader interpretation of our 
present policy, and not as any fundamental change‟.128  As will be discussed below under 
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the section on legality, Government policy had been strictly to avoid indiscriminate 
bombing so Churchill was somewhat stretching the point here. 
 
 The new C-in-C was sent a draft copy of the Directive in advance, not least because 
it did mark a major shift from the tone of the Directives that Pierce had, until recently, 
been either sending out or sanctioning.
129
 Where for Portal the glass was more than half 
full, Peirse saw it as least half empty, worrying that the attacks would be beyond the 
capability of his people and that as few would arrive on targets, the raids would have little 
more than nuisance value.
130
  Although the Air Staff had little option but to reconsider the 
Directive, the official historians wryly commented that there was little change in „form or 
emphasis‟.131 
 
 The vulnerability of the German economy to its oil reserves continued to act as an 
irritant to the policy makers, attracting considerable attention from the intelligence 
specialists and a specific „Committee on the German Oil Position‟ was set up under the 
chairmanship of Mr Geoffrey Lloyd MP and under the wider supervision of Lord Hankey 
who chaired the „Committee on Preventing Oil from Reaching Enemy Powers‟.132  Given 
the high powered composition of these Committees, the Chiefs of Staff were hardly in a 
position to challenge the main findings; nevertheless, the Chiefs qualified their 
recommendations on the subject by stating that their conclusions were based „on the 
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assumption that that the figures in the Lloyd Report are correct‟.133 The recommendation 
was, however, accepted that air attacks should be concentrated „mainly on sources of 
synthetic production of oil in Germany‟.134 When bombing aircraft with sufficient range 
became available, the Lloyd Report recommended action should be taken against Danube 
oil ports, Italy and her allies.
135
  A further paper was submitted by the Foreign Secretary 
(Eden) on the desirability of bombing Romanian oilfields.
136
  The Chiefs of Staff 
emphasised the importance of adhering to the aim until it was achieved, but acknowledged 
that weather and moon conditions would be such that a secondary aim would be 
appropriate and this was to be „lowering of enemy morale, particularly in industrial 
areas‟.137 This was translated into an appropriate Directive for Bomber Command and 
issued on 15 January 1941, although Peirse had been informally warned of the impending 
change by Harris (the new DCAS– brought in by Portal to strengthen the team).138 
 
 The January 1941 Oil Directive acknowledged, as had the Chiefs of Staff, that 
weather and visibility conditions would limit the „occasions when it will be profitable to 
plan attacks against any of the 17 oil objectives‟.139  The reality was that by the end of 
February 1941, Bomber Command had actually only been able to reach oil targets three 
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times.
140
  The issue was compounded by the growing weight of evidence suggesting that 
minimal damage was being done to the „precision‟ targets.141 With growing pressure from 
the Admiralty, and the increasingly desperate straits in which the convoys were placed, the 
available weight of effort had to be switched to the Battle of the Atlantic.  In a directive 
written in his role as Minister of Defence, Churchill stated that: 
We must take the offensive against the U-boat and the Focke-Wulf wherever we 
can and whenever we can. The U-boat at sea must be hunted, the U-boat in the 
building yard, or in dock must be bombed.  The Focke-Wulf and other bombers 
employed against our shipping must attacked in the air and in their nests.
142
 
 
The Air Ministry Directive of 9 March repeated the Prime Minister‟s words and bluntly 
ascribed the change in policy to Churchill‟s ruling.143  The list of targets was amended 
somewhat later in the month by the DCAS.
144
  The official historians have pointed out that 
this interlude in the strategic bombing offensive allowed Bomber Command and the Air 
Staff the opportunity to rework their high-level thinking on just what the force could 
achieve: had they continued against oil targets they concluded that „it would probably have 
done a great deal more damage to its prestige that to its targets‟.145  This is borne out in the 
practical difficulties facing the Command.  Loss of crews had resulted in the Prime 
Minister observing that aircrew were the Command‟s limiting factor and should be 
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conserved over the winter months with no undue weather risks being taken.
146
  The aircraft 
fleets were also plagued with problems of unserviceability.
147
 
 
 Attitudes within the Air Staff towards the use of Bomber Command in support of 
the Battle of the Atlantic were coloured by the question of ownership and of the parallel 
„trend towards two separate air forces‟ with one for the RAF and one for the RN.148  
Although it has to be admitted that some of Harris‟s views on the subject verge on the 
vitriolic, the strength of feeling was widely shared.
149
 Harris voiced the opinion of many 
airmen, both in Whitehall and at Bomber Command, that in supporting the Atlantic 
campaign they had been forced onto the defensive thus allowing the Germans the 
advantage.
150
  The Air Staff were also of the opinion that effort should be concentrated on 
lucrative targets such as the core industry and the dockyards, rather than, at the other 
extreme, „these comparatively fruitless Atlantic patrols‟.151  But the problem remained, if 
Bomber Command was to return to the strategic air offensive, how should it be employed 
without loss of prestige with the resultant starvation of assets? 
 
 In the first instance, the Prime Minister directed in March 1941 that Future 
Operational Planning Section should conduct a comprehensive long-term review; this was 
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subsequently published in June 1941 as the „Future Strategy Paper‟.152  The Chiefs of Staff 
saw this as a valuable background for planning the future conduct of the war and the 
possible involvement of America.
153
  The Introduction to „Future Strategy‟ described the 
war as being one of economy and morale with each of equal importance and dealt with 
these „fronts from both the British and enemy angles.154 The paper emphasised the need to 
maintain a blockade against Germany and noted each of the areas of „leakage‟.155  But it 
also acknowledged the unique contribution of the bombing offensive which had to be „a 
continuous offensive of attrition, progressive and cumulative as our resources grow‟.156  
The „Future Strategy‟ analysis on the scope of the bombing offensive to affect the morale 
of the German people was candid, admitting that the means to have a real impact were not 
yet available, but it was still a valid objective.
157
  The following section on the impact of 
the offensive on the German economy tackled the usual areas of oil, industry and 
transportation and recommended the latter as the primary target set.
158
 
 
The formal staff work was given considerable impetus by a Memorandum 
produced by Lord Trenchard on 19 May 1941.
159
 Predictably, his thesis was exclusively 
offensive in nature and that the RAF should „strike and strike again‟ at the perceived 
                                                 
152
 AIR 41/41, p.49.  FO/954/31A, COS Circulation dated 24 June 1941 covering J.P. (41) 444 „Future 
Strategy‟ dated 13 June 1941. 
153
 Ibid, covering note.  
154
 Ibid.‟Future Strategy‟, op.cit, para.7 
155
 Ibid. Section IV. 
156
 Ibid., para 193. 
157
 Ibid., paras.203-4. 
158
 Ibid., para. 205. 
159
 „Memorandum by Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Trenchard on the Present War Situation Mainly in 
so far as it Relates to Air‟ dated 19 May 1941, reproduced in full in Webster and Frankland, Strategic Air 
Offensive against Germany, Vol. IV, App.10 along with comments from each of the Chiefs.  It should be 
remembered that the convention of the day was that Marshals of the RAF did not retire; they remained on the 
active list and the likes of Trenchard were entitled to make their views known through official routes as well 
as in the House of Lords. Trenchard even went as far as drafting a Directive to C-in-C Bomber Command 
which he then had Slessor (then AOC 5 Group) „wordsmith‟; see AIR 20/3360, Letter AOC 5 Group to 
DCAS (Bottomley) dated 2 October 1941 in which Slessor kept the Air Ministry abreast of the 
correspondence.. 
192 
 
German weak point which Trenchard considered to be the morale of the German people 
whom he considered to be less stalwart than the British.
160
 Trenchard advocated absolute 
concentration of effort on Germany (which included Vienna) exploiting the fact that the 
inaccuracy of bombing would have an effect beyond the physical military damage.
161
 The 
CNS acknowledged the general thrust albeit that it suffered „from the dangers of all over-
statement‟.162  He was concerned, however, that if taken literally, neither the Navy nor the 
Army would get any co-operation; so while it could be agreed in principle, this should 
subject to „intelligent interpretation.163  The CIGS considered that the Battle of the Atlantic 
should have over-riding priority, but that subject to this transportation should be the short-
term priority and morale the longer term objective.
164
  Not surprisingly, the CAS broadly 
agreed with his predecessor and mentor; he nevertheless acknowledged that some effort 
would have to be devoted to the Fleet Air Arm and other areas „essential for our 
security‟.165  With the experience of his time at Bomber Command and eight hard months 
as CAS, Portal cautioned that the „relatively small bomber force‟ should be concentrated 
on a limited number of objectives and that attacks should be sustained.
166
  In a minute to 
Churchill, the Chiefs opined that the operations of the Bomber Force should not be 
conducted „hand-to-mouth‟, but in accordance with a definite strategic aim.167  As 
foreshadowed by the Joint Planning Staffs, and acknowledged by the CIGS, the Chiefs 
advocated a „short-term policy aiming to disrupt the transportation system of Western 
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Germany and the lowering of morale of the industrial workers of that area.
168
  Furthermore, 
targets selected in furtherance of the Battle of the Atlantic should also have lowering 
German morale as a secondary aim.
169
  The Air Staff accordingly produced a new 
Directive for Bomber Command on 9 July 1941.
170
  As the official historians have pointed 
out, the new Directive followed very closely the work that had been carried out in the 
Directorate of Bombing Operations in the Air Ministry where the concept of precision 
attack „died hard‟.171 
 
The execution of this Directive, and the fulfilment of the „Future Strategy‟, 
depended on Bomber Command being equipped with sufficient aircraft and crews to be 
able to mount the weight of offensive necessary to achieve the desired effect. The need for 
a huge force was due in part to the difficulties inherent in operating by night, often in poor 
weather and with no navigational aids.
172
  The Prime Minister‟s disquiet on Bomber 
Command‟s accuracy led him to commission Professor Lindemann (Viscount Cherwell) 
„to make an investigation‟.173  The outcome was the report prepared by Mr Butt (a member 
of the War Cabinet Secretariat) and presented on 18 August 1941.
174
  The report confirmed 
Churchill‟s worst suspicions on which he required CAS‟s most urgent attention.175  
Although there was inevitably some chafing over the statistics, the Butt Report laid finally 
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to rest the myth of selective or precision bombing.
176
  The Air Staff therefore had to work 
out what the implications would be in terms of the size of the force necessary to carry out 
the area attacks necessary.
177
 As the drafting process developed, the „ideal‟ would be to 
deliver six consecutive attacks on the „Coventry scale‟; it was acknowledged that these 
could not be carried over six nights, but they should be carried out over a six month 
period.
178
  The complete destruction of forty-three German towns, most of which had a 
population of over 100,000, would require a force of 4,000 front line bombers.  
Notwithstanding the Prime Minister‟s well-known dislike of „attempts to forecast by 
arithmetic the prospects of success in our bomber offensive‟; Portal duly forwarded the 
estimates to Churchill on 25 September 1941.
179
  Beyond „the Prime Minister‟s usual vote 
of no confidence in „cut and dried‟ calculations‟, Churchill‟s response two days later was 
withering.
180
 He cast doubt on whether bombing, of itself, could ever be decisive and 
argued that the effects were often exaggerated; finally the best the Prime Minister could 
hope for was that the offensive would be „a heavy and I trust seriously increasing 
annoyance‟.181   
 
One of the key interfaces that a senior military leader has to manage is that with his 
political masters.  Portal‟s subsequent handling of Churchill was a particularly fine 
demonstration.  Portal effectively took Churchill back through his own speeches and 
minutes extolling the virtues and necessity of the strategic air offensive and specifically 
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quoted the Chiefs of Staff Review of Strategy which Churchill had approved.
182
  Portal had 
no scruples in telling the Prime Minister that it was hard to reconcile these „facts‟ with 
Churchill‟s minute.  The CAS also bluntly told the Prime Minister that if he had changed 
his mind on this then „we must produce a new plan‟; Portal admitted that there could be 
other plans, such as „a return to the conception of defeating Germany with the Army as the 
primary offensive weapon‟.183  Finally, with a leaf from Churchill‟s own book, Portal 
invited him, if the strategic picture had changed „since the issue of your original directives 
I would urge that revised instructions should be given to the Chiefs of Staff without a 
moments delay‟.184  Having seen the minute, Sinclair wrote in turn to Portal saying 
Masterly – audacious! I agree with every word and it is the bold and strong line to 
take.  It might be prudent to see the Prime Minister and talk to him about it, if an 
opportunity offers before he writes an answering minute.
185
 
 
Churchill, inevitably, did respond with, what for him, was a lengthy minute lamenting the 
„unbounded confidence‟ of the Air Staff, especially when based on arithmetic.186 Churchill 
also reminded the CAS that nothing in warfare was certain and that the „only plan was to 
persevere‟.187  Portal emerged from the contretemps reassured that Churchill „completely 
accepted the primary importance of our bomber operations and of building up the bomber 
force on the largest possible scale‟.188 
 
Putting the new area bombing concept into practice with the existing force proved 
onerous and loss rates mounted.  On 11 November 1941, Portal briefed the War Cabinet 
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that 37 out of 400 aircraft despatched to Germany on the night 7/8 November had failed to 
return.
189
  Weather conditions had proved much worse that forecast with significant 
differences in cloud, wind velocity and in icing conditions.
190
  The Prime Minister re-
emphasised his instructions that „attacks should not be pressed too hard if the weather was 
unfavourable‟ and that „clear instructions must be given to the Commanders-in-Chief that 
in planning operations they should take into account the need to build up our Air Force so 
as to have a stronger force available in the Spring‟.191  The C-in-C had had the opportunity 
to discuss this with Churchill at Chequers the previous day and failed to convince the 
Prime Minister that the issue was simple as providing better training for a few pilots.
192
  
Biddle cites this occasion as probably being crucial in Portal finally losing confidence in 
Peirse as a C-in-C, setting the stage for the appointment of Harris in February 1942.
193
  The 
Air Staff followed up Churchill‟s orders with a formal Directive spelling out the need to 
conserve aircraft and crews.
194
 
 
 
Morality and Legality 
The overall grand strategy towards the issues of legality and morality at the outbreak of 
war were conditioned, almost exclusively, by President Roosevelt‟s appeal to all 
belligerents on 1 September 1939.
195
 Roosevelt essentially requested that all sides refrain 
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from „the ruthless bombing from the air of civilians in unfortified centres of population‟.196 
Early policy was therefore conditioned on the vital need that, in American eyes, Britain 
was not seen to initiate indiscriminate bombing.
197
  In Cabinet discussions on the scope for 
assisting the French in 1939, this was the limiting factor in that the Germans had to be the 
first to undertake indiscriminate air action in Belgium or France.
198
  The distinction 
between what the Luftwaffe had already done on the eastern front versus the importance of 
the arena immediately proximate to Britain was a moot point. 
 
Within the Air Ministry, the Director of Plans (Slessor), as early as 7 September 
1939, carried out a detailed review of German actions in Poland working on the basis that 
Germany had set the precedent for unrestricted attack. 
199
 The official historians have 
pointed out that it was „Air Commodore Slessor‟s duty to examine this question from every 
side, and his memorandum should not be taken as an indication that he or the Air Staff 
were at this time definitely opposed to the policy of restricted bombing‟.200 Nevertheless, 
they added that the policy was as much a matter of expediency as of morality.
201
  This view 
was directly reflected in the words used by Newall in a telegram to Barratt in France some 
weeks later in which he said 
Owing to German action in Poland, we are no longer bound by restrictions under 
the instructions governing naval and air bombardment S.46239/S.6 of 22/8 nor by 
our acceptance of Roosevelt‟s appeal.  Our action is now governed entirely be 
expediency i.e. what it suits us to do having regard to (a) the need to conserve our 
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resources; (b) probable enemy retaliatory action, and (c) our need still to take into 
account to some extent influential neutral opinion.
202
 
 
At face value, this would appear as if Slessor‟s appreciation of the situation had been 
accepted by the CAS and policy had changed formally.  The reality, however, was that the 
strategic air offensive was held in check for many months and prohibition on 
indiscriminate bombing remained in place until 1942 and explicitly reinforced on a number 
of occasions as will be covered below.  From the wording used by the Air Staff, including 
in formal Directives, it is clear that while Newall would have liked to change RAF policy, 
Government policy had not moved at all.
203
  Chamberlain clearly believed that the war 
would „fizzle out with the collapse of the Nazi regime‟ and an escalation in the use of air 
power may have exacerbated the situation.
204
  He had also seen the bombing force 
primarily as a deterrent from the beginning of the rearmament phase.
205
 Chamberlain also 
fundamentally believed that Britain should have the „moral right‟ on her side as it would be 
a „tremendous force on our side‟ and that if bombing started it would be „worth a lot for us 
to be able to blame them for it‟.206 It is possible that Chamberlain‟s mindset over the lower 
relevance of events in countries far away prevented him from agreeing with Slessor‟s 
establishment of the precedent. 
 
The question of expediency and morality had to be reviewed, first in the light of the 
invasion of Denmark and Norway on 9 April 1940, and then the Low Countries in May 
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1940.  The German bombing of Rotterdam showed graphically that there was no chance 
that „the Germans might apply a code of morals in the West different from which Poland 
had experienced‟.207  In Cabinet, the Prime Minister (now Churchill) considered that 
Britain should no longer be „bound by our previously held scruples as to initiating 
“unrestricted” air warfare‟ as the Germans had provided ample „justification for 
retaliation‟.208 Furthermore, opinion in the „United States would not now be averse‟.209  
The implication from all of this is that whatever Newall had said in 1939, the scruples had 
remained in place beyond operational expediency. 
 
Following consideration by the Chiefs of Staff, fresh instructions were issued on 4 
June 1940 in which the term „military‟ was to be interpreted in the broadest sense; lines of 
communication which were useable for military purposes were included.
210
  The formal 
Directive, however, stated absolutely explicitly that in „no circumstances should night 
bombing be allowed to degenerate into mere indiscriminate action, which is contrary to the 
policy of His Majesty‟s Government‟.211 It is clear from a minute sent by SASO Bomber 
Command (AVM Bottomley) to the Groups reminding them that the behaviour of aircrews 
from „another Command‟ in jettisoning their bombs through cloud without being able to 
identify the target was not acceptable; the minute concludes unequivocally that „Bombs are 
not to be dropped indiscriminately‟.212 From this point, however, there was a gradual 
escalation in what Bomber Command was being asked to carry out, and what it sought 
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permission to attempt.
213
  For example, in part in retaliation for the bombing attacks on 
London, the C-in-C sought permission to attack the „middle of Berlin‟ citing the German 
War Office and Air Ministry as appropriate aiming points.
214
  Newall‟s response was to 
substitute „Railway Communications‟ and not mention the former targets!215   
 
 The policy of restraint from indiscriminate bombing remained in place formally 
despite the Prime Minister‟s pleas for reprisals.216 For example, Douglas wrote to Portal 
instructing Bomber Command that it would be a useful propaganda exercise to bomb the 
Leipzig Fair due to be held 25-29 August 1940, but a follow-up letter of 25 August 
stressed that „indiscriminate bombing of the civil population was to be avoided‟.217 
Churchill‟s frustration was evident; he complained in the Second World War, that a month 
later he was „still pressing for retaliation; but one objection after another, moral and 
technical, obstructed it‟ [emphasis added].218 The replacement of Portal for Newall brought 
a degree of alignment in the perceived need for retaliatory action and this was reflected in 
the language of the Directive issued to the Command at the end of October 1940.
219
  This 
included the need to attack the morale of the German people „when they can no longer 
expect an early victory‟.220 In addition to attacks on oil, and aluminium and component 
factories, there should be raids to cause „heavy material destruction in large towns and 
centres of industry‟ as a demonstration „to the enemy of the power and severity of air 
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bombardment and the hardships and dislocation that will result‟.221  These attacks were to 
include high explosives, incendiaries, delayed action bombs and „the occasional mine‟.222  
Part of the rationale was to impose pressure on the fire services.
223
 These instructions 
clearly mirrored the experiences of London over the period and again echoed the place of 
retaliatory action in the culture of the times (which had been present, especially in the 
Press, since the German Zeppelin raids of the First World War).   
 
After an interlude, which was planned to be about four months, where the 
Directives focused on anti-submarine activities a „comprehensive review of the enemy‟s 
present political, economic and military situation‟, disclosed that the weakest points in his 
armour lie in the morale of the civilian population and in his inland transportation 
system‟.224  Although barely mentioned in the directive, the aim of the review was to see 
what could be done to assist Russia.
225
  The other important milestone in this directive was 
the inclusion of „Targets on water suitable for concentrated and continuous area attacks 
on moonless nights‟ [emphasis in the original]; these targets were „congested industrial 
towns where the psychological effect will be the greatest‟ and included Cologne, 
Dusseldorf, Duisburg and Duisburg-Ruhrort.
226
  The section on Duisburg, almost certainly 
inadvertently considering the emotive tones it would later carry, included the word 
„area‟.227  The gradual process of escalation reached its final point in the Directive of 14 
February 1942 (notably to Air Marshal Baldwin who was Acting C-in-C prior to the arrival 
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of Harris) in which his primary object „should now be focussed on the morale of the enemy 
civil population, and in particular of the industrial workers‟.228  The directive 
acknowledged that this renewal of the offensive „on a heavy scale‟ would „enhearten [sic] 
and support the Russians‟.229  The gloves had now been removed and uninhibited area 
bombing introduced. 
 
Throughout the first three years of the war, the legality and morality of the strategic 
air offensive were inextricably interlinked with what was technically possible.  It is clear 
from Churchill‟s frustration over the lack of urgency in carrying out reprisals included an 
element of moral argument.
230
 For much of the period, Britain fought without effective 
allies with whom a coalition strategy could have offered an alternative to bombing. In 
efforts to have some real effect on the German war machine, the march towards 
unrestricted area bombing was inevitable.  The unthinkable option of coming to terms with 
Germany passed and the focus of those charged with the conduct of the war had to come 
up with strategy that offered a credible way in which to win. W.V. Herbert‟s 1898 RUSI 
lecture had stressed the importance of winning „with all of the rest coming a long way 
after‟ was arguably increasingly relevant as the war became „more total‟.231 In many ways, 
it was easier for those charged with decision making if the movement (one would hardly 
call it progress) towards totality in warfare was gradual and the decisions could be taken 
incrementally rather than in a single step.
232
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Concluding Comments. 
The end of 1941 saw the legal and moral constraints on the strategic air offensive 
gradually removed with the stage set for area bombing without restriction in early 1942.  
For the winter, the policy of conservation remained in place along with serious questions 
about the efficacy of the strategic air offensive.  Its leaders could, with reason, explain 
away the lack of impact on Germany away on a number of grounds, despite the scale of the 
losses.
233
  Bomber Command had been lower in the priority for build up of forces at the 
beginning of the war, in favour of Fighter Command.
234
  Furthermore, the needs of both 
Coastal and Middle East Commands had been met at their expense. They could also claim 
that the efforts of the Command had been diverted to other roles in Norway, France and in 
support of the Navy in the Battle of the Atlantic. The optimists would also look forward to 
the advent of the heavy bombers in increasing numbers, the innovative solutions to 
navigation and increased bomb loads.
235
   
 
The early years of the war had seen the organisations, and the relationships between 
them, settle down to a degree of normality.  For better, or worse, this involved a degree of 
overlap at the strategic level with the Command frustrated that their colleagues in the Air 
Ministry were usurping their role.  The role of Churchill, especially as Minister of 
Defence, was such that this situation had been accentuated.  Equally, he was not averse to 
dealing directly with his more junior subordinates, many of whom had their own views of 
what should take place at the strategic level. It could be argued that this made for an 
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organisation that was not „fit for purpose‟, but it is also hard to contemplate an alternative 
model working for Churchill.  In essence, the pattern was set for the rest of the war. 
 
The more strategically minded among the senior leaders, at all levels, would 
increasingly be in a position to contemplate the prospects of a combined offensive with 
America with the full potential of the industrial machine across the Atlantic.  Finally, as 
Portal consolidated his position with his own team of subordinates, who shared his vision 
and offensive spirit, the stage was set for him, Harris and the rest to prove the potential of 
the inter-war years without the excuses. 
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Chapter Six 
 
THE STRATEGIC AND GRAND STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS 1942-45 
  
 
Introduction – The Strategic Level 
The previous chapters have identified that there was an irreducible overlap between the 
senior leadership functions of the CAS on one side, and his colleagues on the Air Staff and 
the C-in-C and the staff at Bomber Command Headquarters.  There was no distinct 
stratification between the grand strategic, political strategic, military strategic and 
operational levels of war.  Sometimes this was due to the Air Staff meddling in the tactical 
detail, such as Portal‟s complaint in his Report on the Norway campaign.  At other times, 
the capacity afforded the C-in-C by not having to run the „Whitehall war‟, allowed him to 
take a more reasoned and higher level view. This was also true of Portal‟s experience at the 
very end of his tenure at Bomber Command.  
 
To some extent, this merging of the boundaries was inevitable given the personality 
of the Prime Minister. Churchill‟s penchant for ranging in his thinking and quest for action, 
from the lowest tactical levels to highest regions of the grand strategic is well known.  
Churchill, in his role as Minister of Defence was confident in the logic of sharing thinking 
at the strategic level with his Chiefs of Staff.
1
 But he was also distrustful of the staffs of 
their Ministries; Air Ministry arithmetic was a particular bête noire.
2
  Churchill also 
genuinely believed that his prodding improved the performance of the respective 
departments, even up to Secretary of State level.
3
 It is also clear that Churchill had no 
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qualms about whom he invited to Chequers to discuss events, invariably leaving it to the 
subordinates to square the circle with their superiors.
4
   
 
As the war progressed, senior leaders also interchanged jobs between the Air 
Ministry and the Commands. For example, Peirse moved to C-in-C from VCAS in October 
1940 and Harris had previously been DCAS.  Officers also moved from Bomber Command 
into the Air Ministry with Bottomley moving at 2 Star level from SASO to DCAS in May 
1941.
5
  Often, this was a deliberate policy to bring front-line experience into the strategic 
Headquarters, albeit at a cost to the front-line and occasionally with negative 
consequences.
6
  In his formal Despatch on War Operations, Harris gave vent to his 
frustration describing the Air Ministry insistence on forming the Pathfinder force as „yet 
another occasion when a Commander in the field was over-ruled at the dictation of junior 
staff officers in the Air Ministry‟.7 
 
For the purposes of the last two substantive chapters, this thesis will accept this 
overlap as a reality and treat, where appropriate, the challenges facing the senior leaders as 
applying across the whole.  Rather than run through a straight narrative of events from 
1942, Chapter six will examine the leadership challenges at the strategic level looking up 
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across the political and grand strategic levels.  It will therefore concentrate heavily on the 
formulation of combined strategy with the Americans.  Chapter seven will look at the view 
from the military strategic level over the operational interface, and in particular, examine 
the controversies over targeting. 
 
Prelude to the Combined Bombing Offensive 
Following the sensitive „staff conversations‟ of 1940 involving Portal at Bomber 
Command discussed in the last chapter, the need for liaison between Britain and America 
continued to grow.  From the American perspective, national policy „was very difficult to 
define‟.8  The general American approach, before Pearl Harbor, was altogether more 
conservative than the view taken by Roosevelt that America would have to intervene at 
some stage, and especially if Britain was to collapse.  Most American citizens were content 
to support material aid for Britain, but were not in favour of deeper intervention; Roosevelt 
„had had to retreat from semi-belligerent policies on several occasions when it was clear 
that the bulk of the American people were not willing to go that far‟.9 Thinking on the 
possible future uses of American air power, including the role of strategic bombing 
nurtured by the Air Corps Tactical School, had to be done in this policy vacuum.
10
  Much 
of the detailed liaison between American staff and the Air Ministry had been conducted 
through liaison officers in Washington, and through reciprocal visits.  For example, Slessor 
visited Washington in autumn 1940 to explain the intricacies of RAF expansion schemes 
and explain how vital American support would be used.
11
  Part of the benefit of these talks 
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was to place British demands in the context of likely American needs, especially for heavy 
bombers.
12
  Reciprocal visits included mid-ranking USAAF officers who would become 
senior leaders during the Combined Bombing Offensive and, in addition to the detail 
discussed, important relationships were made.
13
  One example was Colonel Carl Spaatz 
(later to head the USAAF bomber force in Britain) whose trip in 1940 gave him first-hand 
experience of the Battle of Britain and the practical difficulties of fighter escorts for 
bombers; he also appreciated the need for long-range heavy bombers based on RAF 
experience of the inadequacy on the light or medium aircraft.
14
  Similarly, General „Hap‟ 
Arnold (commander of the USAAF which although not an independent service, was 
treated as such by Marshall) visited the UK in April 1941 to discuss issues with the supply 
of aircraft.
15
 
 
 A more formal approach was taken at the beginning of 1941 with the American-
British conversations conducted in Washington.
16
  The RAF delegation was headed by 
Slessor (whom Portal ordered to remain in Washington for this purpose) who described the 
talks as being of „great historical interest‟ and said because the „general strategic concept 
then agreed – while it became at times a bit frayed at the edges – did continue to govern 
our combined action throughout the war‟.17  In America, the talks were justified as being 
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necessary to set down the principles of co-operation should „the United States be 
compelled to resort to war‟.18  Although conducted at Colonel to 2-star level, these talks 
had clear strategic importance and were the forerunner to the Combined Chiefs of Staff 
organisation.
19
  Furthermore, from an organisational perspective, genuine agreements made 
at this level would ensure that subsequent negotiations at higher levels were less likely to 
be unravelled by „the Indians with one feather‟, the „scores of conscientious colonels who 
in the American system seem to keep such a vigilantly protective eye upon the policy of 
their seniors‟.20 A considerable amount of the discussion in Washington centred on the 
provision of American aircraft and the balance of allocation between the expanding US 
forces versus supporting the RAF; firm decisions were either hard to reach, or 
subsequently overturned due to the immature state of American planning and the 
understandable uncertainty over if, and when, America would enter the war.
21
 
Notwithstanding the ambiguities of the situation, Slessor identified, at this very early stage, 
the potential for „very strenuous opposition on the part of certain naval members of the 
committee‟; in this he was referring to the United States Navy whose future Chief (King) 
was a staunch advocate of primacy for the war in the Pacific.
22
 
 
 Notwithstanding the importance of the talks about aircraft supply, the grand 
strategic level discussions were vital. The first and „most important feature‟ of the ABC-1 
talks was the establishment of the principle that operations would be aimed at defeating 
Germany first and then Japan; it was also agreed that removal of Italy from the war would 
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be a useful step in that direction.
23
  The meeting also endorsed the strategic priorities of 
maintaining economic pressure on Germany (by blockade) and „a mounting offensive from 
the air‟.24 An eventual land offensive against Germany was also agreed in principle when 
the necessary force was available and the need for air support to land and sea operations 
was acknowledged.   But the priority had to be given to „achieving as quickly as possible 
superiority in air strength over the enemy, particularly in long-range striking forces‟.25  
 
The American planning staffs subsequently incorporated the output from ABC-1 
into their own work.
26
  The air mission in Europe was based on identified key nodes which 
required the disruption of Germany‟s electrical power system; its transportation; 
destruction of oil and petrol resources; and the undermining of morale „by attack on 
civilian concentrations‟.27 „Intermediate‟ objectives required the „neutralisation‟ of German 
air forces by attacks on the means of production, including aircraft factories and 
magnesium and aluminium plants.
28
  Finally, attacks would also be required against 
maritime targets such as submarine bases and invasion ports.  It is worthy of note that 
American planners did not advocate city, or area, bombing; they believed that the heavy 
bombers could rely on speed, massed formations, defensive firepower and armour and 
operating at high altitude to allow them to „make deep penetrations of German defences in 
daylight hours‟. They also identified the need to develop a suitable fighter escort to 
accompany the bombers.
29
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Another critically important output from ABC-1 was the „establishment of high 
level military Missions‟ to be set up in each other‟s capitals.30  This machinery was 
intended to facilitate the staff conversations that would be increasingly necessary and 
eventually „ensure a smooth transition to the full wartime system if and when the U.S. was 
involved in the war‟.31  Harris became the first Head of the Air Mission on 1 June 1941.32  
This structure eventually led to the Combined Chiefs of Staff which worked under the 
Prime Minister and President. 
 
The momentum was subsequently maintained when Churchill met secretly with 
Roosevelt off the Newfoundland coast in HMS Prince of Wales on 9 August 1941.
33
  The 
two leaders agreed at the outset to produce a joint declaration of „broad principles which 
should guide our policies along the same road‟.34  The principal grand strategic outcome 
was the „Atlantic Charter‟.35  But there were also wide-ranging discussions on the Far East 
in which the Prime Minister and the President proposed „parallel communications‟ with 
Japan warning against aggression.
36
  Similar high-level discussions took place over basing 
policy on the Atlantic Islands and the so-called „Western Hemisphere Defence Plan No.4‟ 
which provided for US Navy support in the Battle of the Atlantic, an agreement which 
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Churchill described as an „unparalleled gesture of friendship by a neutral power‟.37  This 
was Churchill operating at the genuine grand strategic level. 
 
At the military strategic level, the Chiefs of Staff had equally fruitful discussions 
with their American opposite numbers.
38
 This was an ideal opportunity for the senior 
military leaders on both sides of the Atlantic to start to build the personal relationships 
fundamental to any joint enterprise; the talks were described as „frank and friendly‟.39 
Although his US opposite number, General „Hap‟ Arnold, was going to be present, Portal 
had been left behind in London to „mind the shop‟ along with Ismay (Churchill‟s Chief of 
Staff).
40
  The American forces were „far from being prepared for active operations on a war 
footing‟ with the air corps described as being „still in embryo‟.41 Much of the discussion 
was therefore on questions of supply and organisation.
42
 The air issues were largely 
centred on „the production and allocation of heavy bombers‟ and the British delegation was 
concerned that the Americans intended to keep a greater proportion of these for their own 
use.
43
 The Chiefs of Staff had prepared a strategy paper to share with their American 
colleagues; the review restated the role of the bomber with the emphasis on the destruction 
of „German economic life and morale‟.44  The British report on the talks anticipated that 
the Americans would feel that too much importance had been attached to the bombing 
offensive, but the Americans themselves „had only vague ideas as to the employment of 
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their forces if they came into the war‟.45  Subsequently, the United States Joint Board (the 
equivalent of the COS) reported that they did not consider that the destruction of morale 
was a military objective in its own right and that the bombing offensive should be 
concentrated on objectives that had an immediate relation to German military power.
46
  
This assessment was directly in concert with the thinking of the American air planners in 
APWD-1. 
 
Although not widely discussed in the literature on the strategic air offensive, the 
ABC talks set the foundations for virtually all of the subsequent discussions at the grand 
strategic level and in the routine working levels amongst those dealing with the Missions.  
For the planning of the Combined Bomber Offensive, the insistence on the high priority for 
heavy, long-range strike aircraft was of paramount importance and, establishing this as 
early as March 1941, gave an invaluable lead time for American industry to start producing 
the vital machines with which to prosecute the offensive when the time came.  The 
thinking behind the planning in AWPD-1 was so broad that there was scope to justify 
almost any course of action on its wording. This was a flaw that was to carry through into 
the Casablanca Directive and eventually, the planning for Overlord. 
 
Planning the Offensive – Washington to Casablanca 
Churchill heard the news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on his radio at Chequers 
on the evening of Sunday 7 December 1941 and immediately telephoned Roosevelt.
47
  On 
the following day he sought permission from the King to visit Washington, this time taking 
Portal with him, but again leaving Ismay and also Brooke (who was in the process of 
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taking over from Dill as CIGS) to „mind the shop‟.48 This visit allowed Portal the 
opportunity to build on the relationship that he had established with Arnold during the 
latter‟s visit to Britain in April 1941.49  Notwithstanding the optimism, in British minds at 
least, inspired by America no longer having to act as a non-belligerent, the senior leaders 
still had major strategic issues with which to contend.
50
  The context of America‟s entry 
into the war emphasised the strain under which the Allied navies would be placed with the 
potential areas of operation now world-wide.  The situation in mainland Eurasia was 
inevitably complex; emerging strategy would have to attempt to provide assistance to the 
USSR, either directly or indirectly through increasing the pressure on the German 
economy.  The leaders also had to wrestle with practicalities of deciding when to attack 
Germany with land forces in mainland Europe. There was considerable American pressure 
for early action.
51
  Not only would this help the Russian front, but a successful conclusion 
would allow America then to concentrate on Japan, a course of action for which there was 
considerable domestic demand.
52
  In the event, the Washington Conference (Arcadia) 
confirmed the primacy of defeating Germany with „only a minimum of force necessary for 
the safeguarding of vital interests in other theatres‟.53  The issue of when to return to the 
Continent was more troublesome with President and the Prime Minister keen that this 
should happen in 1942 and the British Chiefs of Staff determined that this should not be 
attempted until 1943.
54
  From the air perspective, it was greed that there should be „an ever 
increasing air bombardment of Germany‟, in conjunction with tightening the blockade and 
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organising „subversive movements‟.55  At the highest level of military strategic command 
and control, the Washington Conference endorsed the setting up of a Combined Chiefs of 
Staff Committee, which necessitated the Americans bringing their internal system 
approximately into line with the British system.
56
  It also established that there should be 
one supreme commander for each relevant theatre.
57
 
 
 Having set the stage for the conduct of the war at the grand strategic level, it was 
immediately evident that both Portal and Arnold were at one on the potential of the bomber 
as an independent weapon.
58
  As the official historians have pointed out, the critical 
leadership challenge would be to decide on a credible „policy by which that strategy might 
be realised‟.59  The technical, and tactical, arguments over the adoption of unescorted, and 
then escorted, daylight raids against Germany have been well covered in the literature; this 
thesis will therefore concentrate on the leadership aspects in general, and the need to 
balance maintenance of the relationships with actually achieving the aims at the 
operational level of war.
60
 The literature on leadership is unequivocal on the need for 
senior leaders to build and maintain relationships; failure to do so has always been one of 
the prime causes for derailment or failure.
61
  In debriefing the War Cabinet on the 
outcomes from Washington, Churchill confirmed that  
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There was little risk of the Americans abandoning the conventional principles of 
war. They were not above learning from us, provided that we did not set out to 
teach them.
62
 
 
This was to prove to be problematic.  The British leaders had gained, from painful 
experience, an idea of what was achievable by bomber formations over Germany by day 
and night.  But as Biddle has pointed out, the US commanders were determined to achieve 
organisational independence and were therefore not going to follow their allies without 
trying out their own theories in which they had a „genuine and unshaken conviction‟, and 
found „elegant, straightforward and promising‟.63  Furthermore, the option of daylight 
attacks, using the latest bombsight technology, gave the American airmen a possible 
defence against charges of unethical or indiscriminate bombing.
64
   
 
 In the event, the American build-up (codenamed Sickle) was slow with the first raid 
not taking place until 17 August 1942 with delays occurring due to poor weather.
65
  In 
addition, the diversion of aircraft and crews to the Pacific added to the frustrations on all 
sides with Spaatz (commanding the Eighth Air Force in Britain) writing to Arnold re-
iterating the importance of the US making a significant contribution to the combined 
bomber offensive.
66
  On the basis of these early forays into France, with extensive fighter 
escort and only in good weather, the American planners concluded that practice justified 
theory and provided the foundations for the combined offensive; not surprisingly, this met 
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with considerable British scepticism.
67
  This reached the surface the following month with 
Churchill writing to Roosevelt on 16 September to express concern over the slow aircraft 
delivery rates and highlighting the need for greater numbers of aircraft „to saturate and 
disperse the defences‟.68  This was followed by a confidential note to Harry Hopkins 
(Roosevelt‟s special assistant) in which the Prime Minister wrote 
I must also say to you for your eye alone and only to be used by you in your high 
discretion that the very accurate results so far achieved in the daylight bombing of 
France by your Fortresses under the most numerous Fighter escort mainly British, 
does not give our experts the same confidence as yours in the power of the day 
bomber to operate far into Germany.  We do not think the claims of the Fighters 
shot down by the Fortresses are correct though made with complete sincerity, and 
the dangers of daylight bombing will increase terribly once outside Fighter 
protection and as the range lengthens‟.69 
 
 
Within the national corridors of power the debate was even more intense.  Slessor 
(now ACAS Policy) was probably the most sympathetic of the senior leadership team to 
the American conviction that daylight bombing was feasible albeit with caveat that success 
would be dependent on „really adequate numbers‟.70  The numbers involved in the USAAF 
plan, which Slessor had seen during his time in America, were in the order of 2000 heavy 
bombers supported by 1000 medium bombers; the first target set would be the Germany 
fighter industry.
71
  Portal did not share this optimism.  Although he acknowledged that a 
systematic destruction of critical targets would have war-winning potential, he did not 
believe that the USAAF would ever achieve this.  Furthermore, Portal considered that 
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under heavy German fighter attack, the American bomber formations would suffer heavy 
losses – despite their faith in self-defending bomber formations. In his minute to Sinclair 
he predicted that 
The Americans will eventually be able to get as far as the Ruhr, suffering very 
much heavier casualties than we now suffer by night, and going much more rarely. 
They will in effect do area bombing with the advantage of the absence of decoys. If 
it can be kept up in the face of the losses (and I don‟t think that it will be) this will 
of course be a valuable contribution to the war, but it will certainly not result in the 
elimination of the enemy fighter force and so open the way to the free bombing of 
the rest of Germany.
72
 
 
The enduring Air Ministry preference was for the USAAF to apply their weight of 
numbers and effort to a concerted night offensive; Portal, in particular, believed that it was 
a relatively simple task to turn a fully trained night force into day bombers, but if the 
Americans were to become competent by night they needed to start working up 
immediately.
73
  If their aircrew were trained to British standards, Portal considered that the 
combined offensive „could pulverise almost the whole of the industrial and economic 
power of Germany within a year, besides utterly destroying the morale of the German 
people‟.74  The official historians have pointed out that the vast majority of Portal‟s 
conclusions were both „weighty‟ and „wise‟, but acknowledged the irony of his continuing 
lack of confidence in the development of a long range fighter escort (the Mustang).
75
 
 
 Churchill was not convinced that the Americans would be able to contribute to the 
bomber campaign and wanted to advocate their use in maritime work. If he had done so, he 
would have seriously risked alliance solidarity. The official historians have described his 
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proposals as a „kind of Coastal Command‟ with the American bombers attacking targets at 
sea (blockade runners and U-boats) and in the Bay of Biscay in support of „Torch‟.76  
Sinclair‟s strategic appreciation of the situation was both eloquent and far-sighted. He 
reminded Churchill of the situation in America in which opinion remained divided as to 
whether the priority should be Germany or the Pacific and the Prime Minister had it in his 
power „to crystallise American opinion and to unite it behind those schools of thought 
which want to attack Germany and want to do it by building up an overwhelming force of 
bombers in this country‟.  He also warned the Prime Minister of the risks of throwing 
„these forces into confusion and impotency if you set yourself against their cherished 
policy of daylight penetration‟.77 Notwithstanding Portal‟s pessimism, Sinclair chose to use 
Slessor‟s more upbeat tone in advocating the potential war-winning benefits of a massive 
bomber offensive.  Churchill subsequently denied having raised „with any American 
authority the question of whether the “daylight penetration” of Germany is a sound 
operation‟. This statement was somewhat at variance with his memorandum to Hopkins 
discussed above.
78
 In this minute, addressed to both Sinclair and Portal (and copied to 
Harris), Churchill challenged the „soundness of the Secretary of State‟s minute‟ both on the 
„merits of “daylight penetration” policy‟ and „the tactics we should pursue towards the 
Americans‟.  Although he finished by saying that there was no need „to discuss that now‟, 
the matter inevitably did not rest there.
79
 Sinclair warned the Prime Minister in a further 
minute „most seriously against decrying the American plan for the daylight attack of 
Germany, and in particular not to try to persuade them to divert their attention to sea work 
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(such as anti-submarine work).
80
 Churchill returned to the fray, again commenting that the 
„USAF [sic] plan and method for bombing Germany by “daylight penetration” required 
searching thought‟ as did „our official attitude to the United States Air Force [sic] and 
Government about it.
81
  Portal highlighted the dilemma facing the senior leaders, pointing 
out that he thought „that premature opposition to their plan may well lead their high 
authorities to seek other theatres where the virtues of day bombing might be better 
appreciated‟.82  The reality of this challenge was confirmed by Slessor in a telegram from 
Washington in which he stated that Arnold was „engaged in stiff uphill fight with his 
colleagues especially with King‟.83  In a meeting discussing the build up of forces in 
Britain, King had „openly said bombing of Germany useless and US heavy bombers should 
go to Pacific‟.84  Portal duly replied warning that Churchill was still in a critical mood with 
„our position... weakened by inability of Arnold to bomb Germany now when fighter 
defences are weaker than ever‟.85 
 
 As a classic example of the complexities and ambiguity of senior leadership, 
Sinclair and Portal, in the words of the official historians, had been „placed in an extremely 
delicate position‟.86  If the combined offensive was gain the momentum necessary to have 
the desired impact on German industry and morale, they would have to support the policy 
of daylight attacks notwithstanding his scepticism over its chances of success.  So, like 
Churchill, Portal had deep concerns over the allied strategy, but chose to suppress them in 
what amounted to a strategic conspiracy of silence.  A more pragmatic interpretation would 
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be that the CAS had elected to allow the policy to stand the test of operations rather than 
allow the whole concept of the bomber offensive to unravel in favour of operations in the 
Pacific.
87
  It was therefore with considerable uncertainty as to what were the prospects of 
success of the combined bomber offensive that Roosevelt, Churchill and the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff prepared for the next major conference in Casablanca in January 1943.   
 
Casablanca (Symbol) 
One of the critical roles of the truly strategic leader is the ability to look above and beyond 
the traditional silos in which they had spent their formative years.  For Brooke and Portal, 
this challenge was all the greater in having to deal with Churchill.  A key facet of the 
challenge was to place the routine administration of their Service Departments in the wider 
context of the grand strategic setting.  Churchill had visited Moscow in August 1942 at a 
time when Russian forces were under considerable pressure from the German army.
88
 
Stalin was barely mollified by the Allied plans for North Africa (Torch) and pressed for a 
second front in Europe to relieve the pressure.  But as Howard has stated, the Prime 
Minister „laid up trouble for the future by his emphatic assurances that Roundup [the cross-
channel invasion] would be launched in 1943 – assurances of a kind that his military 
advisers would have been quite unable to endorse‟.89  Churchill had also promised British 
(and Canadian) support for a further foray into Norway co-ordinated with the Soviets 
(which the latter did not favour).
90
 To some extent, the potential difficulties at the 
Conference in Casablanca in January 1943 were eased by Stalin‟s decision not to attend.91 
The „wickedness‟ of the problems facing the senior leaders in Casablanca were, however, 
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made all the greater because there was considerable diversity of opinion within the British 
and American staffs over which potential course of action should be followed.
92
  In a 
preliminary meeting on 13 January, Dill briefed his British colleagues on the apparent 
divisions, and contradictions, within the American military establishment. Key issues 
included suspicions that British interest in the Pacific would wane after victory in Europe 
and over the relatively conservative policy of attacking Europe through the Mediterranean.  
These were complicated by the logistical reality that the US Navy controlled the bulk of 
the landing craft and were reluctant to prioritise these for theatres other than the Pacific.
93
   
 
 On entering the negotiations, the British position had been encapsulated in a Chiefs 
of Staff report which clearly outlined the conflicting strategic priorities, alternatives and 
constraints.
94
 The report advocated the defeat of the „U-boat menace‟; the expansion of the 
Anglo-American bomber offensive; exploitation of the Mediterranean, maintenance of 
supplies to Russia; limited operations in the Pacific; operations to re-open the Burma 
Road; and „subject to the claims of the above, the greatest possible concentration of forces 
in the United Kingdom with a view to re-entry on to the Continent in August or September 
1943, should conditions hold out a good prospect of success‟ [emphasis added].95  In short, 
the Chiefs, and Brooke in particular, were adamant that a cross-channel attack should not 
be contemplated until Germany had been considerably weakened by bombing, blockade, 
subversion and through efforts of the Red army.
96
  The discussions on the purpose and 
scope of the bomber offensive had therefore to be seen in the light of these factors.  As the 
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official historians have pointed out, those, on both sides of the Atlantic, who harboured 
notions that air power alone could bring about the end of war had to be wary not to say as 
much at Casablanca.
97
  Nevertheless, the Chiefs had concluded that the bomber offensive 
was „susceptible of great development and holds out most promising prospects‟.98  Part of 
this promise was grounded in the improvements in aircraft, crew training and navigational 
aids.
99
  But the Chiefs also acknowledged that there was still „an open question‟ on 
American air forces‟ ability to penetrate Germany by day without prohibitive losses.100  
From a strategic awareness point of view, and American scepticism over its veracity, it is 
interesting that the Chiefs expressly did not claim  
that the bomber offensive will at once shatter the enemy’s morale. It is claimed that 
it already has an appreciable, and will have an increasing effect, on the enemy’s 
distribution system and industrial potential – an effect that the German High 
Command and German people will fear more and more.
101
 [Emphasis in the 
original.] 
 
Portal‟s biographer has noted that for Brooke to endorse the COS paper, after incessant 
demands through 1942 for aircraft to be assigned to army support rather than to Bomber 
Command, „was a remarkable development‟ which could be ascribed to „his own sense of 
the strategically possible‟.102 
 
The Combined Chiefs of Staff met 15 times in all, with three additional meetings 
under the joint chairmanship of the President and the Prime Minister.
103
 As Churchill‟s 
Chief of Staff, Ismay, recorded some issues were easily decided such as primacy of 
defeating the U-boats and that the „German homeland was to be intensively bombarded by 
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day as well as night as soon as the American fortress bombers were ready‟.104  It is clear 
from all accounts that Portal „enjoyed something of a triumph at Casablanca‟.105 By not 
sticking to a narrow and dogmatic viewpoint, he was able to achieve the agreements on 
both air power issues and assist in wider priorities.  Furthermore, it would appear that some 
of his (and Sinclair‟s) pragmatism appears to have rubbed off on Churchill who had a 
lengthy discussion with General Eaker (Commander of American Air Forces in Britain) 
during which the Prime Minister „decided to back Eaker and his theme, and I turned round 
completely and withdrew all my opposition to the daylight bombing by the Fortresses‟.106 
Eaker subsequently thanked Churchill for „saving‟ the Fortresses from abandonment by the 
US; Churchill stated that if this was true he had done so „by leaving off opposing them‟.107
  
Once Churchill had removed his veto for the air plan, the way was then 
theoretically left clear for the staffs to eradicate the divisions that existed within, and 
between, the air forces. As the official historians have pointed out, however, if a rigorous 
solution had been sought, it is probable that there have been no directive at all.
108
  Such a 
„linear solution to a wicked problem‟ would not have worked and it is to the credit of those 
involved that they did not attempt to do so.  The corollary, however, was that the Directive 
which was ultimately agreed upon contained something for everyone, which again would 
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store up trouble for those charged with its interpretation.
109
  Indeed, Portal actually warned 
his colleagues on the Combined Chiefs that „too literal an interpretation‟ of the priorities 
could be detrimental to the exercise of the broader priorities of the offensive.
110
   
 
One of the significant outputs from Casablanca was the appointment of Portal as 
senior person responsible for the „strategical direction‟ [sic] of the combined offensive.111  
Significantly, this included the proviso that the American „Commanding General will 
decide upon technique and method to be employed‟ „under this general direction‟.112  As 
foreshadowed by the Report on Symbol, the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the 
„Directive for the Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom‟ on 21 January 1943.113  It 
stated that the two Commands had as their primary object „the progressive destruction and 
dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining 
of morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is 
fatally weakened‟.  The Directive went on to list the priorities within the higher level intent 
as being: 
a) German submarine construction yards. 
b) The German aircraft industry. 
c) Transportation 
d) Oil Plants 
e) Other targets in enemy war industry 
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The Directive acknowledged that actual targeting would be subject to the „exigencies of 
weather and of tactical feasibility‟ and that the order of priority would be varied depending 
on changes in the strategic situation.
114
 
 
Assessment. The Casablanca Directive may well be construed as a classic example of 
pragmatic compromise at the strategic level.  Indeed, if Slessor‟s account is anything to go 
by, the Combined Chiefs could have ended up parting in acrimony.
115
 The converse 
argument is that the Directive did not actually direct anyone to do anything specific; in 
short it was barely a directive in any military sense of the term. The combination between 
the appointment of Portal with only powers of general direction over the combined 
offensive and the „a la carte‟ language of the main directive would subsequently allow the 
operational commanders scope to interpret from this menu almost as they wished.  On the 
other hand, and without dealing in counter-factual history, the consequences of failing to 
reach agreement could have spelled the end of the combined enterprise as indicated by 
Eaker‟s gratitude to Churchill described above.  It could also have led to the unravelling of 
the Washington (Arcadia) agreement on „Germany first‟. Given the ambiguity that ensued, 
it would be a further test for the senior leadership team either to develop further, or to 
direct, the agreed upon offensive. 
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Washington and Pointblank 
In his memoirs, Ismay described 1943 as the „Conference Year‟.116  High level meetings 
with either the Prime Minister, or Foreign Ministers were held throughout the year with 
Casablanca followed by Washington (Trident) in May; Quebec and Washington 
(Quadrant) in August and September; Moscow (Foreign Ministers only); Cairo (Sextant) 
in November and December; and Teheran (Eureka) in November and into December‟.117  
The Chiefs attended all of these conferences except Moscow.
118
  But 1943 also saw the 
Commanders of the Bomber forces attempt to turn the strategy from Casablanca into 
reality over Germany.  In simplistic terms, for Harris this just meant more of the same as 
Bomber Command had been steadily improving over the previous year and continued to do 
so.
119
  But for Eaker, and the USAAF, their task was altogether more serious in that they 
had to ensure that the build-up of aircraft and crews accelerated to the point where they had 
sufficient assets actually to make their plan of daylight bombing work.  Both Commanders 
were faced by an implacable enemy whose air defences were improving, by day and night, 
markedly.
120
 The AHB Narrative makes the point that the intelligence analysts had greatly 
underestimated the German aircraft industry capacity and the advent of Speer increased its 
efficiency; this latter point is, however, more contentious in recent literature.
121
  The 
importance of reducing this threat was vital both for the effectiveness of the bomber 
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offensives and for the longer term achievement of air superiority in advance of 
Overlord.
122
 
 The plan for the combined bomber offensive, known colloquially as the „Eaker‟ 
plan, was drawn up largely by the American staffs, albeit with operational and intelligence 
input from the British.
123
 Portal accepted the plan and had „assured Arnold that it 
commanded his full support‟; Harris „had expressed no fundamental objections‟.124  
Whether this was a continuation of Portal‟s pragmatic approach to seeing the theory tested 
in operational conditions or full endorsement is not clear, but it is evident that whatever 
debate was needed could again be tackled in the detail of the wording in order to ensure 
that all lines of operation remained open to the respective Commanders.  Agreement at all 
levels of the command chain was relatively easily achieved and the Pointblank plan was 
adopted by the Combined Chiefs, the Prime Minister and the President during the 
Washington talks in May 1943.
125
   
 
A draft Directive in support of Pointblank was sent to the operational Commanders 
on 3 June 1943 for their comment.
126
  The official historians have described this as „a most 
significant document‟ in that it made it „abundantly clear‟ that attacking the German 
fighter force was to be „the most urgent aim‟ of the USAAF Eighth Air Force and Bomber 
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Command.
127
  As suggested above, it is evident in comparing the draft with the Pointblank 
Directive as actually issued on 10 June, that there had been considerable staff action.
128
  A 
significant difference between the two documents was the restitution of the wording from 
the Casablanca Directive stating that the „primary object‟ remained „the progressive 
destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, and 
the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for 
armed resistance is fatally weakened‟.129 The Bomber Command file copy of this Directive 
shows heavy side-scoring of this passage in green pencil – presumably by Harris given the 
Service custom for use of this colour to be reserved for the senior commander (his deputy, 
Saundby, used red).
130
  The Directive then allocated the Eighth Air Force, alone, an 
„intermediary objective‟ of the German Fighter strength and then the familiar list of 
„primary‟ and „secondary‟ objectives.131 As if to emphasise the separate functions of the 
Eighth Air Force and Bomber Command the paragraph the goes on to state that while „the 
force of Bomber Command will be employed in accordance with their main aim in the 
general disorganisation of German industry their action will be designed as far as 
practicable to be complementary to  the operations of the Eighth Air Force. [Emphasis 
added].
132
 The Directive as written is an oxymoron; it gave no clear direction with its 
muddle of adjectives describing the respective priorities, aims and objectives. This again 
allowed the operational commanders the latitude to adopt their own courses of action.  In 
terms of modern leadership theory, this could be interpreted as an ideal form of „mission 
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command‟.  But the reality was that the Directive should have given a clear statement of 
the commander‟s intent (in this case the President, Prime Minster and the Combined 
Chiefs) and as shown was anything but that.  Furthermore, mission command relies on the 
subordinate commanders being given the resources with which to complete the task.  With 
the merits of the different approaches still to be contested in the face of the enemy, it is 
evident that the senior British leaders had adopted the age-old leadership approach of 
„consent and evade‟; Harris‟ approach will be dealt with in detail in the next chapter.133   
 
 As the official historians have noted, the Pointblank Directive as issued actually 
brought the plan closer to the original that had been approved by the Combined Chiefs in 
Washington.
134
  Furthermore, the separation of the objectives for the two operational 
Commands represented a clear acknowledgement that the British efforts should be allowed 
to continue where the Eighth Air Force had permission to prove its case, which, in any 
event, was still dependent on the provision of resources.  Over the following six months, 
Portal and Eaker reported the progress of the bomber offensive to the Combined Chiefs at 
the major conferences.   At Quadrant in August, Portal reported that the expansion of the 
German fighter force had continued and expressed his concern that diversions of forces 
from the Eighth Air Force could prejudice the achievement of air superiority for 
Overlord.
135
  This theme was repeated in December 1943 at the Sextant Conference where 
Portal and Eaker reiterated the challenge of coping with increased German production at a 
time when the Eighth Air Force was only receiving some two thirds of the required 
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aircraft.
136
 The direction from the Combined Chiefs was that Eaker should continue to the 
limit of what could be achieved „without seriously outrunning aircraft and crews‟.137  By 
early 1944, the Eighth Air Force was able to mount raids approaching the scale of those 
launched by Bomber Command.  But by this stage, the American staffs began to appreciate 
that their problems were not just ensuring numbers of aircraft in theatre, but their survival 
rates in the face of German fighters.
138
  The fight against the German Air Force, and its 
supporting industry, was then further complicated by the overarching demands of 
providing air support for the impending invasion of North West Europe. 
 
Strategic Assets for Overlord – Command and Control 
The complex series of grand strategic discussions in November and December 1943 set the 
stage for most of the major engagements of the remainder of the war with substantive 
negotiations with both the Soviets (with Stalin in Teheran) and China (Chiang Kai-Shek in 
the first phase in Cairo).
139
 Erhman described Sextant and Eureka together as a most 
exceptional conference and „one whose complexities and length could scarcely have been 
avoided‟ despite the frustrations of those involved.140  But the Conference outcomes also 
saw confirmation of the absolute primacy of Overlord and the appointment of Eisenhower 
as its Supreme Commander. This signalled „general post‟ for the structure and high level 
appointments which followed.
141
   In accordance with what had become established 
procedure, an American Supreme Commander would have a British deputy. Tedder was 
appointed to that crucial role, not least because of his experience in co-ordinating allied air 
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efforts in a truly joint and combined arena.
142
  The next most critical air command position, 
in practical terms, if not in terms of the Combined Command structure was the 
appointment of Spaatz as commanding general of the United States Strategic Air Forces in 
Europe (USStAFE) (Eaker was moved from the Eighth Air Force to the Mediterranean and 
was succeeded by Major-General James Doolittle).
143
 Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay was 
appointed as the naval commander and Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory as 
the commander of allied air forces.
144
  This latter move was to cause its own share of 
controversy so close to the pinnacle of the senior leadership team, because of Leigh-
Mallory‟s abrasive personality and the subordination of air arms to him.145  To complete 
the picture, Montgomery and Bradley were appointed as the British and American land 
commanders.
146
  Each of these seven appointments had a degree of controversy attached, 
as did many of those that cascaded down from them.  But for the purposes of this thesis, 
the challenges for the senior leaders were all the greater as they had to agree the command 
structures, and the functional relationships, that would be required to make a success of an 
enterprise which could not be allowed to fail. 
 
 At the heart of the problem was the familiar challenge to strategic leaders in 
formulating the vision and purpose of their organisation.  The critical problem, however, 
was the remaining ambiguity in defining the „organisation‟; it could be argued that the 
President, Prime Minister and Combined Chiefs had been obliged to set the threshold of 
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the new entity at too low a level in making Eisenhower Supreme Commander of just the 
invasion of north-west Europe; the geographical limitation to the operational theatre had 
important consequences for the role of the strategic bombers.   This problem in deciding 
who was going to command what had originated in the period immediately prior to the 
Cairo/Teheran conferences when it was generally expected that Marshall would be 
appointed as Supreme Commander for Overlord and, critically, also remain Chairman of 
the Combined Chiefs.
147
 This led to confusion, and ugly rumours, in Washington, 
including speculation that Marshall had fallen victim of someone in the American political 
constellation and had effectively been sacked (and on which German propaganda had a 
field day).  A possible solution emerged in which Marshall would become a Supreme 
Commander of all forces in Europe other than the Red Army.
148
  But this ran counter to 
what the British considered as urgently necessary in setting up a Supreme Commander for 
the Mediterranean; and, in their view, it would have fundamentally shaken the 
constitutionally sound Combined Chiefs of Staff system and placed a lot of power in the 
hands of one man.
149
  The resulting limited scope of the Supreme Command was below the 
threshold necessary to justify Marshall‟s appointment as he was considered by Roosevelt 
to be too valuable in Washington.  But the Overlord command was therefore limited in its 
span as it excluded the strategic air arms, both of which had far wider European 
dimensions and priorities. 
 
As has been discussed above, from Casablanca onwards, many of the issues 
surrounding conflicting priorities, and interpretations of directives, had been either 
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deliberately obfuscated or avoided.  It was therefore inevitable, given the scale and priority 
of the military requirements for Overlord, that the controversies over the contradictions 
would become all the more acute.  The potentially huge risks and gains for both 
individuals, and their aspirations for their services, raised the leadership stakes further.  For 
Harris and Spaatz, as the strategic air commanders, the possibility of the diversion of air 
assets from the Pointblank offensive against the German air force and wider industry came 
at the time when the years of unfulfilled potential actually came close to success with the 
scale of attacks then possible.
150
  But the other senior leaders, both political and military, 
charged with the detailed direction, supervision and planning of Overlord, expected 
nothing short of a massive „campaign of direct air preparation‟.151  The essence of the 
problem in this should have been relatively simple with the issue of a directive to Leigh-
Mallory and appropriate forces either put under his command or allocated to him.  In 
reality this became what the official historians have described as „one of the most 
complicated and confusing command problems of the war‟.152 
 
 In theory, the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces were to comprise the Second 
Tactical Air Force from the RAF and the Ninth Air Force from the USAAF.  Both should 
have had light (or tactical) bombers and fighters.  Command and control issues, over both 
American and British forces, remained confused with debate between Washington and 
London over just what was meant by „administrative control‟ in the case of the Ninth.153  
Following his appointment as Supreme Commander, Eisenhower (along with Bedell 
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Smith, his Chief of Staff) expressed their concern to Churchill over the prospect of there 
being two tactical air forces under Leigh-Mallory.  In a note to Sinclair, Churchill wrote 
that Leigh-Mallory had  
apparently let it be known that he intends to be a real Commander-in-Chief of the 
Air. But that is not what is meant at all. I do not consider Leigh Mallory [sic] is the 
equal of Sholto Douglas who so unfortunately got side-tracked, and in any case 
Tedder with his unique experience and close relation as Deputy to the Supreme 
Commander ought to be in fact and in form the complete master of all air 
operations.  Everything is then quite simple.  There need only be one Tactical Air 
Force which Leigh Mallory can command, Spaatz will come directly under 
Eisenhower as his senior officer and can be told to obey Tedder.  There will be no 
difficulty in arranging between Tedder and Harris‟.154 
 
Sinclair responded the next day telling Churchill that the AEAF were „larger and more 
complex‟ than the Prime Minister had implied not least because the forces included the Air 
Defence of Great Britain (as Fighter Command had become) and that Leigh-Mallory would 
have a major task co-ordinating the disparate elements of the air forces.
155
 He would also 
have to integrate into the Overlord air operations those „heavy bombers from the 
commands of Harris and Spaatz as are placed at his disposal from time to time by the 
Chiefs of Staff‟.  Sinclair reminded Churchill that he was personally responsible from 
Leigh-Mallory‟s appointment (at Quadrant) and that he was a „thoroughly competent 
officer‟.  Sinclair went on to predict the probable role of Tedder in ensuring the smooth 
liaison between the Supreme Command, the Air Staff, Bomber Command and, he hoped, 
Spaatz.  He also expressed his view that Portal should retain his position representing the 
Combined Chiefs over Harris and Spaatz rather than Eisenhower taking this role.  
Churchill wrote on the telegram that these arrangements would have to be reviewed when 
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Eisenhower was in post but that he certainly did „not subscribe to them as at present 
informed‟.156  It is clear from a memorandum from Eisenhower to Tedder that Churchill 
was not going to allow Leigh-Mallory „command the Strat‟ (sic).157 
 
 As Tedder himself has commented, the situation in mid-February 1944 in London 
„was confused, to say the least‟.158 In a letter to Portal, Tedder pointed out that Spaatz had 
„made it abundantly clear that he will not accept orders, or even co-ordination from Leigh-
Mallory, and the only sign of activity from Harris‟s representatives has been a series of 
adjustments to the records of their past bombing statistics‟; the latter was designed to show 
that Bomber Command should not be used for precision targets leaving the Command free 
to prosecute area bombing in Germany.
159
 The leadership challenge in this sort of situation 
has been likened to „herding cats‟ and while it is unlikely that Sinclair or Portal would have 
used the expression, they would have recognised the symptoms.
160
  The tussle for power 
over the disparate air elements was eventually resolved by Portal after discussions with 
Eisenhower; they concluded that Tedder should be responsible for the co-ordination of 
operations in the execution of the Strategic Air Plan once it had been approved, on behalf 
of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, by the Supreme Commander and himself.
161
  Leigh-
Mallory would be responsible for the Tactical Air Plan, which would include the strategic 
bombers, but under Tedder‟s supervision.  Churchill described this as „very satisfactory‟ 
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and the whole was passed to the Combined Chiefs for approval.
162
  The Americans 
demurred over the term „supervision‟, preferring „command‟.163  The potential for a serious 
rift over what was seen as British determination to divide the Supreme Command was 
fixed by the use of the word „direction‟ to define Eisenhower‟s authority over the strategic 
bombers.
164
  This was formalised on 22 March 1944 and came into effect on 14 April 
1944.
165
 
 
The importance of establishing, and then maintaining, personal relationships at the 
senior leadership level has already been covered in this chapter and it is again clear from 
this episode just how detrimental it can be to an enterprise when these relationships do not 
work. It is clear from both American and British accounts that one of the major stumbling 
blocks was a profound reluctance to take orders from Leigh-Mallory.
166
  As a close 
colleague, Douglas has described Leigh-Mallory‟s attitude as uncompromising and even 
aggressive in a manner likely „to rub the Americans the wrong way‟; it is likely that he was 
being comparatively generous in these comments as they feature on the same pages as his 
report of Leigh-Mallory‟s untimely death later that year.167  Orange, in his biography of 
Tedder, quoted with characteristic glee an early appraisal by his subject of Leigh-Mallory 
as being „incredibly pompous, unapproachable by his own staff and I‟m sure very 
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ambitious‟.168  It is interesting to note that Leigh-Mallory, who presumably must have had 
Portal‟s confidence, is not mentioned at all by Richards in his biography.  Although the 
obstacle presented by Leigh-Mallory‟s position in planning air operations had to some 
extent been solved, real issues remained over the use to which the air assets would be 
directed. 
 
Strategic Assets for Overlord – Targeting Policy 
The phrase „targeting policy‟ actually masks the scale of the issues to be resolved in 
deciding on the purpose of the bomber forces.  The situation was exacerbated by the 
addition of Tedder as a commander and a „protagonist‟ in the debates in his own right.169 
Notwithstanding the uncertainty over the role and extent of the participation of the 
strategic bombers, the AEAF had commenced planning at the beginning of 1944.
170
  AEAF 
planners, in their broadest sense, totally accepted the primary importance of securing and 
then maintaining control of the air. They considered that the real land battle would take 
place in Normandy after enemy reinforcements had arrived.  Furthermore, some targets, 
such as coastal batteries, could only be attacked in the immediate run up to the landings to 
preserve surprise.  Beyond that, they believed that considerable reserves of air power had 
to be kept available for contingency use.  This meant that a close second priority in the 
preparation for D-Day had to be given to a systematic dislocation of enemy 
communications to prevent reinforcement; this became the AEAF Transportation Plan.
171
 
A draft of this plan was discussed at a meeting of the AEAF Bombing Committee held on 
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15 February 1945 with Portal, Tedder, Harris and Spaatz in attendance.
172
  Neither Tedder 
nor Portal was completely convinced at this stage.  Both of the strategic bomber 
commanders condemned the plan for a range of reasons including the unsuitability of their 
forces to this work and the perceived unnecessary diversion from the real business of 
attacking Germany.  But as the official historians have pointed out, the two bomber 
commanders were not united by common ground in their disagreement with the plan.
173
  
To Harris, this plan brought together the quest for precision targets to be attacked and was 
a further development of the thinking of the „panacea mongers‟.  Spaatz, however, objected 
on the grounds that firstly, the transportation attacks would have no impact on the war for 
air superiority other than the diversion of his assets. Secondly, and arguably more 
importantly from the bomber perspective, was that adherence to the transportation plan 
would divert assets thereby diluting the long-cherished ideal of German capitulation in the 
face of the offensive.  His third consideration was that, if Germany did not collapse, the 
planning should be designed to offer as much assistance as possible to achieving success 
on the land.  Spaatz did not see the AEAF plan achieving any of these outcomes; only 
attacks on German oil could satisfy all three.
174
 
 
 Spaatz considered that his force was on the brink of achieving the intermediate 
objective of Pointblank by destroying the German air force and ball-bearing production.
175
  
Turning the emphasis to the German petroleum industry, with a special emphasis on oil 
would force the German air force to defend these vital interests at all costs; the German 
High Command would not be able to husband resources with so much at stake. If the 
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German air force was therefore forced to fight, the Americans fighters could further the 
quest for air supremacy.  Spaatz believed that this plan should be immediately 
implemented and attention to Overlord only increased close to D-Day.  Spaatz considered 
this to be the best use of his strategic bombers to ensure the success of Overlord.
176
 The 
arguments inevitably showed all the signs of „going round in circles‟; Portal therefore 
invited Eisenhower, Tedder, Leigh-Mallory, Spaatz and Harris to a conference on 25 
March 1944.  Tedder circulated his paper the day before.
177
  He opened by confirming that 
The primary role of the Air Forces is to secure and maintain air superiority during 
the assault and subsequent land operations. The maximum possible direct air 
assistance is also required is also required in support of the actual assault, and 
against enemy movements and concentrations after the assault. 
 
He went on to state the Army view of the role of Allied air power as being to destroy the 
enemy air forces and „destroy and disrupt communications so as to impose delay on enemy 
movement towards the lodgement area‟.  Tedder then outlined the two competing plans, 
concluding that the Transportation plan was the „only plan offering a reasonable prospect 
of disorganising enemy movement and supply in the time available‟.  He went on to 
recommend that the Pointblank directive be replaced by a combined Pointblank/Overlord 
directive which should be agreed between Eisenhower and Portal and then issued by the 
latter „under whose direction all Allied Air forces concerned will operate‟.178  At the 
meeting, both Spaatz and Harris put forward their opposing views.
179
 Harris doubted the 
overall effectiveness of the plan and his ability to strike the range of targets in the given 
timescale; he also suggested that his city bombing would have a similar effect in any 
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event.
180
  Spaatz adamantly maintained that attacks on oil installations would both force 
the German Air Force to rally in their defence (hence offering target opportunities for his 
fighters) and serve to bring the German war machine to a halt.
181
 Each of the senior leaders 
had his own vision for their part of the organisation and were certainly not lacking in the 
passion necessary to pursue it. But coherence of effort was essential and Eisenhower‟s 
support for the Transportation Plan, on the basis that it would produce the most measurable 
results, along with Portal‟s support ensured its adoption.  The British Chiefs accepted the 
Plan and it was referred to Churchill and then to the War Cabinet. Churchill, however, was 
not prepared to accept the civilian casualties anticipated in the French cities where the key 
nodal points had been identified. 
 
In his final comments at the meeting on 25 March, Portal had reminded his 
colleagues that as many of the targets were in built-up areas, there would almost certainly 
be very large numbers of French civilian casualties and that this was likely to be of concern 
to the British Government.
182
  The perennial challenge of senior leaders in interfacing with 
the political and allied levels was again borne out as this became a protracted saga with 
five discussions in the Defence Committee and three in the War Cabinet.
183
 Churchill was 
very much the prime mover in the discussions and consistently requested revised casualty 
figures; only those targets well clear of built-up areas were authorised.
184
  As experience 
grew, it became evident that Bomber Command was capable of attacking these targets 
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accurately and with lower bomb loads; the estimates for collateral damage decreased 
further.
185
 Portal submitted one such estimate to the Defence Committee on 13 April 1944 
and a „grudging approval‟ was given for the attacks to continue.186  With the judicious 
inclusion of an extra paragraph stating that the „political aspects of this plan, as affecting 
the French, will be kept under continuous supervision, with especial reference to the 
casualties to the civilian populations involved‟, the formal directive was issued to the two 
commanders on 17 April 1944.
187
 
 
Churchill, however, was still not satisfied, particularly when it transpired that, by 
late April, the Eighth Air Force had only attacked one target and the Fifteenth had not 
attacked any. The Defence Committee was therefore concerned that the Americans were 
deliberately allowing Bomber Command to shoulder the blame for killing friendly 
civilians.
188
  Eisenhower confirmed to Churchill that political considerations had been 
realised throughout and attacks against the most densely populated areas had been deferred 
until immediately prior to D-Day.
189
  Eisenhower emphasised the importance of the 
Transportation Plan to the success of Overlord and in this was supported by Brooke (who 
had initially been an opponent) who stated that the „whole concept of Overlord was based 
on making full use of the terrific air power at our disposal‟ and that the whole enterprise 
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would not have been undertaken if the use of air power had been going to be restricted.
190
  
The difference in attitudes was interesting in that Churchill clearly had an eye on the post-
war possibilities of having to live with charges of fratricide where Eisenhower saw the 
French people as „slaves‟ who could only be liberated by the success of Overlord, and that 
their suffering was an extension of the collapse of 1940.
191
 Churchill sought reassurance 
(and attempted to share the responsibility) by sending a telegram to Roosevelt who replied 
that he was content to leave the matters in the hands of the military commanders.
192
  As 
Churchill concluded, „this was decisive‟.193 Even so, he harked back to the subject 
regularly including a characteristically terse note to Tedder asking „How many Frenchmen 
did you kill?‟ on 10 July 1944.194 
  
From a leadership perspective, Eisenhower‟s views, that the Transportation Plan 
would have measurable results in support of Overlord, along with the stated Army 
priorities, apparently left little alternative but acceptance, grudging or otherwise.  During 
the meeting, Portal had confirmed the importance of Spaatz‟s aircraft taking their share of 
the targets, but the latter said that this had not been worked out.  In the event, as Davis has 
pointed out there is always someone who will not accept the final decision as being just 
that.
195
 Spaatz „resorted to subterfuge‟ attacking oil plants in Romania under the guise of 
supposedly bombing railway targets and it was to be some weeks before he tackled any 
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real transportation targets.
196
  Harris, on the other hand, was pleasantly surprised by what 
his Command had achieved against these targets and Leigh-Mallory was able to confirm 
on 3 June 1944 that the Transportation Plan was complete and that the heavy bombers 
would not be used again unless there was evidence of increased enemy activity.
197
  In his 
memoirs, Harris commented that the period when he served under the leadership of 
Eisenhower and Tedder was „absolutely the only time during the whole of my command 
when I was able to proceed with a campaign without being harassed by confused and 
conflicting directives‟.198 This theme will be developed in the next chapter. 
 
D-Day to Dresden 
Following the successful invasion of Normandy, the senior leaders had two main courses 
of action open to them for the employment of the strategic bomber forces; they could either 
return to bombing targets in Germany, or attack targets which would (theoretically) 
provide direct benefit to the Expeditionary Force.
199
  With the benefit of hindsight, it could 
be argued that the requirement for a resumption of attacks on Germany was neither 
necessary from a strategic point of view, nor desirable from the ethical standpoint as an 
alternative, in the form of the land offensive, had proved viable.  It could also be argued 
that the very nature of the fighting made the distinctions between strategic and tactical 
bombing less relevant.
200
  But as the official historians have pointed out, there was still a 
perceived need to continue to take the fight to the heart of Germany and the „sources rather 
than the manifestations of her armed strength‟; as such the final offensive was „not only the 
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continuation but the consummation of the strategic air offensive against Germany‟.201  
Furthermore, the success of the invasion had been a unique blend of land, sea and air 
power all of which would continue to be needed to overcome a very stubborn enemy. 
 
 A week after D-Day, the Germans launched the first of the V-weapons against 
Britain and air assets subsequently had to be diverted to countering this threat.
202
  The 
degree of priority to be given to the Crossbow targets (attacks on V weapon launching 
sites) brought the inevitable responses from the senior leaders with Harris and Doolittle 
(Eighth Air Force) who both emphasised the importance of attacking targets in 
Germany.
203
  Leigh-Mallory‟s priorities were to the provision of close support to the land 
forces, but Eisenhower and Tedder saw the potential threat to the invasion.
204
  Eisenhower 
was adamant that Crossbow targets should have the highest priority, but a combination of 
poor weather over the targets and dubious intelligence convinced his Deputy that air power 
could reduce, but not eliminate the threat.
205
 After considerable discussion over both the 
merits and the practicalities of the operation, a Joint Crossbow Target Priorities Committee 
was set up under the supervision of Tedder.
206
 
 
 As the Allied forces continued to progress through France, Eisenhower moved his 
headquarters to France on 1 September 1944.  This was part of Portal‟s rationale in 
persuading first the British and then the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the desirability of 
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taking the Combined Bomber Offensive back under their direct control.
207
  The Octagon 
Directive was, after American insistence, sent to Spaatz and Bottomley as the direct 
representatives of Arnold and Portal in whom „executive responsibility for the control of 
the strategic bomber forces in Europe‟ was now vested.208  The Directives, like their 
predecessors, were hardly models of clarity or precise in their direction.
209
 The resumption 
of direction at this higher level brought the debates over the real purpose of the strategic 
bomber forces back into formal play, in comparison to the workmanlike informal nature of 
the relationship between Tedder and Harris on the one hand and Eisenhower and Spaatz on 
the other.
210
   
 
 The continuing need to provide heavy bomber support for the land forces was 
acknowledged as having to be met; there was, however, debate as to the nature of the need 
with Portal and Tedder likening the army dependence on air power as being „drugged on 
bombs‟.211  Beyond this „malaise‟, the old debates re-surfaced over priorities between oil 
and/or transportation targets in Germany, military industrial potential and fielded forces.
212
  
The Air Ministry had become convinced of the vulnerability of the German oil and 
petroleum situation and therefore advocated the virtues of attacking these targets.
213
  The 
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newly-formed Combined Strategic Target Committee consistently listed oil and petroleum 
targets. Harris continued to object to them, which led to one of the most controversial 
arguments of the offensive; this will be dealt with in the next chapter.  At the heart of the 
debates was the argument over which target system was most likely to bring the war to an 
early end.  Harris continued to believe that industrial area targets would prove decisive.
214
  
Marshall complicated the plot by suggesting that an all-out dedication of the strategic 
bomber forces to the land campaign could see the war end by the end of the year.
215
 Tedder 
on the other hand, likened the existing pattern of operations to a „patchwork quilt‟216  He 
warned against learning the wrong lessons from the transportation attacks in France and 
Belgium advocating that all losses of traffic in Germany had a direct impact on their war 
effort.
217
  If the strategic bombers were to work in conjunction with (rather than be 
subordinated to) the land forces, the best target system would be the railway centres, oil 
targets, canals and population centres of the Ruhr as this was the primary focus of 
Eisenhower‟s offensive.218 Tedder expanded on this theme at a conference in Versailles on 
27 October which was attended by Bottomley and Spaatz, but not Harris.
219
  An 
appropriate Directive followed on 1 November 1944 designed to set the agenda for the 
winter and to ensure that conditions were set for an early victory.
220
 
 
 The reality did not reach expectations and the senior leaders were not only faced 
with evidence of resilience in both the German oil and manufacturing industries (with the 
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production of jet aircraft particularly worrying), but also had to contend with the German 
counter-offensive in the Ardennes.
221
 This resulted in yet another Directive.
222
  Coincident 
with this work, the Prime Minister showed his typical close interest in events, and in the 
eastern front in particular.
223
  With the next major Allied Conference due in Yalta, 
Churchill was keen to be able to show Stalin what was being done to support his front.
224
  
An operation, codenamed Thunderclap, had been muted from as early as August 1944 as a 
means of hastening the collapse of Germany by attacking the morale of the people in major 
cities in the east of Germany, including Berlin. Portal, and his Air Staff colleagues, 
remained sceptical about the prospects of Thunderclap.
225
  Nevertheless, Churchill pressed 
Sinclair hard over what was going to be done about „harrying the German retreat from 
Breslau‟ and the Secretary of State replied on 26 January 1945.226  Churchill responded the 
same day with his fateful minute: 
I did not ask you last night about plans for harrying the German retreat from 
Breslau. On the contrary, I asked whether Berlin, and no doubt other large cities in 
East Germany, should not now be considered especially attractive targets.  I am 
glad that this is “under examination”. Pray report to me to-morrow what is going to 
be done.
227
 
 
Sinclair confirmed the next day that, subject to overriding claims for the bombers to attack 
oil targets or other „approved systems‟, available effort should be directed against Berlin, 
Dresden, Chemnitz and Leipzig or against other cities where severe bombing would not 
only destroy communications vital to the evacuation from the East but would also hamper 
the movement of troops from the West.
228
 As the official historians have pointed out, the 
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urgency of the initiative was evident from Churchill‟s tone and his actual words.229  The 
broad thrust of this was endorsed by the Russians during Argonaut although the debate 
would subsequently become contentious during the Cold War furore over Dresden.
230
  The 
actual attacks on Dresden, and Chemnitz and Berlin, duly took place in February 1945 with 
the attacks by Bomber Command and the Eighth Air Force on Dresden achieving 
notoriety.
231
 
 
 The debate on Dresden, and the wider issues on Churchill‟s attempts to distance 
himself from the likely post-war odium, have been widely discussed in the literature.  From 
a leadership perspective, however, the debate that took place at the time had some logic as 
was clear from Churchill‟s final minute which was approved by the Chiefs of Staff on 4 
April 1945.
232
  The Prime Minister essentially questioned the wisdom of continuing to 
bomb a desolated country in which the Allies would have to live in occupation.  The 
decision that had to be made was part ethical, and part practical.  But the other side of the 
coin, which is acknowledged by the official historians, but not by Churchill, was the 
potential cost to Allied lives if a premature decision was taken to end the strategic 
offensive.
233
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Conclusions 
One of the greatest challenges for a strategic leader, whether political or military, is to be 
able to span the area from the interface with the operational sphere to the grand strategic. 
At the very highest levels, it is inevitable that the challenge will be complicated by the 
requirement to work with allies whose culture may be very different, and whose priorities 
may conflict. Attitudes to casualties, to methods of warfare, eventual outcomes and 
secondary agendas all make the task more complex. The American airmen, for example, 
fervently wanted to prove the viability of a future independent USAF, and strategic 
bombing gave them the means through which to make their case. Nations are often 
reluctant to place their forces under the command of an allied colleague. The establishment 
of the principle of having a single commander was a major achievement. But it had to be 
the right person otherwise the organisation risks unravelling, as was demonstrated by the 
appointment of Leigh-Mallory. Furthermore, subordination of the strategic bomber forces 
under the full command of one person was a step too far when there was still so much 
controversy over what their primary purpose should be. Hence the system of „direction‟ 
and „oversight‟ was introduced to try and produce some degree of unity of purpose.  
Leaders of the calibre of Portal and Tedder were clearly content to function in this complex 
and ambiguous arena. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL INTERFACE 1942-45 
 
 
Introduction – The Interface between the Politicians, the Air Ministry and Bomber 
Command 
 
The previous chapter discussed the direction and leadership of the strategic bombing 
offensive at the grand strategic level as it made the transition into the Combined Bomber 
Offensive and then Overlord.  This chapter will look at the interface, and indeed the 
overlap, between the strategic levels within the RAF. Rather than attempt to abbreviate the 
official history, or the AHB Narratives, this chapter will examine thematically the areas of 
the interface where the leadership challenges were most significant.  The interfaces are 
critical in almost all organisational situations because most are effectively open systems in 
which external factors have substantive influence.
1
  At the higher levels in an organisation, 
the tasks become increasingly complex and the more senior leaders must have the 
cognitive capacity to deal with the issues.
2
  But, in the ideal world, the more difficult, or 
complex an organisation has become, the greater the need for clear lines of authority and 
accountability; but as will be demonstrated, this was far from the case in terms of the 
relationship between the Air Ministry and Bomber Command.
3
  A senior leader will attach 
a degree of importance to an issue based on a number of factors including its complexity or 
its contentiousness.  If there is a source of inter-personal friction in the topic, it will almost 
inevitably increase the time spent on it.  This scope for debilitating strife will be 
exacerbated by differences in „role culture‟ in which, for example, functions or procedures 
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are significantly different in the organisations that face each other across the interface.
4
  
Kakabadse has stated that, in role culture, „the formal definition of tasks and roles is 
considered to be of paramount importance‟ and that there must be „suitable cross-over 
points‟ at which arbitration and decision-making can take place.5  If some of the agents 
responsible for facilitating this „cross-over‟ are themselves sources of inter-personal 
friction (as was the case of the relationship between Harris and Bufton where the cultural 
complications of rank and status were a source of irritation to the C-in-C) then the higher 
leadership challenge will be greater.
6
  This again will be compounded at each interface, 
especially when the political dimension is added.  
 
 This chapter will therefore examine some of the areas over which there was 
friction, even conflict, between the politicians, the Air Ministry, and Harris and his staff at 
Bomber Command.  These will include the debate over what was understood by the area 
bombing and interpretations of the nature of German morale.  Harris was almost constantly 
frustrated by the diversions of his Command to tasks other than the systematic destruction 
of German cities, and these episodes will be outlined. Overlord has been discussed in the 
grand strategic consequence, so the Bomber Command involvement will then be 
examined.  The chapter will also look at the debate over nodal target systems, or what 
Harris consistently referred to as „panaceas‟ and finally examine the contentious debates 
between Portal and Harris over oil targeting.  Technical debates over the development of 
navigational aids and types of weapon will not be discussed in this thesis as, arguably, 
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these were at the interface between the operational and tactical level notwithstanding the 
high degree of Air Ministry interest. 
 
 In a wider context it is worth acknowledging that, over the period covered by this 
chapter, Bomber Command became increasingly capable in terms of range, accuracy and 
bomb load. In short, its offensive power grew considerably.  At the start of the period, 
paradoxically, when it was relatively weak, Bomber Command was still in great demand 
because it provided British leaders, at the true strategic level, with one of the few offensive 
tools at their disposal.  Not surprisingly, therefore, this demand was bound to increase as 
the potency of the Command grew.  At the heart of the problem, as Cox has pointed out, 
was that the inherent reach and flexibility of air power increased the demands for it to be 
employed in, and across, theatres.
7
 One of the most fundamental military requirements is 
for the leader, or commander, to have the resources with which to carry out the allotted 
tasks. The period when Bomber Command started to reach its real potential was therefore 
bound to have many frustrations owing to the calls on the resources for other tasking. 
 
Churchill and his Bomber Barons 
Churchill‟s direction of the war has been widely described in the literature. Various 
analogies have been used including Churchill as the conductor of an orchestra.
8
 It could, 
however, be argued that the use of such expressions to describe Churchill‟s role risks 
deflecting attention from the actual methods that he deployed in practice.  Churchill was 
keen to avoid a repetition of Lloyd George‟s inability to control the military in the latter 
years of the First World War and therefore made himself Minister of Defence as well as 
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Prime Minister. It is in this former role that he wielded most power in the direction of the 
war.  On taking office and setting up this new constitutional arrangement, Churchill 
himself commented that the „fundamental changes in the machinery of war direction were 
more real than apparent‟.9  He had been careful neither to define his responsibilities, nor 
his rights and had not sought special powers.  The key change was that he took over the 
direction and supervision of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and therefore had, with the 
Chiefs, „full control over the conduct of the war and the armed forces‟.10 Again as 
Churchill went to state, the key change for the Secretaries of State (including the First Lord 
of the Admiralty) was that they „rapidly and almost imperceptibly ceased to be responsible 
for the formulation of strategic plans and the day-to-day conduct of operations‟.11  
Although Sinclair was still responsible to Parliament for the running of his Department, the 
reality was that it was Portal who was responsible to Churchill for the fighting power of the 
Royal Air Force.  Although Churchill did not say it so bluntly, Sinclair‟s role was to 
perform in the House of Commons on air matters when it suited Churchill for him to do so.  
Any examination of the relationship between the Minister of Defence and his senior 
military commanders must be conducted in that light.  It is, however, further complicated 
by the reality that Churchill also frequently behaved as if he was supreme commander in 
addition to being a politician.
12
 
 
 For the purposes of this discussion, the relationship between Portal and Churchill 
was reasonably straightforward. Tedder, having watched the Chiefs at work with Churchill 
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in the run up to Overlord, commented that the CAS „provided the real brains‟ and quoted 
Churchill as saying „Portal has everything‟.13  Portal could indeed write well without 
relying on drafts to be produced for him, was able to persuade the Prime Minister without 
confrontation and had the analytical skills to be able to identify workarounds without 
compromising key principles.
14
  
 
 The more interesting relationship is that between Churchill and Harris.  The 
Bomber Command Headquarters at High Wycombe was only a short drive from Chequers 
and Harris was a frequent visitor, especially in 1942-3, although much less so thereafter.
15
  
Probert‟s description of the relationship is worthy of examination.16  He argued that both 
men shared a „single-minded tenacity‟ and an almost fervent belief in the spirit of the 
offensive; Churchill also empathised with Harris‟s willingness to speak out.  Probert also 
suggested that „Churchill observed in Harris qualities that matched his own; here was the 
kind of high commander he needed in those dark days, a man who shared his convictions 
about the nature of the war they were fighting and the hard things that had to be done to 
win it‟.17  Given that both Sinclair and Portal were strongly supportive of the bomber 
offensive, there was little risk of Harris causing trouble with his direct access to the Prime 
Minister; indeed it had the potential to be turned to advantage.  Churchill encouraged 
Harris to write to him direct on various issues to do with the Command and the C-in-C 
found that doing so was a useful way of getting a message through, provided the paper was 
short and to the point.
18
 An exception to this was a longer paper produced, at the Prime 
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Minister‟s request, entitled „A Note on the Role and Work of Bomber Command‟; 
Churchill subsequently asked for this to be formally printed up and distributed.
19
  The file 
correspondence on this paper has provided an interesting insight into the working 
relationships because it is evident that Harris had kept Portal fully aware at every stage in 
the process.
20
 Interestingly, Sinclair‟s personal staff asked that its circulation be delayed 
until the „Prime Minister is well on the way home in case any question should be raised by 
other Ministers as to the reason why a paper has been circulated for which the Air Ministry 
do not accept responsibility‟.21 
 
 It should not, however, be assumed that Churchill was fully signed up to the 
bomber offensive with the single minded determination evidenced by Harris.  Following a 
further paper submitted by Harris in September 1942, Churchill warned the C-in-C that he 
must be careful not to spoil a good case by overstating.  I am doing all I can to 
expand Bomber Command, and I set a high value on your action against Germany.  
I do not however think that Air bombing is going to bring the war to an end by 
itself, and still less that anything that could be done with our existing resources 
could produce decisive results in the next twelve months‟22 
 
In terms of Churchill giving clear and unambiguous „intent‟ this minute cannot be 
challenged.  It is, however, symptomatic of Harris‟s stubbornness (as opposed to admirable 
determination) that he was not prepared to modify his attitudes.  A similar warning shot 
came from Churchill following Harris sending a copy of a paper prepared by Arnold which 
the Prime Minister thought „a very weak and sloppy survey of the war‟.23  In his final 
paragraph, Churchill commented that Arnold did „not approve of the important Operation 
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which is pending, which certainly shows him lacking in strategic and political sense...‟.24  
The Prime Minister did not add a postscript to the C-in-C counselling him not to fall into 
the same trap, but any senior commander with a degree of high level political awareness 
would have at least reflected upon those words. 
 
It is clear that Churchill built up a degree of respect for both Portal and Harris, but 
he was certainly not blind to Harris‟s obvious predilection for overstating the bombing 
case.  As the war progressed, Harris‟s views on the war being won by the bomber alone 
had decreasing relevance to Churchill who had other genuinely strategic options becoming 
available.  Unfortunately, Harris did not see the importance of this and therefore harness 
his Command more willingly to the realities of the way in which the war was progressing.  
This was not for want of explanation from Portal, as will become evident as this chapter 
develops.  Nor was it for want of advice and direction from the Air Staff: paradoxically 
that may have been partly responsible for Harris‟s intransigence. 
 
The Relationship between the Air Ministry and Bomber Command 
Most senior leaders and commanders would prefer to be issued with the broadest of 
directives, be given the resources necessary and the widest possible latitude with to execute 
the higher level intent.  But unless the operational level headquarters is collocated with the 
wider interfaces at the strategic, or policy, level there will be friction; this was certainly 
true in 1942 with the Air Ministry interacting with the War Cabinet, the Foreign Office, the 
Intelligence Services, the Ministries of Aircraft Production and Economic Warfare (MAP 
and MEW).  The advent of overseas operational headquarters with conflicting demands 
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and priorities exacerbated the situation. The reality was that advice from the various 
Ministries would be relayed to the operational level second hand.  For the changes in 
direction (through directives) to be palatable to the operational commander required an 
organisation that was fit for purpose in the Air Ministry and good relations between the 
two levels, especially at the interface.  Harris, in what is one of the greatest ironies of the 
relationship, had recognised this when he was DCAS in 1940 when he set up the 
Directorate of Bomber Operations.
25
  Portal, when he was C-in-C had felt many 
frustrations and had written to the VCAS complaining about the continuous flow of minor 
instructions from the Air Ministry.
26
  Harris likewise was soon to complain about the „ever 
increasing dispersion of our bombing effort by piecemeal instructions‟.27  
 
 There followed regular complaints about the frequency of the directives, their 
content, the veracity of the analysis upon which they were based and the tactical 
unfeasibility of what did not suit the C-in-C.  Had these missives been framed 
constructively, or even just in a civil manner, Portal and his senior colleagues would have 
been able more easily to smooth the passage at the interfaces.  As it was Portal had 
frequent cause to remonstrate with Harris; in reference to one such letter, Portal wrote  
I feel bound to tell you frankly that I do not regard it as either a credit to your 
intelligence or a contribution to the winning of the war.  It is in my opinion wrong 
in both tone and substance and calculated to promote unnecessary and useless 
friction between your Headquarters, the Air Ministry, and Headquarters Middle 
East.
28
 
 
                                                 
25
 RAF Museum Hendon, Harris Papers, H112, Minute DCAS to VCAS dated 10 December 1940. 
26
 AIR 14/669 , „Despatch by Air Marshal Sir C F A Portal... on the Operations Undertaken by Bomber 
Command during the Norwegian Campaign, 4 April to 10 May 1940‟, Part II, p.12. 
27
 Portal Papers, Folder 9, E66, Letter Harris to Portal dated 21 October 1942. 
28
 Portal Papers, Folder 9, E63, Letter Portal to Portal dated 10 October 1942. 
259 
 
Portal concluded by telling Harris „that great benefit would be gained if you could manage 
to take a rather broader view of the problems and difficulties confronting the Air Ministry 
and the other Commands‟.29  The demi-official correspondence shows the themes of tone, 
substance and narrowness of view to be recurring.  A minute from Portal to his deputy in 
1943 sheds real light on just how far Portal was prepared to tolerate Harris. This was in the 
context of Bomber Command staff indicating that there was a chance of attacking a target 
system „if they waited for the right weather‟; Portal wrote that he „took this as meaning that 
the C-in-C had accepted the order‟, and accordingly was surprised by the next enclosure.30 
[Emphasis added].   
 
 The role, and fitness for purpose, of the Directorate of Bomber Operations was a 
constant source of friction from Harris‟s perspective.  His views, which summed up the 
problems, were expressed in a characteristically robust manner when he complained that 
Bufton‟s (as Director of Bomber Operations) ideas on „Pathfinders, as on some other 
matters, have always been and still are rammed down our throats whether we like them or 
not, and that on occasions more weight is given to his opinions as a junior officer 2 years 
out of command than to the considered opinion of the Commander concerned‟.31  Harris 
further objected to Bufton acting „as a sort of shadow C-in-C of the Bomber Offensive‟ in 
which role he had „the fun of running the Bomber Offensive his way while I take the 
responsibility‟.  Harris then claimed that he did not personally dislike Bufton but could not 
„stand his methods‟; this was at the root of the problem.32 Portal clinically responded with 
                                                 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 AIR 2/4477, Minute 77, Portal to Bottomley dated 5 June 1943. 
31
 Portal Papers, Folder 10, E15a, Letter Harris to Portal dated 14 April 1944. 
32
 Ibid. 
260 
 
his views on what the role of the Director of Bomber Operations should be.
33
  These 
included the duty to stay in touch with the operational needs, thought and practice of the 
Command; to network across other Directorates in the Air Ministry; and to advise the CAS 
in his role of supervising the Command so that he could exercise his responsibility to the 
Secretary of State and Minister of Defence.
34
  The substance of Harris‟s response was that 
Bufton‟s methodology included visiting Groups and Stations and taking their views, along 
with his own, but „without reference to this Headquarters‟ (emphasis in the original).35  
Harris also complained about Bufton‟s role in presiding over the Strategic Target 
Committee from which lists and priorities of targets was developed and sent out for Harris 
to action.
36
 Tedder later complained that the function of this Committee was „to choose 
targets and not to settle policy‟.37  This latter communication suggested that there may 
have been some substance to Harris‟s concerns, but demonstrated a somewhat different 
approach to their resolution. 
 
 These interchanges between Portal and Harris offer a valuable insight into the 
workings of this crucial interface.  It is clear that Portal was satisfied that the process and 
execution in the Air Ministry were fit for purpose, or he would have changed either the 
organisation, or the people, or both.  Harris did not have this option of changing the 
workings of the superior headquarters and was not slow to vent his feelings.  It is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to venture opinions on the personalities of any of the senior leaders.  
But it would be fair to comment on observed (from the archival records) behaviour.  Where 
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Portal consistently comes over as a conciliator, it is obvious that Harris relished the 
confrontational approach.  It may also be argued that Bufton did not exactly show a degree 
of wisdom or tact in his dealings with either Tedder or Harris.  
 
Area Bombing 
The winter of 1941 had seen a prolonged period during which Bomber Command was 
required to conserve its men and machines for the forthcoming spring offensive.
38
  What 
attacks that were launched were carried out by small forces and in decent weather.  By 
February 1942, the Air Staff started to plan for a resumption of the full offensive, based 
largely on the advent of Gee (the first of the navigational aids brought in to improve 
bombing accuracy).
39
  Portal considered that the bitterly cold weather would make it 
difficult for the Germans to combat concentrated incendiary attacks; furthermore, heavy 
attacks on the industrial heartland (the Ruhr and Rhineland) would both encourage the 
Russians and depress German morale.
40
 The Air Staff acknowledged that the Germans 
would attempt to jam Gee and therefore wanted to make the attacks as concentrated as 
possible for maximum effect.
41
  The main aim was to cause the maximum possible 
disruption through destruction of towns specifically selected to have the greatest effect on 
German war production; Cologne, Essen, Dusseldorf and Duisberg were highlighted with 
Hamburg, Bremen, Wilhelmshaven and Emden as reserves.
42
  These attacks would also 
have „widespread moral effects‟ (sic).  The deliberations of the Air Staff were given added 
impetus by the MEW which confirmed the vital importance of the Ruhr as an ideal target 
                                                 
38
 AIR 41/42, p.125. 
39
 Ibid, p.126 and AIR 2/4476, Minute Portal to Bottomley dated 5 February 1942.  This then went to Sinclair 
and was circulated to the Defence Committee as D.O. (42) 14 dated 9 February 1942. 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 AIR 41/42, p.129. 
42
 Ibid. 
262 
 
for area attack.
43
  The essence of the thinking, within both Ministries, was that almost 
wherever the bombs fell, they were bound to do some significant damage.  Accordingly, 
some precision type targets were omitted from the formal lists as were oil targets that fell 
outside the „coverage‟ of Gee.44 
 
 Following approval from Churchill the appropriate Directive was issued to Bomber 
Command.
45
  The first point to note with this Directive is that it was sent to the acting C-
in-C; Peirse had left post and Harris did not arrive until 22 February 1942.  The point has 
already been made in an earlier chapter that the C-in-C‟s primary object „should now be 
focused on the morale of the enemy civil population, and in particular of the industrial 
workers‟.46  The unequivocal nature of what was required was spelled out in an 
interchange of minutes between Portal and Bottomley in which the CAS asked for 
confirmation that the C-in-C understood that the aiming points were the  
„built-up areas, not  for instance the dockyards or aircraft factories where these are 
mentioned in Appendix A‟. This must be made quite clear if it is not already 
understood.
47
  (Emphasis in the original) 
 
The DCAS confirmed that Bomber Command understood the intent.
48
  As the official 
historians have suggested, this Directive, if taken with Portal‟s amplification, provided „in 
some respects, reasonable clarity‟.49 And while they acknowledged that the advent of new 
technology made it desirable for there to be some degree of flexibility, they have also 
pointed out that there was too much scope for future interpretations of the Directive to be 
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made.
50
  The scope for this stemmed from the inclusion of various areas to be targeted in 
Annex A to the Directive and for precise targets in Annex B.
51
  As the official historians 
have suggested the inclusion of Lübeck may have been merely due to its vulnerability and 
Schweinfurt left open the possibility of  nodal, or system, attacks on key industries.
52
   
 
 Although the vision and purpose of the bomber offensive was clear to Portal and 
his colleagues there remained considerable doubt in the minds of his fellow Chiefs as to 
whether it was an appropriate use of resources; Pound consistently argued for more air 
support  for the Battle of the Atlantic and Brooke for support for the army.
53
  A debate 
between the scientists (Lord Cherwell and Sir Henry Tizard) did little to settle the dispute 
over the potential effectiveness of the bombing campaign.
54
  Nor did an independent 
enquiry by Lord Justice Singleton provide clarity.
55
 To the new C-in-C, only convincing 
evidence from the operational arena could justify existing and future investment in his 
Command.
56
  Successful attacks on Lübeck, Rostock and the thousand bomber raid 
Cologne on 30 May 1942 provided demonstrations of what the Command could do.  But as 
Harris himself pointed out, the lack of aircraft, equipment and trained crews prevented him 
from starting the real offensive until 1943; diversions to attack „targets of immediate 
strategic importance – a euphemism for targets chosen by the Navy‟ also continued to 
impede his progress.
57
 From this, it can be seen, as the official historians have stated, that 
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Harris was a „man of strong convictions and unshakeable determination‟ who saw ideas, 
other than his own, as „mere obstruction‟.58  If direction from the Air Ministry allowed any 
latitude, Harris would exploit it to the full.  It can therefore be seen that the February 
Directive gave him sufficient legitimacy to pursue his own ideas, with the fallback of 
claiming impossibility if told otherwise.
59
  Despite the occasional outburst, it was not until 
the Command started to achieve its potential strength in 1943 that Harris was forced to 
take on the Air Ministry in earnest. 
 
 The Casablanca Directive had given top priority to the Battle of the Atlantic and it 
was therefore not until the new Directive of 6 April 1943 that Harris was formally told that 
the „effort thus released is to revert as far as possible to the attack of targets in Germany‟.60  
He himself had actually started the Battle of the Ruhr on 5 March 1943, with Oboe 
equipped aircraft marking the targets.
61
 At the operational level of war, 1943 saw the 
Battles of the Ruhr, Hamburg and Berlin. But at the strategic level, the debate rumbled on 
as to the purpose of the offensive.  The initial draft of the Pointblank Directive had been 
replaced with a document more in keeping with Harris‟s pursuit of the „general 
disorganisation of German industry‟ ideally in concert with the actions of the Eighth Air 
Force.
62
 But the critical point of the Pointblank plan, and the Directive as far as it went, 
was that the strategic air offensive was to be carried out in support of the eventual invasion 
of north-west Europe and not as an end in itself.  Harris did not see it that way; he 
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considered that the offensive would ultimately be decisive and the armies landing in 
Europe would be used for occupation rather than invasion.
63
  For Portal and his staff 
operating at the interface between the military strategic level and above, the problem was 
more complex than the world seen from High Wycombe.  Having sat through the various 
conferences, Portal accepted totally that Overlord was inevitable, and that for it to have a 
chance of success, air superiority had to be achieved.  In short, the strategic bombing 
offensive had to be conducted in accordance with the Pointblank plan, not the all-
encompassing wording of the Directive. Evidence of Harris‟s attachment to this wording is 
clear from the use of green pencil on the Bomber Command file copy of the Directive 
against the wording „the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, 
industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people 
to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened‟.64  
 
 In September 1943, the Air Staff had analysed the impact that the Combined 
Bomber Offensive was having on the German air force and Bottomley expressed a degree 
of disappointment to Portal over Harris‟s failure to attack a number of towns in Germany 
which would have taken steps towards the reduction of fighter production.
65
 Bottomley 
went on to advocate that the area offensive should be more specifically targeted against 
fighter production.  As the official historians have noted, this would be a change of policy 
in keeping with the original draft of the Pointblank Directive.
66
  The potential for a crisis 
over Pointblank came to a head following the American daylight raid on Schweinfurt on 
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14 October 1943 when Portal‟s worst fears were realised. Out of 291 aircraft despatched, 
the USAAF had 198 lost or damaged.
67
  It was clear that the laissez-faire leadership 
approach to the Combined Bomber Offensive would not produce the desired results; a 
concerted approach utilising both strategic bomber commands and long-range fighters 
would be required.
68
  Conversely, as Harris wrote to the Prime Minister on 3 November, it 
was time to bring the Americans into the area offensive.
69
  By doing so, collectively they 
could „wreck Berlin from end to end‟.  Predictably, Harris neither mentioned Overlord, nor 
the German air force.
70
  As the official historians have pointed out, adoption of this course 
of action would have had fatal results for the Intermediate objective of Pointblank 
(reduction of German fighter strength).
71
  Harris persisted in his approach and wrote 
formally to the Air Ministry on 7 December 1943 summarising what his Command had 
achieved and forecast what could be done by the end of March 1944.
72
  He considered that 
the „Lancaster force alone should be sufficient but just sufficient to produce in Germany by 
April 1
st
 1944, a state of devastation in which surrender is inevitable‟.  Harris admitted that 
it was „not possible to dogmatise on the degree of destruction necessary to cause the enemy 
to capitulate‟ but considered that destruction of between 40% and 50% of each of the 
principal German towns would have the desired effect.
73
 
 
 The ensuing correspondence between the Air Ministry and Bomber Command was 
vigorous to say the least and provides an interesting insight into one of the most 
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controversial leadership questions of the relationship; should Portal have sacked Harris 
and, if so, when?  This question is usually discussed in the context of the oil debate in late 
1944, but it could be argued that December 1943 would have been a possible exit point.
74
 
The subtext to this question would have been whether Churchill would have allowed such 
a contentious move when the C-in-C had done so much to turn around the Command‟s 
fortunes.  On 17 December 1943, Bottomley sent an Air Staff paper to Harris that had been 
partly based on work done by the MEW on German reliance on ball-bearings and the 
desirability of attacking Schweinfurt.
75
 Harris responded stating that he did „not regard a 
night attack on Schweinfurt as a reasonable operation of war‟ and reiterated his „strong 
views on the subject of “Panacea” targets in general and ball bearings in particular.76 
Harris further objected to the diversion of assets from „worth-while targets‟ and harked 
back to his aim of inducing surrender by reminding his audience that „we have only four 
months left!‟.  Harris concluded with a single sentence; „I am not prepared to take it on‟.77  
In his internal minute to Bottomley, Portal was surprisingly tolerant (or arguably 
complacent).
78
 He described Harris‟s letter as „characteristically exaggerated but I think we 
must ignore the temptation to dispute with the C-in-C about the past and concentrate on 
trying to get the right answer for the future‟. Portal‟s exasperation did show through in his 
query as to whether the German mission to Sweden and extra flak at a similar factory in 
Turin were „merely part of a deep-laid German plot to deceive us into believing that they 
cared about the damage done to Schweinfurt!‟.  In a more positive refrain, he then 
described the choice between just dropping bombs over a wide area such that few were 
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wasted versus picking a „key industry‟ where the „result per ton of bombs must inevitably 
be increased‟.79  This effectively mirrored American thinking.80  Bottomley‟s response 
confirmed the logic behind attacking Schweinfurt and went on to lay out the nature of 
Harris‟s challenge 
The C-in-C again discloses the fact that he does not agree with the present direction 
of bombing policy and he disputes the basis upon which this direction is founded. 
In fact he challenges the foundation of the Combined Bomber Offensive plan and 
the soundness of the present method of employment of the American Strategic 
Bomber Forces.
81
 
 
Bottomley then went on to make the obvious choice facing Portal that Harris must either 
„conform to the direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff despite any personal misgivings‟ 
or the Air staff would have to take a new plan to the Combined Chiefs.
82
 He continued that 
the area bombing on its own was unlikely to achieve the ultimate aim in the timeframe 
envisaged.
83
  This was a serious statement for Bottomley to make because it suggested that 
the Air Staff had modified the established policy to come more in line with American 
thinking.  Portal referred the whole issue to Sinclair „as it may lead to trouble with 
Harris‟.84  The ensuing Directive was issued on 14 January 1944 and was unequivocal in 
its reiteration of the strategic policy that had been set in place by the Combined Chiefs.
85
  
Furthermore, Harris was requested to „adhere to the spirit of the directive‟ forwarded on 10 
June 1943 and that priority had to be given to the German aircraft industry and ball-bearing 
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production; in particular Harris was effectively told get on with the attacks on Schweinfurt, 
whatever his misgivings.
86
 
 
 As the official historians have pointed out, this episode brought into question Air 
Staff confidence over Harris‟s protestations over tactical difficulties.87  As the crews and 
aircraft improved, their capabilities were greater and Harris was less able to hide behind 
the art of what was tactically feasible.  His objections on these grounds were less and less 
likely to convince. This further blurred the overlap between the strategic and operational 
levels.  Although the Air Staff consistently proclaimed that they were applying the terms of 
the Pointblank Directive, this was only true to an extent.  The Directives had been so 
broadly composed that a commander would have been justified in claiming obedience in 
the furtherance of almost any plan of action he concocted.  By the same token, the various 
elements in the Air Staff, the MEW and elsewhere also could claim that their pet target 
system was covered; certainly each Directive included an element of an option for 
precision targeting.  The critical element for a leader in these circumstances is to 
demonstrate the capacity to situate the policy in the realm of the overarching strategic, or 
grand strategic, priorities of the time. Portal was able to do so, but Harris was very firmly 
entrenched in a dogmatic approach based on his conviction that overwhelming destruction 
was sufficient to bring about victory.  As the official historians have bluntly suggested, 
Harris‟s arguments were not only extravagant, they were becoming irrelevant.  The debate 
therefore remains open as to whether Portal should have replaced Harris at this point. 
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Diversions and Panaceas 
It is clear that, to Harris at least, any utilisation of Bomber Command aircraft, crews or 
senior personnel for other tasks was an unnecessary diversion from the true mission of the 
area bombing of Germany.  And it would provoke inevitable protest even though the 
priorities had been set by the Prime Minister, The Chiefs, or the Combined Chiefs.  It is 
small wonder that Portal had, on occasions to plead that Harris broaden his outlook. 
Furthermore, as Portal regularly had to remind Harris, that predations on Bomber 
Command were inevitable because the Air Ministry had ensured that Bomber Command 
had received the „lion‟s share of the resources‟.88  The diversions can be considered to fall 
into a number of broad categories including to the maritime war; to other theatres; to 
Overlord which will be described in its own right; and to so-called „panacea‟ target sets.  
This section will not explore each area in depth, but will look at the strategic leadership 
implications.  Some of the proposed diversions were so extreme that it would be difficult 
not to have some sympathy; for example an Air Ministry request that he send aircraft on 
tours of „semi-finished aerodromes to encourage the workmen‟, Harris considered „typical 
of the endless suggestions I get for dispersing the effort of this Command, the mere 
rebuttal of which becomes a weariness to the flesh‟.89 
 
 At the other end of the spectrum were the pressing claims from the Admiralty for 
support in the Battle of the Atlantic. These had been evident from the period before Harris 
took command and sparked debate as to what was the best, or most effective, use of the 
heavy bombers.
90
 As Howard has clearly pointed out, once Harris had voiced his 
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complaints and the Directive had been issued, „he loyally carried it out‟.91  The issue under 
contention was the effectiveness of the attacks carried out by Bomber Command.  The Air 
Staff had warned their colleagues in the Admiralty that submarine construction yards and 
submarine slips were small and very well-defended targets, but nevertheless, a sizeable 
effort was made both against facilities in Germany and the Bay of Biscay.
92
  More 
contentious was the loan from Bomber to Coastal Command of squadrons of precious 
Lancasters for anti-U-boat reconnaissance.
93
  Results were meagre in comparison to what 
Harris thought could be achieved by the area offensive.  The leadership issue was that he 
consistently failed to broaden his perspective as asked by his CAS.  It would have been 
naive in the extreme for Harris seriously to have believed that, with the Battle of the 
Atlantic at its height, he could expect exclusive rights on all aircraft and crews. But it 
appears that he did as there is no indication that he was just indulging in formulaic protest.  
The other area where it could be argued that serious leadership issues were botched was in 
the use of language or vocabulary. Harris‟s invective against, for example, „oily boys‟ with 
their „fairy stories‟, „panacea mongers‟ and so forth could only alienate those senior 
colleagues who did not know him as well as Portal.
94
  Furthermore, there appeared to be 
little effort to develop a high level (i.e. for senior officers) vocabulary to convey the 
balance of effort against results achieved.
95
  Even where some policies were effective, such 
as mining operations, it is not always obvious that Harris got the message across.
96
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 Harris‟s limited perspective was again displayed by his refusal to acquiesce in 
deployments of his squadrons to overseas theatres.  When, for example, three squadrons of 
Wellingtons were sent to North Africa he openly expressed his scepticism over the 
temporary nature of the deployment.
97
  Harris went on to criticise those above him tasked 
with allocating priorities saying that he was „astonished at the difficulty which those who 
have the deciding voice appear to find in recognising that at this crucial moment in the war 
Bomber Command ought to have first call on our available resources‟.98  Portal, with 
typical tolerance and patience, responded saying that it would be very easy for every 
Commander to make similar calls, but they had been „commendably broad minded‟.99  
Harris displayed similar traits in his calls for the resistance to „the fearful diversion from 
the Bomber Offensive‟ for Operation Starkey (which was a feint or deception operation). 
Harris then ruined the potential effect of his message by stating that this was „just the sort 
of thing an idle army dotes on‟.100 
 
Harris‟s objections to „panacea targets‟ has been described above in connection with the 
raids on ball bearings at Schweinfurt.  Oil was a similar source of frustration to him as 
were molybdenum plants in Norway and locomotive plants.
101
  The essence of the problem 
was Harris either did not, or did not want to, understand the theories that underpinned what 
was being advocated.  This may have been an issue of Harris not having sufficient 
cognitive capacity; or it may have been a failure of the interfaces between the agencies 
concerned; or it could revert to poor personal relationships.  Evidence of a deeper- rooted 
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explanation may come from Harris‟s attitude to the Transportation plan.  In a private letter 
Harris described „our worst headache has been a panacea plan devised by a civilian 
professor whose peacetime forte is the study of the sexual aberrations of the higher 
apes‟.102  Harris makes no mention of the detailed work that Zuckerman (for he was the 
Professor to whom he was referring) had carried out on blast effects earlier in the war.
103
  
Although not an unbiased commentator, Kingston McCloughry made the point that in 
contrast with Tedder, Harris particularly „disliked admitting that ...Zuckerman, a civilian, 
knew more about bomb damage than himself‟.104  He went on to explain the work done by 
the Professor in the field actually studying the effects of the weapons. Zuckerman‟s 
background, his friends from the London literary world and so forth were poles apart from 
that of Harris and it could be argued that his reluctance to engage with the principles may 
either have been raw anti-intellectualism, or an inferiority complex.  As Furnham has 
pointed out, intellectual ability is one of the best predictors of job success; maybe the 
complexity of the debate was a step too far for Harris.
105
 
 
The Bomber Offensive as a Guerre de Course? 
 
The official historians described the Bomber Command offensive against Germany as a 
guerre de course.
106
  They likened Bomber Command‟s night activity to that of cruisers or 
submarines which sought to evade opposing forces and „to strike blows at the commerce or 
military communications of the enemy; in the air war the opposing forces were the German 
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night fighters.
107
  This theory was based on the work of Mahan and was specifically chosen 
by Frankland as an analytical framework on which to base their discussion of the bombing 
offensive.
108
  The French adopted commerce raiding in the early eighteenth century as an 
alternative to major fleet actions; the suggestion was that Bomber Command did the same 
for the air war. This theory was first used as the underpinning framework for Frankland‟s 
DPhil thesis which he wrote under the supervision of Professor R. B. Wernham on the 
Planning of the Bombing Offensive and its Contribution to German Collapse while on the 
fulltime staff of the AHB; this was a fully classified work which also became an AHB 
Narrative.
109
  Authors, such as Cox, have pointed out that this „intellectual and analytical 
framework‟ may well have been one of the greatest strengths of the official history, but 
acknowledged that it also may have contained „significant weaknesses‟.110 The analytical 
focus on attacking commerce had the dubious consequence that judgement on the efficacy 
of the offensive concentrated on the economic results, rather than the broader military and 
strategic achievements.
111
   Notwithstanding the fact that the accepted high standard of the 
official history led a number of authors to follow it, very few have elected to acknowledge, 
let alone adopt, the guerre de course analytical framework.
112
  That this argument has not 
been taken further, other than in the historiographical debate, suggests that it is either not 
well understood or does not ring true in the wider scholarly interpretation of the planning 
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and direction of the bomber offensive.  It is particularly hard to square the role of 
commerce raiding with the delivery of a knock-out blow, or the bomber always getting 
through.  Neither the phrase „guerre de course‟, nor the concept of mere commerce raiding 
appeared in the writings of the senior leaders involved during the planning or execution of 
the offensive.
113
  Frankland himself took this apparent myopia a stage further with a direct 
attack on those senior leaders when he stated in his autobiography 
Mahan proved to be a more reliable prophet of air power than Guilio Douhet or 
Lord Trenchard; the American Generals, Arnold and Spaatz, who demanded long-
range fighters and knew how to use them with deadly effect in combination with 
long-range bombers, proved to be better strategist and tacticians than the British 
Air Marshals Portal and Harris, who clung to the guerre de course almost to the 
bitter end.
114
 
 
If the concept of the guerre de course has not been broadly adopted by scholars in the 
field, adoption of Mahan as an air power prophet has not been taken further either.  It is 
therefore suggested that this particular criticism of the senior leadership is not to be taken 
further, even though made by such a distinguished historian.  As a footnote to this debate 
over Mahan, it is worth acknowledging that at least some of the senior leaders were well 
aware of his work.  Tedder, in his 1947 Lee Knowles lectures, mentioned Mahan several 
times and the concept of the guerre de course.
115
  But Tedder likened the bomber offensive 
to the Royal Navy‟s blockade of Revolutionary and Napoleonic France with its full 
strategic impact.
116
 
 
 
 
                                                 
113
 See for example, Harris, Bomber Offensive, Tedder, With Prejudice. 
114
 Frankland, History at War, p.63. 
115
 Lord Tedder, Air Power in War (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1947); see p. 31 for the guerre de 
course concept and pp.15-6 for Mahan. 
116
 Ibid. 
276 
 
The Debate over Perceptions of the Campaign 
Not only was Harris willing to challenge directly the Air Staff over what his Command 
was to used to achieve, he was also ready to challenge it on how the Command‟s activities 
were to be portrayed to the wider public.  Any war machine runs the risk of being depicted 
as causing wanton death and destruction; this is an enduring fact of warfare.  The problem 
for Bomber Command, and the Air Ministry, was all the more complex because the crews, 
who risked their lives daily, still lived in the local community and had to return there every 
morning.  Accusations against them would have been hugely detrimental to their morale 
and that of their families.  But Harris was keen for the importance of his Command‟s work 
to reach a wider public.
117
  His post-war complaint was that the Air Ministry was 
„extraordinarily cautious‟ in the way in which it dealt with even the more intelligent and 
reputable journalists.
118
  On the other hand, Churchill, Portal and the Air Staff were 
concerned that offensive could be portrayed as indiscriminate.
119
 Although Harris would 
almost certainly not have been bothered by the comparison, it is probable that his more 
strategically minded colleagues would have preferred not to have any comparisons 
between British and American professed operational techniques aired in public, 
particularly in the United States. 
 
 The problem was exacerbated by the repeated government statements confirming 
that „the policy of limiting objectives of Bomber Command to targets of military 
importance... and not been changed to the bombing of towns and wide areas in which 
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military targets are situated‟.120  In Parliament, in December 1943, Sinclair confirmed that 
the policy had not changed since he had previously answered a similar question in March 
1943.  When tackled over Berlin, Sinclair confirmed the military and economic 
significance of the capital, but again avoided the issue of the government having now 
„resorted to indiscriminate bombing, including residential areas‟.121  As Hastings has 
pointed out, a similar exchange took place between Sinclair and Lord Salisbury when again 
the Secretary of State failed to defend the C-in-C whose rhetoric over the heart of Berlin 
„ceasing to beat‟ had provoked the correspondence.122  
 
Predictably, Harris took up the cudgels formally against the „dead hand of the Civil 
Service‟ in attempting to ensure that the public understood what was being achieved by his 
people.
123
 The Permanent Under Secretary (PUS), Sir Arthur Street assured Harris that „no 
attempt has been made to conceal from the public the immense devastation that is being 
brought to the German industrial cities‟, but he went on to point out that „in all official 
pronouncements‟ the emphasis was on the „obvious truth, i.e., that the widespread 
devastation is not an end in itself but the inevitable accompaniment of an all-out attack on 
the enemy‟s means and capacity to wage war‟.124 Street then went on to state that  
It is, in any event, desirable to present the bomber offensive in such a light as to 
provoke the minimum of public controversy and so far as possible to avoid conflict 
with religious and humanitarian opinion. Any public protest, whether reasonable or 
unreasonable, against the bomber offensive could not but hamper the Government 
in the execution of this policy and might affect the morale of the aircrews 
themselves.
125
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Biddle has described this as „semantic hair-splitting‟ which „enraged Harris‟; presumably 
the lengthy delay before Street replied would have done little to help.
126
  Harris was not 
prepared to accept what was arguably a more reasoned and strategic outlook. His response 
provided both a blunt statement of the reality of the offensive and a clear insight into his 
own view of the total nature of the war. 
It is surely obvious that children, invalids and old people who are economically 
unproductive but must nevertheless consume food and other necessaries are a 
handicap to the German war effort and it would therefore be sheer waste of effort to 
attack them....The German economic system, which I am instructed by my directive 
to destroy, includes workers, houses, and public utilities, and it is therefore 
meaningless to claim that the wiping out of German cities is „not an end in 
itself....‟.127 
 
Harris then went on to explain the reality, that in the war as it was then being fought, 
„everything and everybody‟ in the cities „which is a help to the German war effort‟ came 
within the objectives which Bomber Command was seeking to destroy.  Furthermore, he 
asked that anyone in the authorities who did not understand this should „at once be 
disabused of the illusion, which is not merely unfair to our crews now but will inevitably 
lead to deplorable controversies when the facts are fully and generally known‟.  Harris 
further emphasised that 
It is not enough to admit that devastation is caused by our attacks, or to suggest that 
it is an incidental and rather regrettable concomitant of night bombing. It is in fact 
produced deliberately.
128
 
 
He went on to recommend that the Air Ministry request the Joint Intelligence Committee 
(JIC) to produce a report on German morale.
129
  The findings of this, and the more detailed 
report produced by the Air Ministry intelligence staff will be covered in the next section; 
meanwhile, it is interesting to note that with the exception of a JIC Report in October1943, 
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very little intelligence work had been done on the subject since at least before America 
entered the war.
130
 
 
It is clear from the correspondence that Harris understood that the Air Ministry was 
trying to „provoke the minimum of public controversy and so far as possible avoid conflict 
with religious and humanitarian opinion‟, but did not accept the primacy of such an 
approach over the protection of the morale of his crews who may not have been expected 
to grasp the subtleties of the real strategic level.  Probert, citing Longmate presumably with 
approval, has suggested that only Harris emerged from this debate with any real credit.
131
 
But it could be argued that Harris was not able to grasp, or accept, the complexities and 
ambiguity that characterises leadership at the highest levels.  Furthermore, although he 
professed that he understood the potential consequences of too open an admission of the 
totality of the war Bomber Command was fighting, Harris was clearly not willing to 
moderate his anger or exasperation.  In his memoirs, he remained uncompromising and 
almost dismissive with language such as „the fact that our aircraft occasionally killed 
women and children is cast in my teeth I always produce this example of the blockade‟.132 
To Harris, it was evident that the war with Germany was total war, and he was unshakeable 
in this view and in the consequences that stemmed from it.
133
 In the context of Sinclair‟s 
„hedging‟, Probert has suggested that Harris „was being left, in effect, to carry the can at 
home and abroad‟.134  It could therefore be argued that allowing Harris to remain in post 
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was a politically shrewd decision by Sinclair and Portal, even though they may not have 
said as much. 
 
The Vulnerability of German Morale 
The literature on the use of air power to target civilian morale has invariably merely 
acknowledged that the senior leaders decided to adopt this course of action and the series 
of Directives has been used to support this.
135
  Often targeting morale has been directly 
associated with Trenchardian thinking (or dogma), both in the formative years of the 
Service and during the War (which will be covered below).
136
 Often, the debate has centred 
on the effectiveness of „morale bombing‟, or the lack of it in a state ruled by the „Gestapo‟ 
with a „concentration camp around every corner‟.137  Inevitably, most of the literature 
acknowledging the role of the authorities was published after the event.  The literature has, 
however, been relatively silent on the issue of why the senior leaders thought that the 
morale of a population might be vulnerable to aerial bombardment and that the German 
population would be more susceptible than the British.
138
  It would be all too easy to 
dismiss these views as evidence of racism, or xenophobia, on the part of the senior 
decision makers.  But the majority of these people had seen the defeat of Germany in 1918 
and understood the impact that the Allied blockade had had on the German home front; 
„the rot had started from within‟.139  This was also specifically tackled in a Joint 
Intelligence Committee (JIC) report in 1943.
140
   The Report included a detailed Annex 
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comparing the situation in 1943 to that which had existed in 1918; the main conclusions 
were that, in 1943, food was reasonable, people were generally healthy and the SS had 
rigid control.
141
 Churchill considered this report to be sufficiently serious to justify formal 
printing and circulation.
142
  The fact that Hitler had used the „rot from within‟ as part of his 
campaigning rhetoric in the inter-war years was also well understood in the Whitehall 
community who were not on the JIC distribution.
143
  But it was also prevalent in Germany 
and whole state reporting systems had been set up to monitor morale among the workforce 
that British senior leaders sought to target; concern that „the activists now started their 
agitation and staged another November 1918‟ was never far from the surface.144 It was also 
evident that the German authorities took their internal security reporting seriously as was 
clear, for example, in the spring of 1942 when food rations were cut; with „the regime‟s 
mortal fear of damaging morale‟, the cuts had to be reversed.145 It is clear from Harris‟s 
own account that this monitoring was well understood in Britain.
146
   
 
 What was meant by „morale‟? The members of the Air Staff (including Portal) who 
had been through the RAF Staff College at Andover would have had a relatively 
sophisticated understanding of morale from the lectures and notes given by Brooke-
Popham on the subject, and the essays that they had to produce.
147
  Notwithstanding the 
relative infancy of psychology as an academic subject, Brooke-Popham was able to explain 
the importance of self-preservation as the first and foremost „basic instinct‟.  This was 
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followed by the „group instinct‟ in which preservation of the group could be powerful 
enough „to be proof against any shock or stress‟.148  Brooke-Popham then went on to cite 
the work of Gustave le Bon in which people, especially if from a common race, were 
„imbued with a common thought‟ the whole could become a „self-hypnotised‟ crowd.149  
Brooke-Popham developed this theme in a leadership context and not in conjunction with 
the impact of bombing on a civilian population.  But his notes would not have been 
inconsistent with the notion of the rot starting from within. 
 
 It should also be acknowledged that the impact of bombing on morale was being 
actively studied in Britain and, allowing for standard beliefs in the British being better „at 
taking it‟, the senior leaders would at least be aware (through the War Cabinet) of the work 
carried out on Home Intelligence.  A detailed paper was produced in 1941 and attached to 
a weekly report.
150
  Morale was defined as the „state of conduct and behaviour of an 
individual or a group‟ and had to be measured by what people did, not what they grumbled 
about.  The paper also explained the complexity of the linkages between public opinion 
and the probable state of morale.  It then stressed the material factors affecting morale such 
as food, warmth, work, leisure, a secure base and safety for dependents.  Mental factors 
included belief in victory; belief in equality of sacrifices; belief in the efficiency and 
integrity of leadership; and belief that the war was necessary and the cause just.
151
  The 
report mirrored cutting edge work in psychology that had been first published as early as 
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1940, albeit without appropriate citation.
152
  The essence of the thinking, and was spelled 
out in Taylor‟s report, was that the material factors were invariably more important than 
the mental and had to be satisfied first.
153
  Furthermore, although the material factors could 
be directly affected by bombing, especially as planned by Portal, and executed by Harris, 
against Germany, morale was measured by what people actually did.  Taylor concluded 
that the British would not be „defeated by any means other than extermination‟.154  
Although Taylor concentrated solely on British morale, and public opinion, his report is at 
least evidence of relevant high level thinking within government. 
 
 The official historians were rather dismissive of intelligence reporting on German 
morale, stating that the JIC tended to exaggerate the extension of the effects of bombing 
once the campaign was well under way.
155
  Nevertheless, the detailed Air Ministry report 
was produced (at Harris‟s goading as discussed above) to cover the period 1 November 
1943 to 1 March 1944.  Detailed source reports had been compiled which showed that the 
general attitude of the German public was one of increasing apathy.
156
  The report did not 
predict widespread unrest or an uprising, but forecast that morale would deteriorate and 
apathy worsen.  Although the report did not cross-refer to the Taylor report, it covered very 
similar ground including both material and mental factors; it concluded that speeches and 
rhetoric had become less relevant or effective.
157
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 This section does not conclude that the senior leaders responsible for the strategic 
air offensive had a detailed, or all-embracing, scientific appreciation of the nature of 
morale and the effect thereon caused by aerial bombardment.  But it is not unreasonable to 
infer that from Brooke-Popham‟s notes onwards there was more to their thinking than just 
dogmatic adherence to pre-war thinking, a matter of faith or a mere excuse for 
indiscriminate bombing.
158
  It had been accepted from at least 1941 that the Trenchard 
model of attacking morale was outdated.
159
  Hope that there would be a repetition of the 
collapse of the German home front was clearly evident in London as was the concern over 
it in German high command.  It could be argued that a more detailed analysis might have 
predicted apathy amongst the population from the outset, but for most of the senior leaders, 
the Delphic experience of the history of 1918 was more influential than the relatively new 
world of psychology.
160
 
 
Overlord 
The planning of Overlord and Harris‟s (and Spaatz‟s) eventual, grudging, agreement to the 
Transportation plan has been covered in the previous chapter.  In terms of making the 
interfaces work, it is clear from both Tedder and Harris‟s own accounts that the two senior 
leaders were able to orchestrate the campaign with a minimum of fuss.
161
  Harris wrote that 
he  
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was able to proceed with a campaign without being harassed by confused and 
conflicting directives. It was in many ways a great relief after working under other 
directions.
162
 
 
The root of the problem, Harris believed, had been the level of detail at which the Air 
Ministry had been prepared to work; this involvement in tactical detail had then percolated 
upwards to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and even to the War Cabinet.
163
  This, in turn, 
resulted in the situation where „many individuals thought that they enjoyed the privilege of 
running or trying to run a force without direct responsibility for the results which must, of 
course, remain with the commander‟.164  From a senior leadership perspective, Harris was 
possibly right to have been so frustrated.  In part, the lack of clarity over the command and 
control arrangements was bound to irritate, but it could be argued that, at his level, Harris 
could have shown more understanding of the strategic complexities of combined 
operations.  But more important was the continuing friction between Harris and the DCAS 
and his team in the Directorate of Bomber Operations who Harris believed were anxious to 
regain control of the air offensive.
165
 
 
 In the event, the Air Staff were concerned that Harris‟s „loyal support‟ to Tedder, 
and his commitment to Overlord, had resulted in only „small tonnages being dropped on 
the principal strategic targets‟.166 Once the land forces became established on the 
Continent, the Air Staff argued for a return of the heavy bombers to Portal‟s control on the 
basis that London had the more complete strategic picture.  Furthermore, the situation was 
complicated by Air Staff concerns that the strategic bombing commanders had too much 
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latitude in their choices of targets, and that the Eighth Air Force in particular was not 
tackling its Crossbow commitments.
167
 More importantly, the Air Staff and their specialist 
advisers were becoming increasingly convinced that attacking German oil production 
would have a potentially decisive effect on the war.
168
  Harris concurred that reduced 
bombing of German industry would allow war production to rebuild.  He further argued 
that Crossbow, attacks on oil and on the German air force were all mere diversions from 
Overlord and strategic bombing.
169
   
 
Harris particularly objected to the Air Ministry continuing to task him directly, 
rather than through the Supreme Commander as they did over Crossbow and aircraft 
production targets.
170
  The acerbic nature of the relationship is clear from correspondence 
between Bottomley and Harris over the period of the landings in Normandy.
171
  On 3 June 
1944, Bottomley had sent Harris an appreciation on attacking ten synthetic oil plants on the 
Ruhr.
172
  He responded pointing out that the tonnage of bombs required equated to about 
„one month‟s normal effort by the whole force under my Command.173  Harris refused to 
answer the direct question as to whether he would have capacity to start these attacks when 
the situation with Overlord allowed by tartly reminding the Air Staff that he no longer had 
„the responsibility for choosing strategical (sic) objectives and I assume that this question 
will be submitted to the proper quarter in due course and that I shall be informed of the 
result‟. Harris then went on to state that „In the meantime by agreement with Deputy 
Supreme Commander, I am taking such opportunities as may serve to include synthetic oil 
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plants in the Ruhr amongst other objectives in Germany which are within range during 
these short nights and which may be attacked from time to time for the purpose of 
preventing the enemy from bringing his defences further forward into France‟.174  
 
Bomber Command had actually attacked the first oil target after Overlord the night 
before Harris sent this letter and were to launch two more in June, five in July and four in 
August.
175
 The essence of this interchange was that Harris did actually understand the 
importance of using Bomber Command in support of Overlord, in the widest strategic 
sense, and was certainly prepared to do so at the behest of Tedder.  But he was equally 
determined to continue his war of words with the Air Staff with almost childish vigour.  
Notwithstanding his outspoken objections to the whole concept of a land invasion which 
Harris, as a voice in the wilderness, had considered to be unnecessary, he had got on and 
done the job to the great satisfaction of Eisenhower and Tedder.
176
  Similarly, Probert has 
quoted from autobiographical material not included in Harris‟s memoirs in which he could 
„recall only one period of calm sailing in the 3 ½ bitter years – a veritable centre of the 
hurricane – when all went well, when all pulled together, when there was at last continuity 
of contact between the compass course required and the lubber line – and that was during 
the all too short period when Eisenhower was Admiral and Tedder the Captain on the 
bridge‟.177 
 
There can be little doubt that the bitterness to which Harris refers in this last 
passage was evident to those at the strategic level in London; the tone of his letter of 13 
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June 1944 certainly reflected the angst that he felt.  This begs the leadership question as to 
what, if anything, should have been done to calm the waters.  It could be argued that the 
Overlord period was not one in which Portal could have removed Harris, especially as the 
Command was co-operating to the full.  But it begs the question as to whether the Air 
Staff, under Portal and Bottomley, was „fit for purpose‟.  What is beyond doubt is that the 
acrimony that had built up was not going to dissipate without serious leadership 
intervention and the impending debate over attacking oil would provide the forum for this 
to surface. 
 
Oil 
The previous chapter set the strategic context for the Combined Bomber Offensive in the 
months after control of heavy bombers reverted to Portal and Arnold, albeit through 
Bottomley and Spaatz.  This was the control situation which Harris described as producing 
„an extraordinary lack of continuity and with responsibility so uncertainly poised the 
natural result was a multiplicity of directives embodying one change of plan after another 
and so cautiously worded at the end with so many provisos and such wide conditions that 
the authors were in effect guarded against any and every outcome of the orders issued‟.178  
As Cox has pointed out, the debate over whether Harris had disobeyed orders on attacking 
oil targets and should have been removed has taxed historians in general and in particular 
those who have sought to denigrate Harris.
179
  It is suggested that had an attempt so to do 
been made, Harris‟s first line of defence would have been to question the clarity of his 
orders in line with his quotation above. 
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 Notwithstanding Harris‟s objections to his Directives, that issued on 25 September 
1944 was unequivocal in its placement of the „Petroleum industry, with special emphasis 
on petrol (gasoline) including storage‟ as first priority.180 The German Transportation 
system was at the head of the target systems listed as second priority.  The Directive 
allowed the designated commanders latitude due to „the exigencies of weather and tactical 
feasibility‟.181  This discretion allowed the operational commanders as much room for 
manoeuvre as it did those writing the orders so maligned in Harris‟s earlier quotation.  The 
catalyst for what became a bitter debate came from Harris‟s response to Tedder‟s „Note... 
on Air Policy to be Adopted with a View to Rapid Defeat of Germany‟ dated 25 October 
1944.
182
  Coincident with Harris‟s receipt of a copy of Tedder‟s Note, he had been 
challenged as to why Bomber Command had attacked Cologne on the night of 31 
October.
183
  In a detailed defence of his decision to bomb Cologne, Harris listed eight 
reasons which included weather and tactical considerations; he also stated that the target 
was of direct value to the land offensive and „generally in line with the Directive‟.184  
Harris also commented in great detail on Tedder‟s paper and made an impassioned appeal 
for a continuation of the area offensive.
185
  The official historians have described his letter 
as „unrepentant defence of his grounds for neglecting the bombing directive of 25 
September 1944, but also a defiant challenge to any further directives of that nature‟.186 
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 Harris‟s constant railing against the Directorate of Bomber Operations and the 
DCAS could, when emanating from a successful Commander in the field, be seen as 
eccentric and, given the personalities involved on both sides, almost understandable.  But 
Harris‟s letter of 1 November marked a direct challenge to the authority of the CAS and 
the Combined Chiefs.  It was also clear that he did not share, or had ever admitted to, any 
expression of the vision and purpose of the bomber offensive that did not match his own 
interpretation.  It was also evident that Portal had failed to convince Harris of either the 
strategic considerations or the real merits of alternative strategies.  While it was by then too 
late in the war to sack Harris without causing uproar in the Command and the wider public, 
it was also arguably late in the day to try and win Harris around.  Nevertheless, Portal 
attempted so to do.  In his response on 5 November, Portal informed Harris that his 
requests for information were made not because „I am ipso facto exhibiting lack of 
confidence in Bomber Command‟s operations‟, but that he may have to „explain, and if 
necessary defend‟ what had been going on.187  Portal accepted that he was risking being 
dubbed by the C-in-C as „another panacea merchant‟, but went on to state his belief that 
„the air offensive against oil gives us the best hope of complete victory in the next few 
months‟.  Although Portal admitted that there may be occasions when the re-emerging U-
boat threat would need to be addressed, or the land campaign would require support, he 
considered that the bomber offensive must seize absolutely every opportunity to maintain a 
positive balance between their destruction of the industry and German efforts to repair it.  
On the basis of the „available intelligence‟ (including Ultra) the CAS believed that the 
„whole war situation is poised on „oil‟ as on a knife edge‟.188  What had previously been a 
debate between „directed letters‟ and appropriate „Sir, I have the honour to refer‟ responses 
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had now become a battle of will between two of the most senior leaders in the Service 
couched in demi-official language.  The sensitivity of the correspondence was still evident 
some years later when the official historians sought to use the material and were initially 
refused.
189
  As a result the whole Official History project was either nearly „emasculated‟, 
or driven into extinction.
190
 
 
 Harris replied with yet another defence of his decisions to attack cities rather than 
oil targets, and then challenged the accuracy of the intelligence upon which the plan was 
based.
191
  He also regretted the suggestion that it was thought that he did not „understand 
the importance of the oil war, because that is entirely wrong‟.192  Portal‟s response returned 
to the issue of the devastation of cities to which Harris had referred in his letter of 1 
November 
I know that you have long felt that such a plan to be the most effective way of 
bringing about the collapse of Germany. Knowing this, I have, I must confess, at 
times wondered whether the magnetism of the remaining German cities has not in 
the past tended as much to deflect our bombers from their primary objectives as the 
tactical and weather difficulties which you described so fully in your letter of 1
st
 
November. I would like you to reassure me that this is not so.  If I knew you to be 
as wholehearted in the attack on oil as in the past you have been in the matter of 
attacking cities I would have little to worry about.
193
 
 
Notwithstanding the vagaries of the language used in the various Air Staff communications 
there could be absolutely no doubt as to the higher commander‟s intent on this matter.  
Portal‟s language was firm, to the point and personal. At this point, it is suggested that, 
under an objective test, it would have been reasonable for Harris either to do what he had 
been directed, in the spirit in which it was intended, or at least return to „consent and 
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evade‟.  But Harris chose to resort to a battle of the experts and forwarded an appreciation 
carried out by his Operational Research Section who had calculated a huge required sortie 
and bomb load rate to destroy the key targets.
194
  He berated the „MEW experts‟ for having 
„never failed to overstate their case on “panaceas”, e.g. ball-bearings, molybdenum, 
locomotives etc‟.  Harris considered that the oil plan was already following the path of 
previous schemes with the inclusion of Benzol plants.
195
 
 
 Richards has stated that this missive „disturbed Portal more than the earlier 
ones‟.196 Certainly, Portal‟s pencil annotations to Harris‟s letter confirm that he spent a 
considerable period going through the detail.
197
 Nevertheless, he responded patiently by 
stating that he was „profoundly disappointed that you still feel that the oil plan is just 
another “panacea”‟.198 Portal went on to confirm that Bomber Command‟s load in 
attacking these targets was shared with the Americans (thereby spreading the risk of 
attrition against which Harris had complained) and that „immobilisation and the continued 
immobilisation of the remaining producers‟ was the „greatest and most certain contribution 
that our strategic bombers could make‟.  In response to Harris‟s challenge on the 
competence of the MEW, Portal suggested that greater efforts might have produced the 
results predicted.  Portal also expressed his doubts that Harris‟s staff would not give of 
their best in the „accomplishment of your first priority task if you yourself are not whole 
heartedly in support of it‟.199  Harris responded by reiterating his distrust of the MEW and 
defended his Command‟s efforts against the target sets which Portal had said had not been 
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prosecuted with due diligence.
200
 The official historians have described Harris‟s response 
to this next letter as „extraordinary‟ and suggested that further attempts to persuade him 
„would be useless‟.201  They also alluded to Portal‟s unwillingness to replace Harris at this 
stage.
202
  But what is arguably a key paragraph in this letter, from which they do not quote, 
is where Harris admits that where he leaves „no stone unturned to get my views across, but, 
when the decision is made I carry it out to the utmost and best of my ability‟.203 Nor did the 
Air Staff seriously challenge this saying that there was „no doubt that Bomber Command 
have excellently in the attack on oil and the C-in-C may well feel convinced that he is 
attacking it to the best of his ability‟; they did, however doubt that every opportunity had 
been taken.
204
 In support of the contention that Bomber Command had made progress 
against oil targets, Cox in his introduction to Harris‟s Despatch on War Operations, has 
made the point that Bomber Command‟s performance was acceptable given the weather, 
moon conditions and so forth.
205
 What continued to concern the Air Staff was Harris‟s lack 
of enthusiasm and the effect that this would have on his staff and the wider prosecution of 
the campaign.
206
  But Harris refuted Portal‟s accusation that his views may well have 
influenced his staff for the worse.  His words were classic Harris and are an interesting 
cameo, depicting him as very much an „old school‟, or traditional military Commander   
I do not give my staff views.  I give them orders. They do and always have done 
exactly what I tell them to. I have told them to miss no opportunity of prosecuting 
the oil plan, and they have missed no worth while  (sic) opportunity.
207
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The correspondence therefore continued and Portal‟s next letter, of eight pages and 
produced after lengthy discussions with his staff, contained what the official historians 
have called „a most significant passage‟ which is worthy of repetition at length 
While area bombing, if it could have been continued long enough and in sufficient 
weight, might in the end have forced the enemy to capitulate, his counter-measures 
would have prevented us from maintaining such a policy to decisive point.  We 
would have been forced to precision attack to maintain the air situation needed to 
continue the offensive at all.  The Americans did this for themselves in 1943/44 
with a little help from Bomber Command.  Under cover of the favourable air 
situation which was created “OVERLORD” was launched successfully, and the 
advance to the German frontier gave night bombing a new lease of life.  But for this 
it is possible that the night blitzing of German cities would by now have been too 
costly to sustain upon a heavy scale. These factors must not be overlooked when 
considering the post and future results of area attack.
208
 
 
 
In many ways, this passage is actually the most significant, even extraordinary, of 
the whole chain of correspondence and could only have been conducted in the less formal 
demi-official manner.  The key element was that it was the United States Army Air Forces 
that had won the vital air superiority necessary for Overlord without which the bomber 
offensive would have ground to a costly halt.  Overlord had, in turn, allowed the ground 
forces to overrun the early warning sites and Bomber Command was thus able to operate 
more freely.  The official historians challenged Portal‟s understanding of the situation, or 
at least his „oversimplification‟.209  But it could be argued that this is beside the point.  The 
demi-official correspondence had, by its personal nature, a degree of subjectivity to it that 
would not otherwise be evident and that was behind the two leaders‟ reluctance to have it 
quoted from and refusal to allow its publication. Whether Webster and Frankland‟s 
subsequent analysis was more correct, the critical issue is whether that is what Portal 
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actually believed.
210
  If it was, and he had decided to remove Harris, it would have all the 
appearances of the C-in-C being sacked because Portal and the Air Staff thought that the 
area offensive had failed: they could hardly have published the letters as evidence of 
Harris‟s intransigence. Had Harris been sacked for the perceived failure of such a costly 
campaign the wider impact on morale in the RAF would have been considerable. 
 
Harris duly responded, albeit with regret that the debate had been widened beyond 
the merits of the oil plan.
211
  Harris outlined, again, his objections to any form of selective 
bombing and to the oil plan in particular.  He also vigorously defended himself against any 
charge of disloyalty, but likened the situation to a case of „heads I lose, tails you win‟; if 
the policy in which he had no faith failed, the blame would lie at his door for not 
prosecuting it with sufficient vigour.  Harris went on to ask the CAS „to consider whether 
it is best for the prosecution of the war and our success of arms, which alone matters, that I 
should remain in this situation‟.212 As Richards has stated, „Portal in the pleasantest 
possible way brushed aside Harris‟s offer of resignation‟;  
I willingly accept your assurance that you will continue to do your utmost to ensure 
the successful execution of the policy laid down.  I am sorry that you do not believe 
in it but it is no use my craving for the unattainable.  We must wait until the end of 
the war before we can know for certain who was right and I sincerely hope that 
until then you will continue in command of the force which has done so much 
towards defeating the enemy and has brought such credit and renown to yourself 
and the Air Force.
213
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In many ways Portal was either naive, suffering from wishful thinking or merely 
being placatory in his hope that the end of the war would see one or the other proved right.  
The literature suggests that the debate is still healthy and contentious.
214
  It is certainly 
outside the scope of this thesis to examine the merits or pass judgement on the success of 
the bomber offensive.  From the leadership perspective, however, it is instructive to note 
Sinclair‟s comment when he was shown the trail of correspondence; he concluded that 
Portal was „exquisitely right‟ against one of CAS‟s replies to Harris and that „I see what 
troubles his soul – our failure to go nap on the policy of obliteration and that the laurels he 
is receiving are for successes – e.g. the pathfinders, incendiary attack, the oil plan – which 
are not of his design‟.215 As Sinclair also noted, Harris was obviously „under considerable 
mental stress‟ which is less than surprising given his role for so long.  But then the same 
could be said for Portal who had to endure numerous overseas trips as well as Churchill‟s 
„midnight follies‟.216  Senior leadership is, and has always been, mentally and physically 
taxing. 
 
Having justified his request for information on the grounds that he may either have 
to explain, or defend, Bomber Command‟s operations, it is worthy of note that Churchill‟s 
sole minute to Portal on the subject of oil came at the end of January 1945.
217
 In this 
minute, Churchill noted that three times as many bombs had been dropped on 
transportation targets compared with oil.  He went on to say that „in view of the great 
success of attacks on oil targets and of their immediate effects, I trust they will not be 
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neglected in favour of the long term attrition of German communications‟.218  Portal 
assured him that all „the Air Authorities, RAF and American, are agreed that oil has top 
priority‟.219  The Prime Minister appears to have been oblivious to the turbulent 
correspondence at the interface between the military strategic level and the operational.  
From this, it is not unreasonable to infer that Portal had no intention of escalating matters 
by attempting to remove Harris and was content to weather the storm. 
 
Conclusions.  
The typical controversies over the period when Harris was C-in-C have tended to 
concentrate on his strident advocacy of area bombing and the contentious issue as to 
whether he should have been retained in post.  From a leadership viewpoint, there are a 
number of wider perspectives that need to be added to this debate. In the first instance it 
must be remembered that Harris was not the architect of area bombing; the formal directive 
was in place before he took command. If there was to a single author of the concept, Portal 
would be the leader responsible. For the first two years of Harris‟s tenure, area bombing 
was the primary means of Britain striking back at Germany; from the C-in-C‟s perspective, 
his war was the war. If Harris had a major failing as a leader therefore, it was not adjusting 
to the realities that other options had been opening through 1943, and that Overlord was 
going to happen. All the indications from the eastern front were that Germany was going to 
fight to the end and Harris‟s concept of merely needing an army of occupation was 
irrelevant. The fact that Bomber Command was at its strongest and most potent at this 
stage clouded his judgement further. Although Harris was vociferous in his objections to 
any deviation, or diversion, from his course of action, Bomber Command carried out the 
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tasks broadly as directed; this was especially evident during Overlord.  This may not 
always have been to the satisfaction of all in the Air Staff, but that did not necessarily give 
serious grounds for considering removing Harris from Command. This chapter has 
suggested that if Portal had had such a move in mind, the row over ball bearings and 
Schweinfurt would have been the opportunity; by the time the debate over oil took place, it 
was too late to be a serious proposition and Portal‟s measured correspondence shows that 
he had that view.   
 
The chapter has also alluded to Harris‟s very traditional attitude to „Command‟ and 
it could be argued that this influenced his approach to his relationship with the Air 
Ministry. Harris appeared to see the function of the Air Staff as a high level co-ordination 
body without power of command. The Staff was there to provide him with broad direction 
and the resources with which to prosecute the offensive. But with their input into the 
Chiefs of Staff, Combined Chiefs of Staff and the constitutional responsibility to the War 
Cabinet, as well as links with other government departments, Portal and his staff had a far 
wider remit. With his responsibilities for the direction of the Combined Bomber Offensive, 
Portal had clear primacy in setting the policy.  Admittedly the language of „direction‟ was 
somewhat more opaque than that of „command‟, but that did not change the de facto 
realities.  As a function of strategic leadership, „direction‟ had two distinct facets. The first 
was for Portal, on behalf of the Combined Chiefs, to set their determination of the vision 
and purpose, or their „intent‟ into practical direction to the two bomber commanders. The 
second was for the will of the War Cabinet to be translated into formal Directives for the 
C-in-C to prosecute.  The political intricacies of all of this made it a complex web of 
priorities which conspired against the broad mission command approach that Harris would 
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have preferred. Instead, it resulted in a system of high level centralised command with 
devolved execution. Modern commanders are comfortable with this notion; Portal was 
ideally suited to working in this way, Harris evidently was not. 
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Chapter 8 
 
THE STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP CHALLENGE 
 
 
The stereotypical image of the strategic leaders responsible for the planning, and 
execution, of the air offensive against Germany is, at its most extreme, of a unified band of 
„bomber barons‟ steadfastly following a Trenchardian doctrine of the supremacy of the 
bomber and its ability „always to get through‟. The „barons‟, in this cameo, would be 
depicted as a united band of brothers in concert with a single cause, oblivious to the wider 
utility of air power.  And if Trenchard was the master, Harris was his chief disciple in 
waging an immoral, wasteful offensive against the women and children of Germany. As 
with all caricatures, there are touches of veracity in each of these elements.  But the 
realities of the strategic leadership challenge were altogether more complex than this 
simplistic summary.  This thesis has sought to examine these complexities and has shown 
that, not only were the challenges multi-dimensional, but also consisted of many threads of 
differing hues that changed in texture over time.  
 
The thesis has looked at the senior leadership challenges from the inception of the 
strategic bombing concept through to the conclusion of the campaign in May 1945.  It 
would be tempting to risk casually using the word „apogee‟ to describe this point, but again 
the realities are too complex.  The concept of the „strategic‟ nature of the campaign is also 
complex.  It could be argued, and to an extent still is, that the strategic nature of the 
campaign was simply that it straddled operational theatres by taking the war to the 
heartland of the enemy and, as such, was no more than a large-scale „operational 
campaign‟ in its own right.  But it could also be suggested (and was) that the bomber 
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offensive could have the ultimate strategic effect in either directly causing outright victory, 
or significantly creating the conditions for this to result. One of the key features of strategic 
leadership is the establishment of the vision and purpose of the enterprise.  Although it 
could be suggested that victory over Germany was the ultimate goal, even this was 
complicated with the entry of America into the war and priority over the Pacific. Even if 
the „ends‟ desired in Europe were commonly accepted, the „ways and means‟ were not; 
there was considerable variation in the thinking over the execution of the campaign.     
 
The stages of evolution of the strategic offensive could be depicted as a linear 
progression from its inception during the First World War; its development as a concept 
and as a force in being; the challenges to its very survival in the bleak inter-war years; the 
expansion to meet the growing threat in Germany; the early application; and then the 
exploitation of the force as it grew in strength, capacity and accuracy.  But again, this too 
simplistic: it was not a linear development over time.  There were elements of each cycle 
in each of temporal phases. The conceptual thinking evolved in conjunction with 
technological advances and in response to political circumstances.  At each stage in the 
process, the strategic bomber force was under threat of extinction at either the hands of the 
other services; from a complete abolition of military aviation in Geneva; from diversion to, 
arguably, higher priority tasks such as the anti-submarine offensive; or subordinated to the 
support of the invasion of other theatres, including, ultimately, north-west Europe and 
Overlord; and ironically when it was at its genuine perigee when the force nearly died 
because it was failing to deliver. There were also several phases of expansion, each of 
which was fraught with danger as the resilience of the technology was stretched to, and 
sometimes beyond, its limits of elasticity.  Each of these bore the risk of catastrophic 
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failure.  It was only with the advent of the Lancaster, with its huge bomb load, variation in 
types of ordnance, and improved navigational accuracy that the application of the force 
reached a point where it could be exploited in a sustainable fashion. In each of the phases, 
and in each of the cycles therein, the whole enterprise could have failed.  The senior 
leaders‟ task throughout was to ensure that the balance was maintained, between the 
strategic bomber and the wider picture. 
 
A number of enduring tenets overlaid these challenges.  Some were matters of 
faith; others the result of public or political priority; some may have been just wishful 
thinking. The role of the media in the voicing the thinking of the prophets, or even the 
more mundane process of prioritisation is open to debate, but its influence on leaders, and 
followers, was undeniable.
1
 The first influence on the senior leaders, throughout the period 
covered in this thesis, was the promise of air power.  Its ability to go beyond the two 
dimensional constraints of the war at sea, or on land, gave air power the potential to 
revolutionise warfare.  That this could obviate the slaughter of the trenches brought about 
by industrialisation, mass armies and the coalescence of artillery and rapid fire weapons, 
made the possibility of war in the third dimension all the more alluring. That this might 
extend, beyond the battlefront, to the means of war production and even to the fundamental 
will of the people to support continuance of the conflict gave the future of air power an 
almost „el Dorado‟ quality. The extent to which the senior leaders really internalised this 
possibility of transmutation is debatable; but what is evident from the sources was the 
desirability of avoiding the carnage of the trenches over which they had flown with bravery 
and distinction.  The inherent flexibility of air power offered more than just this allure. 
                                                 
1
 For the debate in this context see Mark Connelly, „The British People, the Press and the Strategic Air 
Campaign against Germany, 1939-45‟, Contemporary British History, 16(2) 2002, p.40. 
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And in many ways, it could be argued that it prevented the bomber offensive from ever 
realising the true potential advocated by the „barons‟.  The reach, and resulting 
deployability, of air power in its various guises so often made it the arm of choice for 
reinforcement, or for offensive action when other choices would have been too costly.  
 
The Trenchardian spirit of the use of air power in the offensive was all-pervasive in 
the new Service and was to endure to the end of the war.  But again it would be too 
simplistic to suggest that this was merely a Blackadder-style incarnation of the senior 
airman doggedly following Haig as the master of attritional warfare.
2
  Whether desirable, 
or otherwise, land warfare has been described as a question of movement, supply and of 
destruction all brought together on increasingly vast scales.
3
 It was therefore axiomatic that 
air power, as an offshoot from the army, would follow this doctrine.  Equally, with 
antecedents in the naval tradition, it is not surprising that the strategy of blockade allowed 
the war to be taken indiscriminately to the population. Indeed the British strategy for much 
of the Second World War was to maintain the blockade along with aerial bombardment. 
Furthermore, the unique nature of British imperial history ensured that continental armies 
were the exception, but worldwide commitments and dependencies (in all senses of the 
word) absolutely prevented an isolationist stance. The advent of air power, and its 
offensive use, fitted ideally into this melange and this was intuitively understood by all the 
leaders concerned. 
 
Although the debate was to flourish over the balance between offence and defence, 
the need to protect Britain‟s island shores was accentuated by the ability of German air 
                                                 
2
 See Sheffield, Forgotten Victory, pp.1-3. 
3
 Henderson, The Science of War, p.1. 
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power in the First World War to take the conflict to the domestic audience.  The offensive 
was advocated consistently as the best form of defence, in which the enemy was forced to 
defend vital interests, thereby reducing the intensity of attack against Britain, but it was not 
always politically acceptable. Something had to be done, and to be seen to be done. Thus 
the defence of London in particular, also emerged as an enduring theme which was well 
understood by the senior leaders at the political and military levels. If attention to other 
theatre of operation distracted the senior leaders, the press could always be relied upon to 
remind them of the threat to the home front. In a similar vein, the press could also be relied 
upon to call on retaliation and retribution following attacks on the British towns and cities.
4
 
And until the desirability of a comfortable seat on the moral high ground following 
Dresden appealed to Churchill, his advocacy of reprisals was strident, particularly against 
Berlin.  Inevitably, this was not lost on the military leaders, as shown when Portal was still 
the C-in-C. 
 
The task of the senior leaders in transforming these principles into workable, and 
affordable, policies and then executing them was considerable.  The challenges at each 
phase were variable and complex. Linear, or simple, solutions to such „wicked problems‟ 
were not applicable. Although the strategic leaders of the period would not have used such 
language, the more discerning would have certainly understood the difficulty.  There are 
no single „magic solutions‟ to leadership at the most senior levels.  Nor are there unique 
characteristics that are transferrable to every scenario.  But, again, there are recurring 
themes.  The first of these is the ability, at the senior level,  to be able to make the 
transition from the operational level to the strategic in which the leader at that level is 
                                                 
4
 Connelly, „The British People‟, pp. 47-9. 
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required to oversee a diverse spectrum of operational „silos‟ beyond the one from which 
she or he has just been promoted.  Portal‟s promotion to CAS from Bomber Command was 
a classic example of this. The strategic leader has to look across the tops of these silos and 
thence to the interfaces of the various organisations that contribute to the greater enterprise.  
Portal was able to do this across the range of Whitehall and into international arena. Harris, 
operating in the difficult area of overlap between the strategic and operational levels had 
frequently to be asked to broaden his outlook. It has also been evident in this examination 
that the traditional descriptions of the levels of warfare, whilst convenient tools, are no 
more than that.  The realities of senior leadership are that there will be overlaps, blurred 
zones and inevitable forays from the grand strategic to the tactical with Churchill the best, 
and worst, example.  Although it is outside the scope of this thesis to draw contemporary 
lessons from these challenges, it is evident that they still apply. 
 
A detailed analysis of the strategic leadership of the bomber offensive through the 
lens of Dixon‟s On the Psychology of Military Incompetence has been outside the scope of 
this thesis, not least because it is essentially a social psychology task. Nevertheless, another 
enduring theme of senior leadership is that it is ambiguous and complex, requiring 
intelligence and intellectual capacity to cope with the demands. In an ideal world, the 
succession planning in an organisation would ensure that people with these traits reached 
the top. In a military organisation, this simple statement is easier said than done. From the 
start, the attributes required at the top of the organisation may not have been those 
necessary to climb through the ranks, especially where there is evidence of anti-
intellectualism. This was, arguably, particularly relevant in an air force where skills as a 
pilot, and the unique challenges of actually leading in the air, were of the first most 
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importance. Again, it is arguable that this remains as relevant today, albeit in a range of 
institutions. It is clear that officers such as Portal, Tedder and Slessor had these attributes.  
But the fact that they stood out, has suggested that they were the exception rather than the 
rule. Regrettably, there appears to be little evidence to suggest that Harris was in this 
league and the bitter wrangle over the targeting of oil suggests the opposite. 
 
A further recurring theme in the modern literature of strategic leadership is the need 
to build, and maintain, strong interpersonal relationships.  This is essential at the military-
political interface; with allies; with peers; and at the institutional boundaries where intent, 
leadership and direction interact with the operational, or tactical, task of delivering output. 
It would be tempting to seek a workable template, or model, of a situation which could be 
emulated.  But this thesis has demonstrated the each of the „top team‟ relationships has 
been different depending on the people, the circumstances and the challenges faced.  For 
example, the relationship between Londonderry and Salmond (and then Ellington) in the 
face of disarmament and rearmament was very different to the situation between Churchill, 
Sinclair and Portal.  As has been discussed, Sinclair was effectively relegated to the role of 
spokesman in the Commons leaving the running of the bomber offensive to Churchill and 
Portal, both working and interacting with Harris „jointly and severally‟. In the face of these 
positive relationships, it is interesting to compare the neutral, or dead, situation in the 
phoney war between Chamberlain and Newall.  At the other end of the spectrum, the 
appointment of Leigh-Mallory as the Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces 
has demonstrated the potential for what can go wrong when parties are just not prepared to 
work together.  In a military situation, with so much at stake, it seems almost bizarre that 
such a thing could occur; the stereotypical view would have been that military personnel 
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did as they are told and got on with it.  But the critical element was that there was so much 
at stake that those involved were not prepared to risk the outcome, or their own position in 
history, on having to trust the intellect, capacity and qualities of a senior leader who 
appeared out of place. Portal‟s, and Churchill‟s wisdom in making this appointment, which 
was agreed in advance of the appointment of the Supreme Commander, must be questioned 
particularly with talented airmen such as Douglas and Slessor available.
5
 
 
The machinery which a British government uses to take the country to war, and 
then oversee the conduct of the conflict must, of constitutional necessity, be answerable to 
Parliament and this invariably done through the War Cabinet. Churchill, by his own 
admission, had set himself up with wide ranging powers as Minister of Defence. Senior 
leaders in such a situation have to understand, and adapt to, the situation. Clear, linear 
wiring diagrams describing the chain of command are rarely apposite. This was true from 
Churchill taking power until the end of the war. It was complicated further by the entry of 
America into the war and the, often tortuous lines of „direction‟ and „oversight‟. It was 
evident that both Portal and Tedder were comfortable operating in this environment. But 
from his outbursts, it was clear that Harris was, at best, unwilling to accept the vicissitudes 
of coalition warfare. At worst, Harris did not have the intellectual capacity to cope with the 
necessarily opaque language used as political and strategic „direction‟ was translated into 
„Directives‟. That the Air Staff may have added their own spin to the process cannot have 
helped. 
 
                                                 
5
 See Christina J.M. Goulter, A Forgotten Offensive: Royal Air Force Coastal Command’s Anti-Shipping 
Campaign, 1940-1945 (London: Cass, 1995), pp.214-5. 
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For a major enterprise, such as the strategic bomber offensive, to succeed, it needs 
to be supported by an organisation that is fit for purpose.  As has been described, Harris 
recognised this when he was DCAS and set up the Directorates of Fighter and Bomber 
Operations.  His relationship with the latter, or with its occupants, was to be one of 
longstanding friction.  At the heart of the issue was that Harris wanted to be given broad 
direction and then allowed to prosecute his bit of the war in his own way.  When the Air 
Staff, through the Director of Bomber Operations, sought to amend direction due to an 
evolving intelligence picture, strategic requirements or advice from other government 
departments, Harris objected, often vehemently. In many ways, Harris was naive to think 
that he could draw upon the lion‟s share of the nation‟s resources and then expend them 
with unlimited flexibility, especially in his early days when the case for area bombing had 
not been proven. That he failed to follow Churchill‟s hints on not overstating the case adds 
evidence to the case for the charge that he was not up to leadership at the strategic level. 
This has been further reinforced by the stubbornness of his reluctance to acquiesce (or even 
accept orders) when the grand strategic direction did not suit.  To be fair, it was evident 
that others, such as Tedder, shared the disquiet over Bufton (as Director of Bomber 
Operations) who had his own very clear views on how the bomber war should be fought; 
and as Harris pointed out the Air Commodore did not have the responsibility of the 
Commander.  Nevertheless, it certainly appeared that Portal was content both with his Air 
Staff and that he would need to expend considerable energy on keeping his C-in-C in 
harness. 
 
This necessarily leads to a brief comment on whether Harris should have been 
sacked. In replacing Peirse, both Churchill and Portal demonstrated a willingness to move 
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Commanders who were not performing to accepted standards. Churchill was certainly not 
averse to moving senior generals when he was unhappy with their performance.  But 
equally nor was he keen to move senior commanders for the sake of it, or when they had 
only just started to understand their Command. It is to be regretted that Portal did not leave 
diaries similar to those kept by his colleague Brooke. It can only therefore be surmised that 
Portal was content that Harris‟s performance as an operational commander in conducting 
the offensive along the lines that he had originally envisaged and was prepared to tolerate 
his tantrums.  There are other explanations, including that Churchill would not have 
accepted Harris being sacked as they shared the belief in the offensive spirit and the hard-
nosed approach to the campaign.  Alternatively a common view is that there was no 
obvious replacement. If this was indeed the rationale, it does not speak well of the senior 
leadership requirement to ensure succession planning.  It could also be argued that Harris‟s 
extreme, and openly stated, views on the potential of area bombing allowed those 
responsible for its original instigation to take a more measured, and morally secure, 
position in the background. This cynical interpretation, when seen in the light of the 
correspondence following Dresden and the failure to recognise the sacrifice, and 
achievements, of the Command appears more reasonable. 
 
The need to establish a just and moral cause has been part of the western military 
ethic for many centuries.  Part of the rationale has been that soldiers fight better if they 
know what that cause is and can believe in it. This remains as valid today as it did for the 
bomber offensive.  In addition to providing this moral underpinning, states have sought to 
provide a formal codification of rules of going to war and conducting it once enjoined.  
Some authors have concluded that the failure, through self-interest, of states to ratify the 
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1923 Hague Rules rendered them a failure. But as this thesis has shown, the Air Staff, with 
cognisance at the highest levels, were strongly of the opinion that some form of regulation 
was desirable, even though there was a tacit acknowledgement that, sooner or later, the 
„gloves would have to come off‟. A combination of factors, including limited offensive 
capability, and Chamberlain‟s pacifistic leanings, delayed the onset of full scale area 
bombing until just before Harris came into Command.  The incremental nature of the 
relaxation of the restrictions has also been noted. The totality of the war, and the need for it 
to be finished as quickly as possible, not least to save further lives, did not prevent debate. 
The correspondence between the Permanent Secretary and Harris is illustrative of the 
tension discussed above. 
 
The thesis has used the broad tenets of modern thinking on senior leadership as an 
aid to the analysis of the strategic challenges at the different stages from the inception of 
the concept of bombing. Although the senior leaders of the period under discussion would 
not have used the more recent vocabulary, they would have recognised the principles and 
acknowledged the realities and challenges. Although some of social science leadership 
literature has used historical examples, these have faced the challenge of selectivity. This 
thesis has done the opposite with the theory used as an analytical tool.  The primary themes 
in strategic leadership have also proved to be enduring. 
 
Leadership at the most senior levels is demanding, both physically and mentally. It 
requires intelligence and intellectual capacity. This is true in any walk of life, but is 
especially the case in warfare where the survival of the nation, and arguably of an 
acceptable form of civilisation, is at stake. Many forms and occasions in war have 
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provoked controversy and debate; many still do. For the debate of the bomber offensive to 
be labelled „savage‟ is indicative of its depth, and of the passions that it ignites. Many of 
the senior leaders were aware of this as the events that they led and directed unfolded. It is 
improbable that the debate will die away, not least because many of themes continue to 
recur. These include the essence of leadership, the justness of the cause and the never 
ending battle for the resources necessary to wage war in the most effective way. The most 
enduring of all the themes is that of the importance of people and their relationships with 
each other and between their organisations.  
 
APPENDIX 1: DEFINITIONS OF LEADERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND 
COMMAND 
 
The following definitions are those utilised by the United Kingdom Defence Academy, 
Defence Leadership and Management Centre
1
 from 2003 onwards: 
 
Leadership 
 
“Leadership is visionary; it is the projection of personality and character to inspire people 
to achieve the desired outcome”.  There is no prescription for leadership and no prescribed 
style of leader.  Leadership is a combination of example, persuasion and compulsion 
dependent on the situation.  It should aim to transform and be underpinned by individual 
skills and an enabling ethos/culture.  The successful leader is an individual who 
understands him/herself, the organisation, the environment in which they operate and the 
people that they are privileged to lead.  
 
Management 
 
Management is a facet of Command. It is about the allocation and control of resources 
(human, material and financial) to achieve objectives. Management requires the capability 
to deploy a range of techniques and skills to enhance and facilitate the planning, 
organisation and execution of the business of defence. A successful Manager combines 
these skills with those of leadership.  A Manager with the style of management most suited 
to the circumstances is the most successful. (A Leader/Manager) 
 
Command 
 
Command is a position of authority and responsibility to which military men and women 
are legally appointed. Leadership and management are the key components to the 
successful exercise of Command. Successful management is readily measured against 
objective criteria but commanders are not leaders until their position has been ratified in 
the hearts and minds of those they command. 
 
  
                                                 
1
 Reproduced with permission of the Director DLMC: Crown Copyright Reserved 
APPENDIX 2: BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
 
The following notes complement the main text in providing brief comment on the key 
military and political figures.  They are based on the relevant autobiographies, biographies, 
Probert‟s High Commanders and the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 
 
RAF Officers: 
 
ACM Sir Norman Bottomley (1891-1970). Transferred from the Territorial Force to the 
RFC in 1916. Bottomley became SASO Bomber Command in 1938 and then commanded 
5 Group from 1940. He was appointed as DCAS from 1941 (and then ACAS Ops when the 
DCAS post was disestablished). Bottomley spent the rest of the War in this role before 
taking command of Bomber Command in September 1945. 
 
AVM Sydney Bufton (1908-1993). Joined the RAF in 1927. After commanding 10 
Squadron, Bufton was posted the Air Ministry as deputy director Bomber Operations rising 
to Air Commodore rank.  He was called the „the little air commodore‟ by Churchill. 
 
ACM Sir Hugh Dowding (1882-1970). Joined the Army through Woolwich and was 
commissioned into the Royal Garrison Artillery in 1900. Dowding learned to fly in 1913 
and transferred to the RFC in 1914. After a patchy war, including falling out with 
Trenchard, clawed his way back into favour reaching the Air Council as Air Member for 
Supply and Research in 1930 and then for Research and Development in 1935. Dowding 
took over the newly formed Fighter Command in 1936. He was then passed over for CAS 
in 1937 and his tenure at Bentley Priory was marked with both conspicuous success and 
further controversy including his removal in 1940. 
 
MRAF Sir Edward Ellington (1877-1967). Joined the Army through Woolwich in 1895 
and was commissioned into the Royal Artillery in 1897.  Ellington learned to fly in 1912 
and attended CFS in 1913. However, he spent most of the War in the Royal Artillery and 
subsequent staff appointments including deputy director-general of aeronautics in the War 
Office in 1917. He transferred to the RAF on its formation and rose to become CAS on the 
death of Sir Geoffrey Salmond in 1933. Sweetman (ODNB) is scathing about his weak 
leadership and lack of air mindedness. Nickname: Uncle Ted (from when he was Inspector 
General of the RAF). 
 
MRAF Sir Arthur Harris (1892-1984). Joined the 1
st
 Rhodesian Regiment in 1914 
before returning to the UK and learned to fly in 1915. After transferring from the RFC to 
the RAF in 1919, Harris rose to become deputy director plans in the Air Ministry from 
1934-7. He commanded 4 Group prior to a liaison tour in America. After the outbreak of 
War, Harris commanded 5 Group before joining Portal in the Air Ministry as DCAS. After 
another spell in America, Harris took over Bomber Command from Peirse in 1942.  Was 
known affectionately by his crews as „Bomber‟ and by his friends as „Bert‟ (a naval 
tradition in which all those with Harris as their surname are known as Bert). 
 
ACM Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt (1886-1973). Joined the Army through Sandhurst and 
was commissioned into the Royal Irish Rifles in 1905. Ludlow-Hewitt joined the RFC in 
August 1914. Under Trenchard‟s patronage, he rose rapidly through the ranks to become 
C-in-C Bomber Command from 1937-1940. Hastings has commented that „Ludlow‟ lacked 
the steel for the highest levels of command. 
 
AVM E. J. Kingston-McCloughry (1896-1972). Born in Australia and commissioned 
into their engineers in 1915 McCloughry joined the Australian Flying Corps in 1917. 
Wrote and published extensively in the inter-war years. He worked extensively with 
Zuckerman on the Overlord bombing committee. 
 
MRAF Lord Newall (1886-1963). Joined the Army through Sandhurst and was 
commissioned into the Royal Warwickshire Regiment in 1905. He learned to fly in 1911 
and subsequently joined the RFC rising to be the brigadier-general in charge of the 8 
Brigade charged with bombing operations under Trenchard. Newall succeeded Ellington as 
CAS in 1937 and remained in post until 1940. Newall had a reputation for working 
exceptionally long hours and was at the centre of a number of controversies including his 
own removal! 
 
ACM Sir Richard Peirse (1892-1970). Peirse learned to fly in 1913 before joining the 
RNR and flying operationally in the RNAS. He transferred to the RAF in 1919 and rose 
through the ranks to become DCAS in 1937.  After a short spell as VCAS, Peirse was 
appointed C-in-C Bomber Command after Portal in 1940. As Jordan (ODNB) has pointed 
out, Peirse joined the Command at an awkward time with heavy commitments and 
considerable pressure to perform. Portal‟s confidence in him as C-in-C waned after a series 
of heavy losses and he was removed in January 1942 to be succeeded by Harris. 
 
MRAF Sir John Salmond (1881-1968). Joined the Army through Sandhurst and was 
commissioned into the King‟s Own Royal Lancaster Regiment. He wrote on air power as 
early as 1910 and learned to fly in 1912 just after joining the RFC. By October 1917, 
Salmond had become a major-general and the youngest officer ever to reach the Army 
Council (as DG Military Aeronautics). He then distinguished himself in Iraq before 
becoming AOC-in-C of the air defence of Great Britain.  He replaced Trenchard as CAS at 
then of 1929 and the plan had been for him to hand over to his brother (Sir Geoffrey) who 
became too ill to take up the post allowing the way in for Ellington. 
 
MRAF Viscount Portal (1893-1971). Joined the Army as a motorcycle despatch rider in 
1914 from Christ Church Oxford. Portal joined the RFC in 1915 and gained great 
distinction as a pilot and commander. Trenchard marked Portal out as a future star and 
selected him for the first RAF Staff College Course. Rising rapidly through the ranks, 
Portal became Director of Organisation in the Air Ministry in 1937 and the AMP in 1939. 
After a short stint as AOC-in-C Bomber Command in 1940 „Peter‟ Portal served as CAS 
for the rest of the War. 
 
MRAF Sir John Slessor (1897-1979). Despite having been rejected as „totally unfit‟ for 
military service, Slessor wangled his way into the RFC. Slessor was clearly identified 
(along with Portal) as a future star and was one of „Boom‟s wordsmiths‟. He published Air 
Power and Armies in 1936 and was the Director of Plans from 1937 to 1940. Slessor was 
the highly influential in the sensitive staff talks with the Americans in 1940-41 before 
Commanding 5 Group. He then moved to C-in-C Coastal Command in 1943 and replaced 
Tedder commanding the RAF in the Mediterranean and Middle East. 
 
MRAF Lord Tedder (1890-1967). After Cambridge and the diplomatic service, Tedder 
joined the Army as a second lieutenant in the Dorsetshire Regiment in 1915. He transferred 
to the RFC in 1916. Tedder made good progress in the inter-war years rising to become 
DG Research and Development in 1938. He then made his name in the Mediterranean 
despite Churchill attempting to have him sacked in November 1941. Tedder was influential 
in shaping British and American air efforts in the early days of the combined operations 
and worked exceptionally well with Eisenhower. He was therefore a natural choice to 
become his deputy for Overlord.  Was addressed in demi-official letters as „Tirpitz‟.  
 
MRAF Viscount Trenchard (1873-1956). Joined the Army, at the third attempt, in 1893 
in Royal Scots Fusiliers and was posted to India where he was known as „Camel‟ because 
did not drink and could not speak!  He joined the RFC in 1912 having learned to fly at the 
advanced age of nearly 40. He rose quickly to head the RFC in 1915 and pursued a policy 
of constant offensive action. He became the first CAS before falling out with the political 
establishment, then commanding the Independent Force in France.  Trenchard regained his 
CAS post at the behest of Churchill in 1919 and remained in post until 1929. Known 
fondly as „Boom‟. 
 
 
 
Civil Servants: 
 
Sir Arthur Street (1892-1951). Street became Permanent under-Secretary in the Air 
Ministry in 1939 and served in that role until 1946. 
 
 
 
 
Politicians: 
 Marquess of Londonderry (Charles Stewart) (1878-1949). Served as finance member of 
the Air Council and then Under Secretary of State from 1919-1921. He became Secretary 
Of State in 1931 and served until 1935 over the years of disarmament. 
 
Earl of Swinton Philip Cunliffe-Lister) (1884-1972). Became Secretary of State for Air 
in 1935 and oversaw the expansion of the RAF through to 1938. 
 
Viscount Templewood (Samuel Hoare) (1880-1959). Hoare was Secretary of State for 
Air from 1922 until 1929 working with Trenchard to secure the survival of the RAF and to 
boost long distance air travel. 
 
Viscount Thurso (Sir Archibald Sinclair) (1890-1970). A long and close friend of 
Churchill, Sinclair was a leading Liberal in the inter-war years. Although he refused office 
under Chamberlain he accepted the position as Secretary of State for Air in 1940 from 
Churchill. 
 
Viscount Weir (William Douglas Weir) (1877-1959).  Weir was an active advocate for 
the formation a Single Air Board in 1916 and subsequently succeeded Rothermere as 
President of the Air Council in 1918. He was an early supporter of the concept of strategic 
bombing. 
 
 
 
 
  
APPENDIX 3: LEGAL TEXTS 
 
The 1923 Convention on Aerial Warfare (p.62): 
 
Article 25. The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages or 
buildings which are undefended is prohibited. 
 
Article 26. The officer in Command of an attacking force must, before commencing 
a bombardment, except in cases of assault, do all in his power to warn the 
authorities. 
 
Article 27. In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, 
as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art science, or charitable 
purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are 
collected, provided they are not being used for military purposes. 
 
The Hague Conference and the Rules of Aerial Warfare 
 
Article 22. Aerial bombardment for the purpose of terrorizing the civilian 
population, of destroying or damaging private property not of military character, or 
of injuring non-combatants is prohibited. 
 
Article 24 went on to state that: 
 
(1) Aerial bombardment is legitimate only when directed at a military objective, 
that is to say, an object of which destruction or injury would constitute a 
distinct military advantage to the belligerent. 
(2) Such bombardment is legitimate only when directed exclusively at the 
following objectives: military forces; military works; military establishments or 
depots; factories constituting important and well-known centres engaged in the 
manufacture of arms, ammunition or distinctively military supplies; lines of 
communication or transportation used for military forces. 
(3) The bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings not in the 
immediate neighbourhood of the operations of land forces is prohibited. In 
cases where the objectives specified in paragraph 2 are so situated, that they 
cannot be bombarded without the indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian 
population, the aircraft must abstain from bombardment. 
In the immediate neighbourhood of the operations of land forces, the bombardment 
of cities, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings is legitimate provided there exists a 
reasonable presumption that the military concentration is sufficiently important to 
justify such bombardment having regard to the danger thus caused to the civilian 
population. 
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